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Summary
This thesis explores the incentive effects of transparency in two variants of a two-
player multi-task joint project. The first two chapters analyze a two-round effort
investment game where (i) task success is determined by a player’s overall con-
tribution, and (ii) transparency involves the observability of efforts at an interim
stage. In a discrete efforts model, under a general complementary production tech-
nology transparency dominates non-transparency by achieving at least as much,
and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to non-transparency,
and eliminates the inferior equilibria in multiple equilibrium situations. This ben-
efit of transparency is demonstrated both for exogenous rewards and in terms of
implementation costs (with rewards optimally chosen by a principal to induce full
cooperation). If, on the other hand, players’ efforts are substitutes, transparency
makes no difference to equilibrium efforts. With continuous efforts exhibiting
increasing marginal costs, under perfect substitution technology transparency be-
comes harmful by strictly lowering efforts.
In the third chapter, (i) task success is realized at the end of the first round,
where the second round offers a chance for an unsuccessful player to make a second
attempt, (ii) efforts are completely observable, and (iii) transparency involves the
disclosure of first-round outcomes. Significant complementarities exist between
players’ individual tasks. Disclosure, by allowing players to motivate others into
continued activities through revelation of interim progress, is beneficial if costs are
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Chapter 1
Peer Transparency in Teams:
Does it Help or Hinder
Incentives?1
1.1 Introduction
Joint projects in teams based on voluntary contributions of efforts are vulner-
able to free-riding. In formulating incentives, an organization may try to influence
its members’ effort decisions by designing the structure of contributions. In par-
ticular, the organization may be able to determine how much the members know
about each other’s efforts. This type of knowledge can be facilitated by an appro-
priate work environment, such as an open space work-floor or regular reporting of
team members’ actual working hours. We aim to show how transparency in effort
contributions within a team may (or may not) help to mitigate shirking and foster
1Based on joint work with thesis supervisor Parimal Bag.
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cooperation. Empirical evidence certainly point to the relevance of this kind of
transparency as a key determinant of productive efficiency (Teasley et al. 2002;
Heywood and Jirjahn 2004; Falk and Ichino 2006).
When efforts are observable during a project’s live phase (i.e., in a transparent
environment), team members play a repeated contribution game. On the other
hand, when efforts cannot be observed (i.e., a non-transparent environment), the
project is a simultaneous move game. The repeated contribution game expands the
players’ strategy sets relative to a simultaneous move game because later period
actions can be conditioned on the history. The additional strategies can create
new equilibria that are not available under the simultaneous move game, or remove
existing equilibria of the simultaneous move game by introducing strategies that
lead to profitable deviations. By enlarging or shrinking the equilibrium set or by
simply altering it, does observability of interim efforts induce more overall efforts
or less efforts? Which game form is better? We will show two main results.
First, if the production technology exhibits complementarity in team members’
efforts, transparency is beneficial. On the other hand, if the technology involves
substitutability in efforts, transparency is mostly neutral in its impact on individual
and collective team efforts.
In teams, repeated games and dynamic public good settings, the general issue
of transparency (i.e., observability/disclosure of actions) and its incentive impli-
cations have been studied by several other authors. See Che and Yoo (2001),
Lockwood and Thomas (2002), Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) etc. in the con-
text of dynamic/repeated games, Winter (2010), and Mohnen et al. (2008) in the
context of sequential and repeated contribution team projects, and Admati and
Perry (1991), Marx and Matthews (2000), etc. in dynamic voluntary contribution
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pure public good settings.2
This chapter is closer to the peer transparency problems of Mohnen et al. (2008)
and Winter (2010). Mohnen et al. consider a team of two workers exerting efforts
over any (or both) of two rounds, with the total output equaling the sum of efforts
by the two workers (i.e., the technology is one of perfect substitutes). The workers
are paid identical remunerations – a fixed wage plus bonus – with the latter being
a positive fraction of the team output. When each worker is averse to inequality of
efforts (relative to co-worker’s effort), allowing the contribution game to be trans-
parent by making each other’s first-round efforts observable improves the overall
contribution and output relative to when the workers cannot observe the first-
round efforts. Further, if the workers’ utility functions are modified by dropping
the inequity aversion component, then transparency makes no difference to the
equilibrium efforts (and output). Thus in their model the benefits of transparency
are realized largely due to the workers’ distaste for inequity.
In the context of a team project, Winter (2010) asks when more information
among peers about each other’s efforts (IIE or ‘internal information about effort’
measuring transparency) makes it easier for the principal to provide incentives so
that all agents exert “effort” (called the INI outcome).3 The agents can either
exert effort or shirk as a one-off effort investment decision, and each agent’s effort
choice is made at different points of time although an agent may or may not observe
2There is also a growing literature on tournaments with more recent contributions by Ger-
shkov and Perry (2009), Aoyagi (2010), etc. where the focus is on interim performance evalua-
tions (or feedbacks) as a way of incentivizing competing players to exert greater efforts. Trans-
parency in teams, as an issue, is very different from the feedback idea for two reasons: (i) because
of the public good nature of the players’ rewards, in contrast to tournaments where the reward is
of the winner-take-all variety; (ii) interim efforts do not directly translate into rewards whereas
in tournaments rewards are a function of interim performance.
3Winter (2006) analyzes the problem of incentive provision in a team where its members exert
efforts sequentially towards a joint project but does not analyze the transparency issue, whereas
Winter (2004) studies another team efforts problem where the agents move simultaneously (rather
than sequentially). On incentive design with complementarities across tasks but in a principal-
agent setting (rather than team setting), see MacDonald and Marx (2001).
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the past decisions by the earlier agents. With an acyclic binary order, k, on the
agents reflecting an IIE,4 if any two IIE s, say k1 and k2, can be compared in the
manner k1 is “richer” than k2,
5 then k1 is said to be more transparent than k2.
Then, defining a project to exhibit complementarity (substitution) if an agent’s
effort is marginally more (less) effective in improving the project’s probability of
success as the set of other agents who also exert effort expands, the paper makes
several interesting observations: (i) if a project satisfies complementarity, then it is
less costly to induce INI the more transparent the IIE ; (ii) a sequential architecture
in which each agent observes the effort decision of his immediate predecessor is the
most transparent IIE ; and (iii) if the project exhibits substitution, transparency
is no longer important, i.e., neutral, in inducing INI ; etc.
We complement and extend the analysis of Mohnen et al. (2008) and Winter
(2010), by studying a team setting with some plausible and important model
features not considered by these authors. There is a project consisting of two tasks.
Two workers work over two rounds on one task each, and in each round a worker
may choose to put in zero, one or two units of effort with total efforts over two
rounds not exceeding two units. The success or failure of the project materializes
only at the end of the second round. The project’s success probability is increasing
in the total efforts invested in each task. The project exhibits complementarity
(substitutability) if the incremental success probability due to additional efforts in
a task is increasing (decreasing) in the efforts invested in the other task. Following
successful completion of the project each worker receives a (common) reward v > 0
and receives zero if the project fails; rewards cannot be conditioned on efforts
as the latter might not be verifiable. Two alternative work environments are
4An ordering of peers in the form of i1 k i2 k...k ir indicates that peer i1 knows peer i2’s
effort, i2 knows i3’s effort, and so on.
5I.e., i k2 j would imply i k1 j but not necessarily the other way around; see the previous
footnote.
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considered: in a transparent (or open-floor) environment first-round efforts are
publicly observed by each worker before each chooses respective second-round
efforts; in a non-transparent (or closed-door) environment efforts are not observed.
Among the modeling differences, ours consider more general technologies than the
one analyzed by Mohnen et al. (general complementary/substitution technologies
vs. perfect substitution technology) but the agents’ preferences are standard util-
itarian without any concern for equity. Different from Winter (2010), we allow
for repeated efforts by the players and thus transparency in our setting not only
allows a player to influence another player’s future play through his own action
today but also by conveying how he himself might again play/respond in a future
round.6 This intertemporal coordination in players’ actions through public obser-
vation of all players’ past actions demands more extensive strategic considerations
compared to the one-off effort investment decision model of Winter. So the rela-
tionships between transparency, technologies and incentive provision need further
scrutiny.
We show the following results. Under complementary technology, with exogenous
player rewards, the transparent environment is weakly better than the non-
transparent environment (Propositions 1.2, 1.3 and Table 1.1) in the following
sense: the best Nash equilibrium efforts pair in the non-transparent environment
entailing partial or full cooperation by the players can be uniquely implemented in
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the transparent environment, by eliminating any
other inferior Nash equilibrium (or equilibria); in addition, we show that when
shirking (i.e., (0, 0)) is the unique Nash equilibrium, under certain conditions the
maximal efforts equilibrium or some form of cooperation (i.e., (2, 2) or (2, 1)) can
6In Winter (2010) the structure of IIE rules out mutual knowledge of efforts as there is a
fixed timing structure according to which the agents make their investment decisions (formally,
any binary order k reflecting IIE is acyclic).
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be achieved with transparency.7 Further, when full cooperation is induced only
under observability of efforts, it involves each worker putting in one unit of effort
in the first round followed by another unit of effort in the second round. Thus, full
cooperation might be achieved at best gradually – transparency allows workers to
make observable partial commitments in the first round and complete the project
successfully by supplying the remaining efforts in the second round (Proposition
1.2).8 These results we obtain assuming effort costs are linear. For increasing
marginal costs, similar results (weak-dominance and gradualism) obtain except
that now the uniqueness of equilibrium involving partial or full cooperation may
not be guaranteed under transparency. Based on the weak-dominance result in
Proposition 1.3 we further show that, when the principal determines the rewards
optimally , compared to non-transparency the principal can achieve weak or unique
implementation of full cooperation at no more and possibly lower overall costs in
a transparent environment (Proposition 1.4). Finally we show that if the technol-
ogy exhibits substitutability in efforts and effort costs are linear, transparency is
neutral in terms of equilibrium efforts induced (Propositions 1.5 and 1.6).9
The weak-dominance property of transparency in our setup, while similar to the
main theoretical result of Mohnen et al., is due to different underlying reasons.
First, as our results show, the workers’ inequity aversion is not necessary for ex-
plaining why organizations may favor transparency; in our setup the dominance (of
transparency) obtains mainly due to the complementary nature of the production
7In the latter case (2, 2) obtains along with (0, 0), so transparency results in a weak im-
provement; when (2, 1) obtains, it is more likely that (0, 0) will be eliminated, which is a strict
improvement.
8Besides a number of papers mentioned earlier, some of the other works on gradualism are
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), and Gale (2001).
9In Chapter 2 we show that for increasing marginal costs of effort, transparency is harmful
(i.e., induces strictly lower efforts).
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technology.10 This enriches the possibilities under which organizations may favor
a transparent work arrangement beyond the environment studied by Mohnen et
al. The contrast between complementary and substitution technologies with their
differing implications (for transparency) is similar to Winter (2010)’s result. But
unlike in Winter’s paper the players in our setting receive identical rewards, so
there is no discrimination among team members (according to one’s position in
the sequential efforts chain).
Another related point may be noted here. In a pure public good setting, Varian
(1994) made the observation that if agents contribute sequentially, rather than
simultaneously, the free-riding problem gets worse – total contribution in a se-
quential move game is never more and possibly less than in a simultaneous move
game.11 As Winter (2010) has shown, if an external authority can give discrimina-
tory rewards to the contributors of a joint project (unlike in voluntary contribution
public good models), then even though such projects exhibit public good features,
sequential game performs better than a simultaneous move game when player ef-
forts are complementary. And we show that, in joint projects, the domination
over the simultaneous move format can be extended to the repeated contributions
format. So unlike in the sequential move game of Varian, observability of contri-
butions is distinctly a positive aspect for complementary production technology.
The model is presented next. In sections 1.3 and 1.4, we derive our main results on
transparency. Section 1.5 concludes. The proofs not contained in the text appear
in Appendix A. Appendix B contains some additional results.
10Knez and Simester (2001) and Gould and Winter (2009) document the positive impact of
peer efforts due to complementarity between team members’ roles – the former is a case study
on the performance of Continental Airlines in 1995, and the latter is a panel data analysis of
the performance of baseball players. Gould and Winter also show negative peer effect when the
players are substitutes.
11Bag and Roy (2008) show that if agents contribute repeatedly to a public good and have
incomplete information about each other’s valuations, expected total contribution may be higher
relative to a simultaneous contribution game.
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1.2 The Model
A team of two identical risk-neutral members, henceforth players, engage in a
joint project involving two tasks, with one player each separately responsible for
one of the tasks. The probability of the project’s success depends on the players’
aggregate effort profile over a horizon of two rounds.
In each round, players simultaneously decide on how much effort to put in. Denote
player i’s sequence of effort choices by {eit}2t=1, i = 1, 2 and his overall effort∑2
t=1 eit by ei ∈ Ei = {0, 1, 2}. Let p(ei, ej) be the project’s success probability.
The cost to player i of performing his task is c per unit of effort, c > 0. If the
project succeeds, both players receive a common reward v > 0; otherwise, they
receive nothing. The payoff to player i (= 1, 2), given his overall effort ei and
player j’s overall effort ej (j 6= i, j = 1, 2), is:
ui(ei, ej) = p(ei, ej)v − cei. (1.1)
The efforts are irreversible: shirking by player i (ei = 0) means {eit}2t=1 = {0, 0},
partial cooperation by player i (ei = 1) means either {eit}2t=1 = {1, 0} or {eit}2t=1 =
{0, 1}, and full cooperation by player i (ei = 2) implies any of the following:
{eit}2t=1 = {2, 0}, {eit}2t=1 = {0, 2}, or {eit}2t=1 = {1, 1}. So a player can choose
full cooperation either by making a single contribution of two units of effort early
or late in the game or by contributing gradually, one unit of effort in each round.
The success probability function p(ei, ej) has the following properties:
A1. p(2, 2) = 1 and p(0, 0) > 0;
A2. Symmetry : p(ei, ej) = p(ej, ei);
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A3. Monotonicity : For given ej, p(ei, ej) is (strictly) increasing in ei; and
A4. General Complementarity : For any ej ∈ {0, 1}, p(1, e′j)−p(0, e′j) > p(1, ej)−
p(0, ej) and p(2, e
′
j)− p(1, e′j) > p(2, ej)− p(1, ej), where e′j > ej.
In other words, while the project succeeds for certain if and only if both players
exert the maximum amount of effort, there is, however, still some chance of success
if players shirk or cooperate only partially. We have specified complementarity in a
general form, requiring only that any additional effort by player i is more effective
(in terms of incremental probability of success) the more cooperative player j
is.12 This formulation admits perfectly complementary technology, p(ei, ej) =
p(ei)p(ej), where p(ei) and p(ej) are the individual tasks’ success probabilities.
Also note that symmetry and monotonicity are very natural and weak assumptions;
further, for complementary technology to be analyzed in section 3, we do not
require any further curvature restriction on the success probability function: p(., .)
can be concave or convex in each effort component (i.e., incremental probability
of success is decreasing or increasing).13
Finally, v can be interpreted in two ways – as the players’ valuation for the project,
or their compensation as set by a principal, with v being common knowledge. The
principal can condition the rewards only on the outcome and not directly on the
efforts; in fact, the principal need not necessarily observe the efforts. Since players
are identical, v1 = v2 = v. The chapter’s main insights do not depend on the
identical players assumption. Most of the analysis will be carried out assuming
12The incremental gain (in terms of probability of success) from own effort is assumed to be
strictly increasing in the other player’s effort, in order to eliminate equilibrium involving asym-
metric efforts under non-transparency. A similar assumption will be made for the substitution
technology in section 4 for consistency in modeling.
13However, in section 4 with players’ efforts acting as perfect substitutes, the success proba-
bility function will be strictly concave. See footnote 24.
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v to be exogenous. Later on v will be solved to minimize the principal’s costs of
inducing full (or partial) cooperation.
We will consider two versions of the effort investment game. In one version, players
are able to observe first-round effort choices in an interim stage before the second-
round effort choices are made, while in the other version players are unable to
observe actions taken in the first round. Observability of efforts (or the lack of
it) may be due to the principal designing a suitable work environment or because
of direct reporting. Following others studying similar environments, we term the
observable effort case transparent and the one with non-observable actions non-
transparent.
Most of our analysis will be carried out under the assumption of constant per-unit
cost of effort, as specified above. Towards the end we discuss briefly how changing
to increasing marginal costs (of effort) might alter the results.
1.3 Benefit of Transparency: Complementary Ef-
forts
Unobservable contributions. When a player is unable to observe the
amount of effort exerted by the other player before the end of the project’s active
phase, the overall efforts are determined by the Nash equilibrium (or NE ) of the




0 p(0, 0)v, p(0, 0)v p(0, 1)v, p(0, 1)v − c p(0, 2)v, p(0, 2)v − 2c
1 p(1, 0)v − c, p(1, 0)v p(1, 1)v − c, p(1, 1)v − c p(1, 2)v − c, p(1, 2)v − 2c
2 p(2, 0)v − 2c, p(2, 0)v p(2, 1)v − 2c, p(2, 1)v − c v − 2c, v − 2c
Figure 1.1: Simultaneous move game G
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Denote this one-shot game by G, any strategy profile (e1, e2) of G by eG, and a
pure-strategy NE, (e∗1, e
∗
2) of G, by e∗G.
Lemma 1.1. Suppose success probability p(., .) satisfies A1-A4. Then the game
G has no asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In view of Lemma 1.1, in the one-shot game we focus on the symmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (or equilibria):
Proposition 1.1 (One-shot Nash equilibrium). In the one-shot
game G (i.e., with unobservable contributions), the pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(or equilibria) can be characterized as follows:
Equilibrium (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (0, 0) obtains if and only if
c ≥ max{(p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v, [(p(2, 0)− p(0, 0))v]/2};
Equilibrium (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (1, 1) obtains if and only if
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v;
Equilibrium (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (2, 2) obtains if and only if
c ≤ min{(1− p(1, 2))v, [(1− p(0, 2))v]/2}.
Note that the above is a characterization result. In Appendix A we show that
there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Observable contributions. The effort investment game proceeds as fol-
lows:
Round 1 : Players simultaneously choose their efforts ei1 ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i = 1, 2.
Interim period : Players’ first-round decisions are revealed. Denote the set of
possible observed effort levels e1 = (e11, e21) by Eˆ1. Clearly,
Eˆ1 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2)} .
Round 2 : Players make their effort decisions simultaneously, having observed each
other’s first-round effort choices. Denote player i’s set of admissible second-round
effort choices by Eˆi2. Since overall effort ei cannot exceed 2,
Eˆi2 =

{0,1,2} if ei1 = 0;
{0,1} if ei1 = 1;
{0} if ei1 = 2.
(1.2)
At the end of Round 2, the project concludes. Both players receive reward v if
the project is successful. If the project fails, they both receive 0. ||
With observability, the joint project induces a repeated contribution game in which
players move simultaneously in each round. The extensive form appears in Fig.
1.2. The payoffs in each continuation game are in terms of the second-round
incremental gains relative to those yielded by the pair of observed effort levels e1
that gives rise to the continuation game. For example, suppose that both players
choose one unit of effort in the first round. This restricts the set of admissible
actions for players 1 and 2 to Eˆ12 = Eˆ22 = {0, 1}, resulting in a continuation
game with the strategy space S2 = {0, 1} × {0, 1}. (In general, the strategy space
of any continuation game is S2 = Eˆ12 × Eˆ22.) Denote player i’s interim payoff,
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i.e., payoff generated by observed effort levels e1 = (e11, e21), by uˆi1(ei1, ej1),
14
and incremental gains following second-round actions (ei2, ej2) by uˆi2(ei2, ej2|e1) =
ui(ei1 + ei2, ej1 + ej2)− uˆi1(ei1, ej1).
Therefore, player i’s payoffs in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 1) are
uˆi2(ei2, ej2|(1, 1)) =

0 if ei2 = 0, ej2 = 0;
(p(1, 2)− p(1, 1))v if ei2 = 0, ej2 = 1;
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c if ei2 = 1, ej2 = 0;
(1− p(1, 1))v − c if ei2 = 1, ej2 = 1.
Payoffs for the other continuation games are computed in the same way.
One specific continuation game is worth noting here: the game following (0, 0)
efforts in the first round. This continuation game is same as the one-shot game
G except that all the payoffs are subtracted by p(0, 0)v. For later use, we will
describe these two games as identical, given that the players’ strategic decisions
will be the same.
Denote the extensive-form game by Ĝ, and any subgame-perfect equilibrium (or


















Given the extensive-form representation in Fig. 1.2, we can evaluate how the over-
all equilibrium efforts change when efforts are made transparent. In particular,
take an equilibrium (or equilibria) that arises in the one-shot game; from Propo-
sition 1.1 we see that this equilibrium (or equilibria) results if and only if certain
conditions hold. Taking these conditions as given, we then examine the setting
14Interim payoffs are calculated assuming as if the players will exert no further effort in Round
2.
15To be precise, equilibrium second-round strategies should be more general functions of any
first-round effort decisions and not just of (e∗11, e
∗
21). Our equilibrium analysis uses the formal
definition of SPE.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Extensive-form game Ĝ
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with repeated, observable contributions, and determine which overall efforts result
(or do not result) in an SPE under these conditions.
Below we start with some preliminary results hoping to demonstrate, at the end,
how transparency can sometimes be critical to achieving full cooperation and en-
sure the project’s success.
Lemma 1.2. Assume A1-A4.
(i) If, without observability, full cooperation is not an equilibrium, then the only
way full cooperation can arise with observability is through gradual cooperation,
i.e., (1, 1; 1, 1).
(ii) If, without observability, partial cooperation is an equilibrium while full coop-
eration is not, then full cooperation cannot arise with observability.
Lemma 1.3. Assume A1-A4. Suppose, without observability, shirking is the
unique equilibrium. Then full cooperation may arise with observability and can only
be through gradual cooperation. A set of sufficient conditions that guarantee full
cooperation, and which can be consistent with shirking as the unique equilibrium
without observability, is as follows:
p(0, 2)v > v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c
p(0, 1)v − c > p(0, 2)v − 2c
and v − 2c ≥ p(0, 1)v.
 (1.3)
Moreover, if shirking is the unique equilibrium without observability and (1.3) hold,
shirking remains an equilibrium with observability.
Fig. 1.3 illustrates Lemma 1.3 for the perfectly complementary technology, p(e1, e2) =
p(e1)p(e2), where for i = 1, 2,
Chapter 1. Peer Transparency in Teams: Does it Help or Hinder Incentives? 16
p(ei) =

α if ei = 0;
β if ei = 1;
1 if ei = 2.
(1.4)
Given this specification, p(0, 2) = α, p(1, 2) = β, p(0, 1) = αβ, and p(1, 1) =
β2. The figure plots the payoffs against β and identifies the values of β such
that the payoffs satisfy conditions (1.3) for a profile of the remaining parameters,
(α = 1
5
, v = 2.4, c = 1).16 Further, e∗G = (0, 0) since for all β ∈ (0, 1), α2v >
0, αβv − c < 0, and αv − 2c < 0 (i.e., p(0, 0)v > 0, p(1, 0)v − c < 0, and
p(2, 0)v − 2c < 0). To verify uniqueness of e∗G = (0, 0), first note that (1, 1) is not
an NE since p(0, 1)v > p(1, 1)v−c (because αv > β2v−c), and (2, 2) is not an NE
because p(0, 2)v > v− 2c (follows from (1.3)), and there is no other pure strategy
equilibrium (by Lemma 1.1).











v - 2c 
βv - 2c 
αβv - c 
αv - 2c 
βv - c 








Figure 1.3: Full cooperation arising only under transparency: an example.
16The figure has been generated in Mathematica.
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, and we see that, for the given parameter values of (α, v, c), all
the conditions (i.e., (1.3) as well as uniqueness of e∗G = (0, 0)) are simultaneously






It is clear from the first and the third conditions in (1.3) above that p(0, 2)v > v−
2c > p(0, 0)v. In other words, full cooperation Pareto-dominates shirking, though
the latter prevails when there is no way to observe the ongoing contributions.
There is mutual interest in cooperating, but it is not in any player’s individual
interest to cooperate. In this setting, making efforts observable encourages full
cooperation. However, since efforts are irreversible, sinking two units of effort in
the first round is risky, as the other player can exert zero effort in both rounds,
get p(0, 0)v > v − 2c, and go unpunished. (The only way to punish him would
be for the cooperating player to move back to shirking, which is not possible.)
Therefore, while transparency induces cooperation, it can only do so using partial
commitments, i.e., gradually. The result is similar to the gradualism result of
Lockwood and Thomas (2002).
Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3, together, yield the following behavioral prediction for
one type of full cooperation equilibrium under observability:
Proposition 1.2 (Gradualism). Suppose a joint project involves two tasks
satisfying a general form of complementarity as defined in A1-A4 in section 2.
If full cooperation does not arise when transparency is lacking, then transparency
can achieve full cooperation only through gradual reciprocity. Moreover, in this
case full cooperation obtains under transparency only if under non-transparency
partial cooperation fails to realize (along with full cooperation not being an NE),
and if conditions (1.3) hold.
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Thus gradualism is one way to make transparency make a difference when, without
it, only the worst (i.e., shirking) would have realized. This may lead to a distinct
cost advantage for a principal who wants to design reward incentives to uniquely
implement full cooperation, as we will see in Proposition 1.4. Proposition 1.2 also
prompts the question whether a similar domination could be achieved but without
realizing full cooperation. Later in Table 1.1 we will verify that indeed this is pos-
sible, sometimes by achieving overall equilibrium efforts of (2, 1) in the transparent
environment while (0, 0) is the only equilibrium under non-transparency.
In Proposition 1.2 we assumed full cooperation not being an equilibrium under
non-transparency. It is possible that sometimes shirking or partial cooperation is
not an equilibrium under non-transparency. Then, a similar outcome also fails to
realize under transparency:
Lemma 1.4. (i) If (0, 0) 6= e∗G, then overall efforts of (0, 0) cannot arise in
an SPE of the extensive-form game Ĝ.
(ii) If (1, 1) 6= e∗G, then overall efforts of (1, 1) cannot arise in an SPE of the
extensive-form game Ĝ.
Finally, full cooperation being an equilibrium under non-transparency has the
following implications for the transparency regime:
Lemma 1.5. Suppose full cooperation is an NE in the one-shot game. Then:
(i) Full cooperation obtains in an SPE in the transparent environment. Specif-
ically, all strategy profiles in the extensive-form game Ĝ that correspond to
full cooperation are SPE.
(ii) Partial cooperation, i.e. (1, 1), cannot arise in an SPE of the extensive-form
game Ĝ.
Chapter 1. Peer Transparency in Teams: Does it Help or Hinder Incentives? 19
While Lemmas 1.4 and 1.5 (and other lemmas to be reported) may not offer
a very clean picture of their standalone economic implications/motivations, these
should be seen as necessary steps to develop our main results on the performance of
transparency vis-a`-vis non-transparency for implementation of better effort profiles
and the related optimal incentive costs.
We begin with the claim that by allowing players to observe each other’s efforts
during the project’s active phase, the principal would do no worse and possibly
do better. For example, if full cooperation is an equilibrium in the one-shot game
but not necessarily unique, then full cooperation must be the only equilibrium in
the extensive-form game.
Define the set of outcomes inferior to eG = (e1, e2) by
IeG = {(e˜1, e˜2) | e˜1 < e1 or e˜2 < e2} .
Note that by this definition, (2, 0) and (0, 2) are inferior to the effort pair (1, 1).
We now look at two cases: when partial cooperation is a one-shot equilibrium,
and when full cooperation is a one-shot equilibrium.
Lemma 1.6. Suppose that e∗G = (1, 1) (not necessarily unique). Then under
transparency overall efforts that entail shirking by any player cannot arise in an
SPE.
Lemma 1.7. Suppose that e∗G = (2, 2) (not necessarily unique). Then under
transparency overall efforts where any player exerts less than two units of effort
cannot arise in an SPE.
Thus, making efforts observable eliminates all outcomes inferior to the ‘best’ one-
shot equilibrium possible where ‘best’ is interpreted in terms of total team efforts.
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But still elimination does not establish superiority of transparency. We must
show that the best one-shot equilibrium, or perhaps a better effort profile, can be
supported as a pure-strategy SPE of the extensive-form game under transparency.
The following proposition achieves this objective.
Proposition 1.3 (Beneficial Transparency). Suppose a joint project
involves two complementary tasks as defined in A1-A4. Then transparency dom-
inates over non-transparency in the following sense:
Equilibrium (or equilibria) in the non-transparent environment entailing partial or
full cooperation by both players is weakly improved upon in a unique equilibrium
in the transparent environment by retaining the best equilibrium and at the same
time by eliminating all inferior effort profiles (i.e., ones in which at least one
player exerts lower effort).
Moreover, under appropriate conditions, when shirking (i.e., (0, 0)) is a unique
equilibrium under non-transparency, with transparency it is possible to achieve full
cooperation by both players.
Thus, when there are multiple one-shot equilibria, the weak dominance of trans-
parency is achieved through (i) preservation of the best one-shot equilibrium and
(ii) the elimination of all potential inferior outcomes (including inferior one-shot
equilibria). When the one-shot equilibrium is unique and involves cooperation
(partial or full), overall equilibrium efforts under transparency coincide with the
efforts under non-transparency. Finally, when shirking is the unique one-shot equi-
librium, transparency improves upon non-transparency by making full cooperation
possible (under certain conditions) through partial commitments.
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As already mentioned in the Introduction, relative to non-transparency the ex-
panded strategies under transparency has the potential to result in additional
equilibria and equally it could eliminate some one-shot equilibrium. Proposition
1.3 confirms both these predictions to be true but what is interesting is the uniform
impact of the two effects to make transparency superior in terms of effort incentives
(not only inferior outcomes are eliminated, strictly superior outcome may emerge).
For an intuition note that with complementary efforts whenever there are multiple
equilibria in the one-shot game, the equilibria can be strictly Pareto-ranked from
the players’ point of view with the equilibrium involving highest symmetric efforts
dominating the lower symmetric efforts equilibrium (or equilibria). This allows
a player to be unilaterally aggressive to play his “best” one-shot equilibrium ef-
fort in the first round under observability. The unique best response of the other
player, then, is to choose aggregate efforts over two rounds to correspond to his
best one-shot NE. Thus, any player, through an aggressive play, can eliminate all
inferior effort pairs (not just inferior NE ) from being supported in SPE. By a sim-
ilar logic, due to complementarity observability (of efforts) can generate strictly
higher efforts than is possible under non-observability. Later on we will see that
if, instead, the efforts are substitutes, transparency is either neutral or sometimes
may even be harmful.
Another aspect worth emphasizing is that, while equilibrium selection using the
criterion of Pareto domination may seem a valid reason not to worry about the
inferior equilibria (in the case of multiple equilibria under non-transparency), the
problem of miscoordination in team settings is a very reasonable concern which
gets worse as the team size becomes large. And with the introduction of slight
risk aversion on the part of the players (in our treatment players are risk neu-
tral in monetary rewards), non-transparency is likely to tilt the balance towards
Chapter 1. Peer Transparency in Teams: Does it Help or Hinder Incentives? 22
lower efforts equilibria. Transparency fully resolves this coordination problem by
eliminating the inferior equilibria.17
In Table 1.1 we provide (see detailed formal derivations in Appendix A), for a
complete breakdown of the cost parameter c in an ascending order (for any given
value of v and the project technology p(e1, e2)), the list of various equilibria un-
der the two arrangements, non-transparency and transparency.18 It demonstrates
cleanly the value of mutual observability of team members’ interim efforts.
The case of increasing marginal costs. So far our analysis has been
based on the assumption of linear effort costs. We now briefly discuss possible
modification to the main result if effort costs are convex: the cost of exerting the
second unit of effort within the same round is c+ δ, δ > 0, i.e., the marginal cost
of effort is increasing within a round.
With the change in effort costs, our previous intuition in favor of transparency
gets somewhat weakened. After all, due to increasing marginal costs players are
strongly discouraged against sinking in two units of effort within a single round.
This gives fewer options to contribute two units of effort in both the transparent
and the non-transparent environments, as the players should like to space out their
effort contributions over the two rounds. In the non-transparent environment this
lack of options is of no real consequence, because the players can shift their contri-
butions across the two rounds privately. But in the transparent environment, this
17For example, in the case where e∗G = (0, 0), e
∗
G = (1, 1), and e
∗
G 6= (2, 2), transparency allows
any player to confidently sink in one unit of effort early on regardless of whether the other player
chooses zero effort or one, because when the other player observes his move it will be in his best
interest to match it (if he has not already done so). Since this decision by any player will always
be matched by the other player, a situation where one player partially cooperates and the other
player shirks cannot arise with observability.
18In Table 1.1 and later on in Table 1.2 and for the supporting derivations for Table 1.1 in the
Appendix, we will slightly abuse the notation e∗Ĝ to refer to overall efforts pair in the two-round
game that can be supported in SPE.
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creates a perverse incentive among the players to withhold individual contributions
in the first round, thereby credibly conveying to the other player that pushing up
contribution in a later round would be unlikely (this effect is the principal reason
why transparency is potentially harmful in the substitution technology case). So
players may well end up in a bad coordination under transparency with reduced
first-round efforts and lower aggregate efforts. We show that, in our three efforts
setup, such harmful effect never arises and transparency continues to be (weakly)
better than non-transparency. The main difference, compared to the linear effort
costs case, is that we can no longer guarantee the uniqueness of the overall equi-
librium efforts in the extensive-form game. The formal analysis is developed in
Appendix B (Supplementary Materials).
Optimal rewards. So far we did not consider the question of optimal incen-
tives: what should be the minimal rewards to induce a particular pair of aggregate
efforts, with and without transparency? Table 1.1 provides an exhaustive sum-
mary of the various equilibria possible as the effort cost parameter, c, is varied.
We then construct Table 1.2 by rearranging the same information given in Table
1.1 but now in terms of the ranges of v, in decreasing order of v. It should be
clear from Table 1.2 how to determine the optimal v: for any given effort im-
plementation target, identification of the required minimal v would minimize the
implementation costs. Below we demonstrate the procedures for unique imple-
mentation of full cooperation; similar methods apply for weak implementation of
full cooperation.
Suppose the objective is to uniquely implement full cooperation under non-
transparency. From Table 1.2, we know that the ‘optimal’ reward, call it vuNT ,
is either in (a), (b), or (e) (by ‘optimal’ reward we mean the lower bound (i.e., the
infimum) of the reward, v, inducing any target efforts pair).
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Let c be a typical condition enumerated in the first column in Table 1.2, and
denote the lower bound of any set of v values defined by c, when non-empty,
by mc. Clearly, mc is equal to either the lower bound of v satisfying the main
condition or the lower bound of v satisfying the additional condition(s) (under c),
whichever is greater.
Suppose that the set of v-values defined by (b) and (e) are empty, i.e., respectively
(i) c




p(2,0)−p(1,0) ≤ cp(1,0)−p(0,0) .
Suppose (i) holds. Then it must be that c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) =
c









p(2,0)−p(1,0) , any v
that satisfies any of the conditions in Λ1 = {(f), (g), (k), (l)} (i.e., the union of
v-values defined by each of these configurations) would uniquely implement full
cooperation.19
If the set defined by (f) is non-empty (in which case it is single-valued), then
the set defined by (g) is also non-empty; moreover, any v satisfying (g) will be
strictly less than the v satisfying (f). Therefore, for unique implementation under
transparency, we can restrict to the set of v-values defined by Λ1 \ {(f)}.
Now note that mc, when it is well-defined for any c ∈ Λ1 \ {(f)}, will be strictly
less than c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) .
20 Then it must be that the least-cost reward that uniquely
implements full cooperation under transparency, call it vuT , is equal to the min{mc}
with c being the elements from Λ1 \ {(f)} for which mc’s are well-defined. By
construction vuT = min{mc} < vuNT , whenever mc is well-defined for at least one
19Configurations (b) and (e) were already excluded under non-transparency. If cp(2,0)−p(1,0) =
c
p(1,0)−p(0,0) , then (c) is empty-valued; further, v ≤ cp(2,1)−p(1,1) < cp(1,0)−p(0,0) (by applying A4
on the right-hand side of the main condition of (j)), thus configuration (j) is also empty-valued.
20It should be clear that the permissible v’s are decreasing as we move down the list of con-
figurations.
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c ∈ Λ1 \ {(f)}; otherwise, vuT = vuNT .




equality case was considered in (i)), and vuNT = m(a) =
c
p(1,0)−p(0,0) . Under trans-
parency, aside from vuNT =
c
p(1,0)−p(0,0) , any v that satisfies any of the conditions in
Λ2 = {(c), (g), (k), (l)} would uniquely implement full cooperation.21 Therefore,
by construction vuT = min{mc} < vuNT , whenever mc is well-defined for at least one
c ∈ Λ2; otherwise, vuT = vuNT .
Next, suppose that max{ c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) ,
2c
p(2,0)−p(0,0)} < cp(1,0)−p(0,0) so that the set of
v’s defined by (b) is non-empty, and c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) ≤ cp(1,0)−p(0,0) so that the set of
v’s defined by (e) is empty. Then vuNT = m(b) = max{ cp(2,0)−p(1,0) , 2cp(2,0)−p(0,0)}. By
construction vuT = min{mc} < m(b) = vuNT , whenever mc is well-defined for at least
one c ∈ {(c), (g), (k), (l)};22 otherwise, vuT = vuNT .
Finally, suppose the set of v’s defined by (e) is non-empty, i.e., c
p(1,0)−p(0,0) <
c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) . Then v
u
NT = m(e) = max{ cp(2,1)−p(1,1) , cp(1,0)−p(0,0)}. By construction
vuT = min{mc} < m(e) = vuNT , whenever mc is well-defined for at least one c ∈
{(g), (j), (k), (l)};23 otherwise, vuT = vuNT .
More generally, we can make the following observation:
Proposition 1.4 (Implementation costs). Suppose a joint project
involves two complementary tasks as defined in A1-A4. Then full cooperation
21Earlier, configurations (b) and (e) were excluded (see footnote 19). Configuration (f) is
empty-valued since cp(2,0)−p(1,0) <
c
p(1,0)−p(0,0) . Configuration (j) is also empty-valued: the
right-hand side of the main condition implies v < cp(2,0)−p(1,0) , so to be non-empty it must be
that cp(1,0)−p(0,0) <
c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) , which is impossible by hypothesis.
22Configuration (e) is already excluded under non-transparency. If cp(2,0)−p(1,0) ≤ cp(1,0)−p(0,0)
holds, then (f) is empty-valued. Configuration (j) is also empty-valued, by the same argument
as in footnote 21.
23By hypothesis, cp(1,0)−p(0,0) <
c
p(2,0)−p(1,0) , so (f) is empty-valued.
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by both players, i.e. overall efforts (2, 2), can be uniquely (or weakly) imple-
mented under transparency for a reward that is no more and possibly less than
the minimal reward needed for unique (respectively, weak) implementation under
non-transparency.
1.4 Substitution Technology: A Neutrality Re-
sult
In this section, we consider team projects with player efforts primarily as substi-
tutes. The main objective is to see whether the change from complementary to
substitution technology alters how transparency impacts on team members’ ef-
forts. We hope to convince that much of the benefits of transparency will be lost
as a result, and transparency may even prove rather unhelpful.
To formalize, let the project’s success probability, denoted by ρ(e1, e2), inherit
properties A1-A3 from the previous section and satisfy the following property:
A4′. General Substitutability : For any ej ∈ {0, 1}, ρ(1, e′j) − ρ(0, e′j) < ρ(1, ej) −
ρ(0, ej) and ρ(2, e
′
j)− ρ(1, e′j) < ρ(2, ej)− ρ(1, ej), where e′j > ej.
That is, the incremental probability of project success due to an extra unit of
effort by a player is decreasing in the other player’s effort.24 We continue to
assume linear effort costs. At the end we discuss the likely changes in results if
one assumes increasing marginal costs.
24It is easy to check that in the perfect substitution case, ρ(e1, e2) = ρ(e1 + e2), the general
substitutability property implies ρ(1)− ρ(0) > ρ(2)− ρ(1) > ρ(3)− ρ(2) > ρ(4)− ρ(3) > 0, i.e.,
ρ(e1, e2) is strictly concave separately in each player’s effort.
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Unobservable contributions. When efforts are unobservable, the in-
duced effort contribution game is essentially a simultaneous move game although





0 ρ(0, 0)v, ρ(0, 0)v ρ(0, 1)v, ρ(0, 1)v − c ρ(0, 2)v, ρ(0, 2)v − 2c
1 ρ(1, 0)v − c, ρ(1, 0)v ρ(1, 1)v − c, ρ(1, 1)v − c ρ(1, 2)v − c, ρ(1, 2)v − 2c
2 ρ(2, 0)v − 2c, ρ(2, 0)v ρ(2, 1)v − 2c, ρ(2, 1)v − c v − 2c, v − 2c
Figure 1.4: Simultaneous move game GS
Denote the NE of this game by e∗GS . In Appendix A we show that there always
exists a pure-strategy NE in GS . We also establish the following result:
Lemma 1.8. In the normal-form game GS , multiple symmetric pure strategy
Nash equilibria cannot arise. That is, any e∗GS = (e, e) must be a unique equilib-
rium.
While for complementary technology one-shot equilibrium is necessarily symmet-
ric, for substitution technology one-shot equilibrium can be asymmetric. More-
over, an asymmetric equilibrium can arise along with a symmetric one-shot equi-
librium.25
Observable contributions. When first-round efforts are observable, the
extensive form is as in Fig. 1.5. Denote the extensive-form game by ĜS , any SPE
of this game by e∗ĜS , and the continuation game following e1 = (e11, e21) in the
extensive-form game ĜS by GS (e11,e21).
25For example, suppose that v−2c > p(1, 2)v− c and v−2c = p(0, 2)v, such that e∗GS = (2, 2).
By Lemma 1.8, we know that e∗GS 6= (1, 1) and e∗GS 6= (0, 0). However, v − 2c > p(1, 2)v − c and
v − 2c = p(0, 2)v imply that, using A4′ and A2, p(0, 2)v − 2c > p(2, 1)v − c and p(0, 2)v − 2c >
p(0, 0)v. Together with the fact that v − 2c = p(0, 2)v, these conditions imply that e∗GS = (0, 2).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.5: Extensive-form game ĜS
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With player efforts as substitutes (as opposed to complementary efforts), free-
riding becomes a more serious problem under either contribution format, with
and without transparency, because one player’s slack can be more easily picked up
by another player. But then a player cannot easily free ride by simply putting in
low effort in the first round because this effort reduction can be made up for by
the same player by putting in more effort in the second round, given linear costs of
effort. So how substitutability in efforts affects the players’ overall effort incentives
under the two formats, transparency and non-transparency, is not a priori clear.
Our next result shows that unlike in the complementary technology case, when
efforts are substitutes, transparency cannot eliminate inferior efforts equilibrium
if there are multiple equilibria under non-transparency.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose a joint project involves effort substitution as defined
by A1-A3 and A4′. Any NE efforts pair (η∗1, η
∗
2) under non-transparency can be
supported as an SPE of the effort contribution game under transparency with the





The next result shows that any overall effort profile achievable under transparency
can also be replicated in the one-shot game under non-transparency:
Proposition 1.6. Suppose a joint project involves effort substitution as defined
































22, is an NE of the effort contribution game under non-transparency.
Substitutability in efforts thus takes away from transparency the distinctive ad-
vantage of ‘gradualism’ noted previously: under complementary technology some-
times full cooperation could be supported mainly by gradualism that might fail to
materialize otherwise.
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To summarize, Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 together establish, in contrast to our
findings in section 3, a form of ‘neutrality of transparency’ when player efforts are
broad substitutes in team output and effort costs are linear: observability of efforts
is neither gainful nor harmful for inducing efforts. The result further implies that
if one were to explicitly design incentives to implement full cooperation (or partial
cooperation), the optimal reward v will be identical with and without transparency.
Our neutrality result contrasts with Varian (1994), who showed that total contribu-
tion in a two-player voluntary contribution public good game under observability
of contributions is often less than (and never exceeds) the total contribution under
non-observability. Note that in Varian’s setup, due to sequential structure of con-
tributions, an early mover has the opportunity to free ride on the late mover by
committing to low contribution; in our setup, the fact that in the last round both
players get to move simultaneously, combined with the fact that marginal cost of
effort is constant, completely nullify the extra free-riding opportunity associated
with an early move and observability makes no difference. But if marginal cost of
effort is increasing, low contribution in the early round will have a commitment
value similar to Varian’s setup because to make it up in the second round will push
up the player’s effort costs at an increasing rate, making observability of efforts
harmful (from the organization’s point of view).26 We demonstrate this result in
Chapter 2 in a continuous efforts formulation of a two-player, two-round repeated
efforts joint project game, assuming the players’ efforts are substitutes.27
26A similar contrast can be found between the dynamic contribution game of Admati and
Perry (1991), which assumes sequential contributions, and the repeated contribution game of
Marx and Matthews (2000), which assumes simultaneous contributions within each round.
27The continuous efforts formulation in Chapter 2 allows comparison with the result of Mohnen
et al. (2008) who also considered continuous efforts and have shown that transparency is neutral
if the players are selfish utilitarian and the players’ marginal cost of effort is increasing. The
difference between Chapter 2 and Mohnen et al. (2008) lies in the way efforts translate into
output: in Mohnen et al. output is linear in efforts (output equalling sum of efforts) whereas in
Chapter 2 each player’s effort translates into team project’s success at a decreasing rate.
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Also as we discussed in the Introduction, our neutrality property of transparency
is similar to Winter (2010)’s result. The important difference between Winter’s
setup and ours is that a player in our model may choose non-zero efforts over mul-
tiple rounds giving rise to repeated efforts contribution game, whereas in Winter’s
analysis a player gets to exert effort (or shirk) only once so that the effort invest-
ment game is mostly sequential in nature (late movers observe the early movers’
efforts and not the other way around).28
1.5 Conclusion
Transparency is an important subject of debate in public economics and its appli-
cations in team settings. Samuelsonian formulation of public goods, in a major-
ity of models, takes substitutability of contributions in public good’s production
as a starting point, with the free-rider problem as the main challenge. Team
productions in organizations, on the other hand, may exhibit a large degree of
complementarity, while the benefits of team performance are similar to a public
good.
To see how this work adds to the literature on transparency, in Table 1.3 we
present a summary of the main features and results of our model and three related
papers. Our model has the following attributes: joint (or team) project, repeated
contribution of efforts, self-interested utilitarian contributors (whose preferences
we describe as “standard preferences”), complete information, and the two types
of production technologies – complementary and substitutes.
28In Winter’s setup, in some of the stages more than one worker may move (simultaneously)
in which case they do not observe each other’s efforts, but the late movers do observe the early
movers’ efforts.
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Table 1.3: Alternative related models of transparency
This chapter Mohnen et al. Winter[2006a] Varian
complete info. complete complete/ complete
incomplete
effort effort effort public
contr. contr. contr. good




standard inequity standard standard
preferences aversion# preferences preferences
complementary tech.; substitution; complementary; substitution;
transparency adv. transparency adv. transparency adv. transparency disadv.
substitution tech.; #change to substitution;
transparency std. pref. transparency –
neutrala ⇒ transparency neutral
neutral
a This holds for linear effort costs; for strictly convex effort costs, transparency
is harmful (see Chapter 2).
Of the papers listed in Table 3, Varian (1994) is in pure public good setting. Winter
(2010) is in a team setting (similar to ours) analyzing the architecture of informa-
tion (i.e., how different peers are positioned in the observability-of-efforts chain)
and its implications for what should be the right kind of team (function-based or
process-based) from the optimal design viewpoint. Except Mohnen et al. (2008),
all the papers listed assume standard utilitarian agents; Mohnen et al. consider
the implications when agents view an inequitable distribution of the burden of
contribution with extra aversion beyond the direct utility-of-rewards calculations.
Finally, we have implicitly assumed, by leaving the decision to make efforts trans-
parent or not to the principal, that agents can credibly commit to the information
regime that the principal has chosen. If however we allow this choice on the part
of agents to be endogenous, then it is not immediately clear that they would prefer
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transparency. For example, in duopoly games moving early (i.e., committing) may
confer benefits to a player if he is the only one to do so but is costly if the other
player commits as well (van Damme and Hurkens (1999; 2004), Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990)).29 The implications of credible commitment adds another layer of
complexity which would require more careful treatment beyond the scope of this
chapter, and is thus left to future research.
29I thank an anonymous internal reviewer for pointing this out.
Chapter 2
Harmful Transparency in Teams:
A Note
2.1 Introduction
Peer transparency in teams can induce members to exert more effort in the ab-
sence of explicit, high-powered rewards (e.g., Che and Yoo (2001)), for two main
reasons. First, a team environment is characterized by repeated interaction be-
tween workers. Second, outside supervision is complemented, and sometimes even
replaced, by peer monitoring. These factors, by creating implicit incentives, are
believed to facilitate the enforcement of cooperation within a team (Kandel and
Lazear (1992); Fehr and Schmidt (1999)).
Mohnen et al. (2008) show that peer transparency, by allowing inequity-averse
workers to observe each others’ efforts, induces more individual and collective ef-
forts. This is because when workers are averse to both advantageous and disadvan-
tageous inequality, the observability of efforts creates peer pressure: by exerting
40
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higher effort in the first round, a team member can induce the other member
to adjust his second-round effort upward using this interim information. When
this information is not available, however, then inequity-averse workers behave as
though they are selfish. Therefore, in their model inequity aversion matters only
when the environment is made transparent.
However, suppose that workers have standard preferences. Then their model pre-
dicts that observability also does not make a difference: the equilibrium outcomes
under non-transparency and transparency are identical. In this short note, we
show, in a two-round effort investment game with the same structure as in Mohnen
et al., that when workers have standard preferences transparency can be harmful :
collective and individual efforts are strictly less when workers are allowed to ob-
serve each other’s first-round efforts, relative to the non-transparent environment.
2.2 The Model
Consider a project that consists of a single task that must be completed jointly by
the players over two rounds. The probability of the project’s success is p(e), where
e = ei + ej = ei1 + ei2 + ej1 + ej2, p(·) is twice differentiable, p(0) ≥ 0, p′(e) >
0, p′′(e) < 0 for all e ∈ [0, e¯], e¯ < ∞, and p′(e¯) is small enough (in a sense to
become clear below). The project pays each player v > 0 if it succeeds and zero
if it fails. Denote player i’s cost of effort in Round t (= 1, 2), by ψ(eit), where
ψ : [0, e¯] → R+, ψ(0) = 0, ψ′(0) = 0, and ψ′(·) > 0 and ψ′′(·) ≥ 0 for all eit > 0;
further, ψ′(e¯) > p′(e¯). Given ej, player i’s utility following effort choices ei1 and
ei2 is ui(ei, ej) = p(ei + ej)v −
∑2
t=1 ψ(eit).
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2.3 The Analysis
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that ψ(·) is strictly convex. Given ej, for any ei chosen by
player i the payoff-maximizing breakdown of overall effort in the non-transparent




The proof is straightforward. Since, for any given aggregate effort ej of player j,
any (ei1, ei2) combination by player i over two rounds that add up to the same
aggregate effort ei yields the same probability of the project’s success, player i
would choose the effort combination that minimizes his overall effort costs. Since
ψ(·) is strictly convex, splitting the aggregate effort, ei, equally between the two
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satisfied). That is, in the unique one-shot equilibrium, (∗, ∗), each player chooses
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With observable efforts, players i and j engage in a two-round repeated effort
investment game. The game is solved backwards. Given the first-round efforts ei1
and ej1 and the aggregate effort ei1 + ej1 denoted as ξ1, player i’s second-round
choice of ei2, taking player j’s second-round choice ej2 as given, solves
max
ei2
p(ξ1 + ei2 + ej2)v − ψ(ei2).
The first-order conditions implicitly define the players’ reaction functions in Round
2:
p′(ξ1 + ei2 + ej2)v = ψ′(ei2) (2.2)
p′(ξ1 + ei2 + ej2)v = ψ′(ej2). (2.3)
The Nash equilibrium strategies in Round 2 obtained by solving (2.2) and (2.3)
depend on the first-round aggregate effort ξ1, and are denoted as e
∗∗
i2 (ξ1) and






How do equilibrium second-round effort choices respond to changes in ξ1? By











p′′ − ψ′′ p′′
p′′ p′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p′′ − ψ′′ p′′
p′′ p′′ − ψ′′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1Note that the solutions to (2.2) and (2.3) certainly exist for ξ1 = 0, and for ξ1 = 2
∗ there
will be no solutions. It will be shown below that in any equilibrium of the two-round game,
ξ1 + ei2 + ej2 will be strictly less than 2
∗. And we can make this last observation assuming that
(2.2) and (2.3) have interior solutions for an appropriate range of ξ1.
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= − (p
′′)2 − p′′ψ′′ − (p′′)2









That is, the players’ first- and second-round efforts (with respect to both own and










∣∣∣∣ < 12 , if ψ′′(·) > 0.
These last comparative statics show that if the first-round aggregate effort were to
decrease by one unit, in the second round the increased efforts of the two players
combined will be less than one; this is so because the marginal cost of effort
function is increasing in effort.
Agent i’s overall utility as evaluated in the first round, given first-round choices
(ei1, ej1) and that both players follow their equilibrium strategies in the continua-
tion game, is
ui = p(ei1 + ej1 + e
∗∗
i2 (ei1 + ej1) + e
∗∗
j2(ei1 + ej1))v − ψ(ei1)− ψ(e∗∗i2 (ei1 + ej1)).

















Rewriting, and using the second-round first-order condition (2.2), yields
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Denote the subgame-perfect equilibrium aggregate effort in the extensive-form
game by 2˜, where the sum of optimal first-round efforts is ˆ and the sum of












Lemma 2.2. Suppose ψ′(·) > 0. Then the equilibrium aggregate effort in the
two-round game will be different from the equilibrium aggregate effort in the one-
shot game, that is, 2˜ 6= 2∗.






j2) will be unique if ψ(.) is strictly convex; if ψ(.) is linear, the
equilibrium effort profile over the two rounds need not be unique but all such profiles will result
in a unique overall effort for each agent.
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= ψ′(ei2); the first equality follows from (2.1), and the second equality is
due to the hypothetical equilibrium split of efforts in the repeated effort game.
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, since (2.5). However, ei2 >
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Lemma 2.3. Suppose ψ′(·) > 0. Then 2˜ ≯ 2∗.
Proof. Suppose not. Then by strict concavity of p(·),










(by (2.2) and (2.1))
⇒ ˆˆ < ∗










⇒ e∗∗i2 < e∗∗i1 ,
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a violation of (2.5); a contradiction. 
Finally, suppose that when ψ(·) is linear, it takes the form ψ(eit) = ceit. Moreover,
suppose that p′(0) ≥ c. Then combining these assumptions with conditions (2.2)
and (2.3) when ψ(·) is linear, and using Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 when ψ(·) is strictly
convex, gives us the following result.
Proposition 2.1 (Harmful transparency). Suppose the project’s suc-
cess probability depends only on the combined efforts of the two players, i.e., the
production technology is one of perfect substitution.
(i) If the marginal cost of effort is constant, the equilibrium efforts under ob-
servability are the same as when efforts are not observable.
(ii) If the marginal cost of effort is increasing, observability results in lower col-
lective as well as individual efforts in equilibrium relative to the case where
efforts are not observable.
The intuition is straightforward. With repeated contributions, an early mover can
attempt to free-ride on the other player by decreasing his first-round contribution.
This action has a commitment value only with convex effort cost, because then
increasing his second-round contribution to make up for his earlier lower effort will
push up his effort cost at an increasing rate; with constant marginal cost of effort,
this increase in effort cost does not arise, thus his earlier action is not credible.
The poor performance of transparency differs from Mohnen et al. who conclude
that transparency is neutral in effect given selfish agents (whose marginal cost
of effort is increasing). The difference lies in the way efforts translate into out-
put. In their model, output equals the sum of efforts (the marginal benefit of a
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player’s effort is constant), whereas in ours the marginal benefit (in terms of the
grand project’s success) is decreasing in each player’s effort. Thus, the technology
matters.
In Chapter 1, we derived a positive result showing the (weak) dominance of trans-
parency over non-transparency in a two-period, discrete effort contribution game
with linear cost of effort and selfish agents. This benefit from transparency arises
largely because of the complementarity between workers’ efforts. However, in the
same setting, when efforts are substitutes transparency becomes neutral relative
to non-transparency. This extends the result of Mohnen et al., (namely, that when
agents are selfish and efforts are perfect substitutes, observability does not make
a difference) to the case where efforts are substitutes in the general sense. Thus
we have shown that even without extraneous assumption about agents’ prefer-
ences, the impact of transparency can vary with the production technology and





In any organization transparency of activities, progress and procedures (or the
lack of it) shape important incentives for its key members. A popular view is
that an organization should be transparent. Several contributions have already
shown why taking an unqualified stand on this subject could be wrong.2In this
chapter, we highlight a novel and confounding implication of transparency in a
team context involving players who engage in a multi-task project with significant
complementarities.
We consider a two-agent joint (or team) project with observable efforts. Each
agent’s effort influences the probability of success of the specific task assigned to
1Based on joint work with thesis supervisor Parimal Bag.
2See Angeletos and Pavan (2004), Bac (2001), Fang and Moscarini (2005), Gavazza and
Lizzeri (2007; 2009), Levy (2007a; 2007b), Mattozzi and Merlo (2007), and Prat (2005).
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him. The overall project is successful only if both tasks are successful. The agents
are allowed two attempts to complete their tasks. While a team member is able to
observe his partner’s first attempt, its outcome, i.e., whether it is successful or not,
can be credibly conveyed only by the organization (or the team manager).3,4 This
setup is not unnatural and is becoming a more acceptable description of some
work environments: (i) mutual observability of efforts can be a distinguishing
property of certain types of team works, for instance in software development
sometimes important members may be seated in a ‘war room’ or ‘dedicated project
room’, known as team collocation, to facilitate rapid progress of the tasks that are
complementary in nature;5 and (ii) although the supervisor (or the project leader)
may not always observe efforts, he will have the special expertise to determine the
state of progress of various tasks. We also consider a variant model where efforts
are not observable within the team.
An example is an R&D team project broken down into different components, all of
which must work for the composite to succeed.6 Researchers often make several at-
tempts to crack a problem. Lack of progress in the initial stages may be suppressed
to keep team morale high; also, if one component meets early success, the news,
3Given the obvious motive of encouraging partners into actions, any claim to success by a
team member is always going to be viewed with due skepticism.
4In several works, Winter (2004, 2006, 2009, 2010) analyzes team settings with complemen-
tarity between various members’ tasks and each member having only one opportunity to attempt
his task. The main focus of his papers are on the design of effort-inducing rewards/incentives
under observable as well as unobservable efforts, with the former giving rise to sequential efforts
and the latter corresponding to simultaneous efforts; the effort outcomes in his models are not
observable until at the very end. On incentive design with complementarities across tasks but
in a principal-agent setting (rather than team setting), see MacDonald and Marx (2001).
5Teasley et al. (2002) study the positive impact of collocation on team productivity. See also
Eccles et al. (2010). The environment of observable efforts (i.e., collocation) and its implications
for team incentives is the main focus of peer transparency studied in a field experiment paper
by Falk and Ichino (2006), two recent theoretical papers by Winter (2006, 2010) as cited above,
and the work of Mohnen et al. (2008).
6Projects of this nature are quite common in the industries, especially in software engineering
or in the development of any new product or technology. Academic researchers in some disciplines
carry out collaborative projects with considerable complementarities under the supervision of a
project leader who oversees project development and coordination.
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while morale-boosting, might be suppressed to prevent crucial methodological in-
formation from leaking out to competitors.7 The organization, however, cannot
make selective reports on progress, choosing only to announce “good news”, other-
wise team members can deduce the state of the project from the level of publicity,
in the sense of Milgrom (1981). Suppose that the organization aims to maximize
the probability of the project’s success. Should it always disclose its information
about the project’s up-to-date progress?8
Clearly, an agent with a failed first attempt will find the information about another
agent’s success/failure relevant. An early success by another team member can
conceivably embolden an agent to exert effort in the second stage, while failure
can discourage him. Thus, committing to a policy of disclosure may have sharply
divergent results for the manager. Concealing the information, on the other hand,
may narrow this divergence. This occurs because, absent this information on
outcomes, an agent will be left to infer the occurrence of success or failure, i.e.,
their likelihoods, from his partner’s first-period effort choice.
We are going to argue that a policy of disclosure may not always be preferred.
First, with disclosure we derive an equilibrium where both agents exert effort
in the first round, and if one fails then he exerts effort once more provided the
other agent has been successful in the first round. Next, we analyze the situation
where only first-round effort choices, but not the outcomes, are observable. We
find that if the effort cost is non-negligible but moderately low, secrecy weakly
7Even just the news of interim progress of one firm may prompt rival firms into greater
activities (as in Choi (1991) where a firm’s success in the initial stages, by conveying that the
project is feasible, is “good news” to its rival) or discourage them (as in the R&D race of Bag and
Dasgupta (1995), where early success reveals a firm to be a “high” type, thereby intimidating
weaker firms). Thus there may be other reasons, besides internal incentives, why an organization
may prefer secrecy or not.
8Sometimes the supervisor may choose to only occasionally announce the state of progress for
reasons other than strategic disclosures, time constraint being one of them. This paper assumes
away the time constraint and focuses only on strategic disclosures.
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improves on disclosure by uniquely implementing in subgame perfect equilibrium
the maximal individual and collective efforts over the two rounds (which is also
an equilibrium under disclosure along with another equilibrium involving lower
efforts). However, for higher costs disclosure may have a very different impact:
rather than chancing their luck with little efforts in the early rounds in the case of
secrecy, with disclosure the agents tend to be proactive by exerting efforts in the
early rounds so that any individual success prompts others to continue with their
efforts in the later stages. So there is a double edge to transparency of outcomes
– it can boost incentives or dampen incentives.
The confounding implications of transparency in this paper further demonstrate
the complexity of the issue. On this subject, Prat (2005) had first pointed out the
importance of distinguishing between transparency of actions and transparency
of the consequences of actions. In a principal-agent model where the agent is
motivated by career concerns, the principal benefits by committing to learn only
about the consequences of the agent’s action and not the action itself. With
the agent’s ability unknown to both the principal and the agent, if the principal
observes the agent’s action then the agent may disregard his own signal of a payoff
relevant state (from the principal’s point of view) and choose an action that a high-
ability type might be expected to select (state and outcome, along with the agent’s
ability, jointly determine the principal’s payoff), thus hindering the principal from
discerning the agent’s ability.
In a different principal-agent formulation where the principal is informed about
the agent’s productivity, Fang and Moscarini (2005) have argued that making
worker’s quality transparent through wage differentiation could either benefit or
harm the firm. Specifically, differentiated contracts convey “good news” to some
workers about their ability, which raises morale and effort, but “bad news” to
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others, which depresses morale and effort; the negative effect on output may be
large enough to justify offering the same contract to all employees. In our analysis
there is no ability parameter, only efforts matter and the issue is about strategic
disclosures of individual successes and failures.
Several other works noted in the introductory paragraph have studied the nega-
tive effects of transparency in various applications and especially in politics and
bureaucracies. Levy (2007a, 2007b) shows that in committee decisions through
voting, transparency of individual votes leads to worse decisions when those cast-
ing votes are motivated by career concerns. Mattozzi and Merlo (2007) study
the relationship between political transparency and the quality of politicians at-
tracted and show an inverse relationship, i.e., with more transparency quality
drops. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2007) have argued that when the service qualities of
different public offices are released, demands for better quality providers increase
which, in the absence of high-powered incentives, leads to crowding and rationing,
ultimately lowering the incentives of high-quality provision. Gavazza and Lizzeri
(2009) delve into several subtle and complicated issues of transparency of the po-
litical system, of government spending and revenues. The authors argue that while
transparency of government spending is beneficial, improved transparency of taxes
(i.e., revenues), through better intertemporal smoothing of the tax burden, can
paradoxically lead to more wasteful transfer spending by political parties. In a
macroeconomic application, Angeletos and Pavan (2004) analyze the welfare ef-
fects of varying levels of transparency of some payoff relevant public information in
economies with strong complementarities between (a continuum of) agents’ invest-
ments and the possibility of multiple investment equilibria; greater transparency
improves coordination of agent activities, but given that coordination can lead to
a collectively good or bad equilibrium, more transparency may be beneficial or
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harmful. Different from the above literature, Bac (2001) relates transparency of
decision making in public offices to opportunities of establishing connections with
key officials that may ultimately result in more corruption.
Finally, we would like to make a distinction between transparency in teams as
analyzed in this paper, and the idea of interim review (or feedback) in multistage
tournaments (recent contributions are Aoyagi (2010), Gershkov and Perry (2009),
and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) where interim performance evaluations are
used as a strategic device to incentivize competing players to exert greater efforts
over several rounds. In ours, the issue is not about using interim outcomes directly
as the basis for a winner-take-all reward, rather the question is whether making
first-round outcomes public would help or hinder team members’ effort incentives
and its effect on the team’s success which is a common goal for the team members.
Our work is thus closer to the team problems studied by Winter (2004, 2006, 2009,
2010).9
We now provide an outline of the model. In sections 3.3 and 3.4 we analyze the
two cases, disclosure and secrecy. Our main results comparing the two mechanisms
appear in section 3.4. Section 3.55 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix C.
3.2 The Model
A joint project consists of two tasks, with two agents (henceforth “players”) as-
signed one task each. The joint project succeeds if and only if both tasks are com-
pleted successfully. A player is given a maximum of two periods to successfully
9In Bag and Pepito (2010), we consider issues of peer transparency in teams where team
members make repeated efforts towards a joint project. There, outcomes are not observed until
at the very end of the project’s duration. It is shown that transparency of efforts during the
project’s development is beneficial when efforts are complementary in the project’s success but
neutral if the efforts are substitutes.
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complete his task; effort is discrete, costs c per unit, and is perfectly observable.
Towards the end of section 4 we discuss the implications for our analysis if efforts
are not observable.
A player’s effort influences his task’s success as follows. In Round 1, a player
decides whether to exert effort (one unit) or shirk (exert no effort). Denote player
i’s effort in the first round by ei1, and the probability that his task succeeds given
ei1 by p(ei1). Suppose that for i = 1, 2,
p(ei1) =
{
α if ei1 = 0
β if ei1 = 1
where 0 < α < β < 1.
Players choose their first-round efforts simultaneously, following which each player
observes whether his own task has been successful or not but does not observe the
outcome of the other player’s effort. The principal observes both tasks’ outcomes
and can credibly and publicly disclose his information to the players, if he wishes to
do so, before they choose their second-round efforts. Any decision to reveal or not
reveal by the principal is committed ex-ante, before the players choose first-round
efforts. Moreover, any revelation must be instantaneous.
If a player succeeds at the end of Round 1, he has done his part of the project and
no longer needs to exert any effort in Round 2. On the other hand, if he fails at
the end of Round 1, he has another opportunity to complete his task successfully.
As in Round 1, the success probability associated with player i’s second-round
effort ei2 is
p(ei2|i’s task failed in Round 1) =
{
α if ei2 = 0
β if ei2 = 1.
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Again, second-round choices are made simultaneously. At the end of Round 2, the
project concludes. If the project succeeds, both players receive a common reward
v; otherwise, they both receive 0.10
We look at two versions of this effort investment game. In one version, the principal
announces the outcomes of the players’ first-round efforts; in a second version,
first-round outcomes are not announced. We will call these cases disclosure and
secrecy, respectively.
Note that because a player always knows his own outcome, a disclosure policy
where the principal’s decision to reveal outcomes is contingent on the realized
outcome profile (i.e., reporting is selective) has no bite: given such a report, a
player can either deduce the true state after the first period (i.e., it reduces the
game to one of disclosure), or infer that he is in one of only two states (which is
none other than our secrecy environment). So in our setting, partial disclosure
policies of this sort (as analyzed in the tournament literature) can be shown to be
equivalent to one of our information environments.11
3.3 Disclosure
In this version of the game, the principal announces, before Round 2 starts, the
outcomes of the players’ first-round efforts. Denote “success” by S and “fail-
ure” by F. Further, denote the principal’s announcement by a = (a1, a2), where
10Common value is a reasonable description if the principal (or the institution organizing the
project) gives identical outcome-contingent rewards. The analysis can be easily extended to
differential rewards.
11Gershkov and Perry (2009) consider only binary revelation, disclosure or secrecy, whereas
both Aoyagi (2010) and Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011) additionally allow for partial disclosure.
Earlier Prat (2005) and Levy (2007a) considered only full disclosure or complete secrecy.
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ai ∈ {S, F}, i = 1, 2, is the outcome of player i’s first-round effort choice. The
announcements are assumed to be truthful.
We will analyze the two-round effort investment game backwards, using Markov
perfect equilibrium (or, MPE ) as the solution concept, as defined in Maskin and
Tirole (2001). Formally, strategies that depend only on the payoff-relevant “state”
of the game, rather than the entire “history”, are known as Markov strategies, al-
ternatively stationary strategies. In the disclosure game formulation with observ-
able efforts, first-round outcomes are of direct relevance to determine the payoffs
from the players’ efforts in the second round and thus called the state, whereas
first-round efforts can be considered as “bygones”, or history, unless players use
them to play history-dependent strategies (that Maskin and Tirole call “bootstrap-
ping”) in the second round;12 so a state in our application can be associated with
more than one history, and a history can lead to any of multiple states. (Later in
the secrecy game with observable efforts the history and the state will coincide,
to be defined by first-round efforts.) Any subgame perfect equilibrium (or, SPE)
in Markov strategies is called Markov perfect equilibrium. In this paper, we will
consider only pure strategy equilibrium.
We want to construct the following equilibrium:
Round 2: If both players fail in Round 1, each will choose to shirk in Round 2; if
only one player succeeds in Round 1, then the other player exerts effort in Round
2.
Round 1: Both players exert effort in the first round.
12In the introduction of their article, Maskin and Tirole point out the extensive focus on
history-independent/Markov strategies in the the applied game theory literature. Further, they
provide various justifications, including bounded rationality, for the appeal of Markov equilib-
rium.
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We call the second-round, continuation strategy by a player in the above specifi-
cation, the reinforcement strategy, and denote it by e˜i2(a), i = 1, 2.
The reinforcement strategy is one of several outcome-contingent strategies a player
may adopt in the second round.
Now start with Round 2. A player who failed in the first round needs to consider
two subgames:
• Both players failed in the first round;
• He alone failed in the first round.
(It should be clear that any two subgames with the same first-round outcomes
but different first-round actions are the same, as they present identical strategic
choices in the subgame and payoffs for any player.)
In the first subgame (call it G) both players simultaneously choose efforts with the
payoff to player i, given his effort ei2 and player j’s effort ej2, given by
ui2(ei2, ej2) = pi(ei2)pj(ej2)v − cei2, i 6= j,




0 α2v, α2v αβv, αβv − c
1 αβv − c, αβv β2v − c, β2v − c
Figure 3.1: Simultaneous-move game G
For the remainder of this section and the paper, we make the following assumption:
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Assumption 1. The parameters α, β, v and c are such that the game G has
two Nash equilibria, e∗G = (0, 0) and e
∗
G = (1, 1). That is, knowing that one’s
partner has failed in Round 1, a player (who also failed in Round 1) would shirk
if the other player shirks and would exert effort if the other player exerts effort.
Thus, in the first subgame, a player does not have a unique optimal action in
the second round. The following conditions are both necessary and sufficient for
Assumption 1 to hold:
α2v ≥ αβv − c i.e., c ≥ α(β − α)v, (3.1)
and β2v − c ≥ αβv i.e., β(β − α)v ≥ c, (3.2)
with at least one of the inequalities strict, since α < β.
Condition (3.2) implies that
(β − α)v − c > 0, i.e., βv − c > αv. (3.3)
In other words, a player would strictly prefer to work rather than shirk if, after
the first round, he has failed but he knows that his partner has succeeded. Thus
the assumption that e∗G = (1, 1) implies a unique optimal action in the second
subgame.
Thus, by Assumption 1 and the implied condition (3.3), the reinforcement strate-
gies constitute a Nash equilibrium (or, NE ) along each subgame. Importantly, in
the reinforcement strategy, we assume that if the players reach the game G then
e∗G = (0, 0) will be played although β
2v − c ≥ α2v (i.e., the payoff-dominant NE,
e∗G = (1, 1), is not chosen). By committing to shirk if the other player has failed,
both players are mutually enhancing their incentives to exert efforts in the first
Chapter 3. Double-edged Transparency in Teams 60
round. Coordinating on this inferior equilibrium in the second round thus acts as
a disciplining device, which is a standard method in the repeated/dynamic games
literature to induce cooperation.13
Let us now fold the game back to Round 1, assuming that the players will choose
the reinforcement strategy. Denote the strategy space of the simultaneous-move
game in Round 1 by Σ = {0, 1}×{0, 1}. For player 1’s payoff calculations, consider
the various continuation possibilities following any first-round strategies (e11, e21):
• a = (S, S) with probability p(e11)p(e21). Both players receive v.
• a = (S, F ) with probability p(e11)(1− p(e21)). No further action is taken by
player 1; however, he has to wait one more round (during which player 2
makes another attempt at completing his task) for his payoff to be realized.
Note that player 1’s payoff will depend on player 2’s second-round effort
choice, e22. Player 2, for his part, will choose the action that will give
him the higher payoff, given that player 1 has succeeded in his task; his
payoff from each second-round action following the outcome/announcement
a = (S, F ) is
u2((S, F ); e22) =
{
αv if e22 = 0
βv − c if e22 = 1.
By condition (3.3), following the outcome (S, F ) player 2 will choose e22 = 1
in Round 2; consequently, player 1 will receive the payoff βv.
• a = (F, S) with probability (1− p(e11))p(e21). No further action is taken by
player 2. By the same argument as in the immediately preceding case, player
1 will choose e12 = 1 in Round 2, for a payoff to player 1 of βv − c.
13Che and Yoo (2001), for instance, recognize that “the team equilibrium concept relies on
the agents’ abilities to select the worst possible (subgame-perfect) punishment.”
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• a = (F, F ) with probability (1 − p(e11))(1 − p(e21)). The game G is played.
The resulting equilibrium is e∗G = (0, 0), and player 1 receives α
2v.
So the expected payoff of player 1 in the first-round, simultaneous-move game for
each (e11, e21) ∈ Σ is
EuD11(e11, e21) = p(e11)p(e21)v + p(e11)(1− p(e21))βv + (1− p(e11))p(e21)(βv − c) +
(1− p(e11))(1− p(e21))α2v − ce11. (3.4)
Remark 3.1. Note that the payoff in (3.4) is calculated assuming that the play-
ers play some specific Nash equilibrium (or sequentially rational) strategies in the
continuation games, whether the continuation games are on- or off-the equilibrium
path. In particular, we do not write the payoffs to be contingent on first-round ac-
tions where players select different NE in the continuation game G depending on
actions. Fixing an equilibrium (or a sequentially rational strategy) in any subgame
is due to our restriction that the players play only Markov strategies.
Denote the reduced one-shot game, when there is disclosure, by GD1 . For conve-
nience, let EuD11(0, 0) = x, Eu
D
11(1, 0) = w, Eu
D
11(0, 1) = y, and Eu
D
11(1, 1) = z (by
symmetry, player 2’s expected payoffs in the reduced game are similarly defined).




0 x, x y, w
1 w, y z, z
Figure 3.2: Simultaneous-move game GD1
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Using (3.4), write
z = β2v + β(1− β)βv + (1− β)β(βv − c) + (1− β)(1− β)α2v − c,
y = αβv + α(1− β)βv + (1− α)β(βv − c) + (1− α)(1− β)α2v.
Assuming players choose the reinforcement strategies e˜i2(a), an NE in the reduced
game will involve both players exerting effort in the first round, that is, e∗GD1
= (1, 1)
(this will then constitute an MPE in the extensive-form game with disclosure) if
and only if
z ≥ y
i.e., (β − α)βv + (β − α)(1− β)βv − c ≥ (β − α)β(βv − c) + (β − α)(1− β)α2v
i.e.,
(β − α) [(2β − α2)(1− β)]
1− β(β − α) v ≥ c
i.e., (β − α)g(α, β)v ≥ c, (3.5)
where g(α, β) = (2β−α
2)(1−β)
1−β(β−α) .
Thus, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 3.1. Under the policy of disclosure, (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) will be an MPE
if and only if the cost parameter c satisfies (3.1), (3.2), and (3.5), i.e., c satisfies,
for given v, α, and β,
α(β − α)v ≤ c ≤ min{β(β − α)v, (β − α)g(α, β)v}, (3.6)
with at least one of the inequalities strict if min{β(β − α)v, (β − α)g(α, β)v} =
β(β − α)v.
Chapter 3. Double-edged Transparency in Teams 63
Example 3.1. Suppose that β = 0.7, α = 0.3, and v = 10. Then it is easy
to check that Assumption 1 is satisfied (i.e., (3.1) and (3.2) will hold) if and only
if c ∈ [1.2, 2.8], and that (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) is an MPE under disclosure if and
only if c ∈ [1.2, 2.18333] (so that (3.5) also holds) as shown in Lemma 3.1. Note
that relative to the continuation game G, inducing efforts by both players in the
first round is more difficult (the upperbound of c shrinks) as players can take a
chance by shirking early on in the play. The cost cannot be too low either as
otherwise exerting effort in the second round becomes a dominant strategy and
the reinforcement strategy will no longer be an NE in the continuation game. 
3.4 Secrecy: Better or worse?
We assume, as in the previous section, that the players’ efforts are observable. Our
main concern is about the transparency of outcomes. Also, we continue to impose
Assumption 1, so conditions (3.1) and (3.2) (and by implication (3.3)) will be
assumed to hold. Towards the end, we will relax the assumption on observability
of efforts.
When the principal commits to secrecy of outcomes, the game proceeds as follows:
Round 1. Players simultaneously choose their first-round efforts, ei1 ∈ {0, 1},
i = 1, 2. If a player succeeds in the first round, then he exerts no further
effort; if the player fails, then he proceeds to Round 2 with the information
gained during an Interim period.
Interim period. First-round efforts, e1 = (e11, e21) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
are observed by both players (Transparency of efforts, the default scenario).
Further, each player knows the outcome of his first attempt, i.e., whether he
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has succeeded or failed, but does not know the outcome of the other player’s
attempt. However, from ej1 player i can infer that player j succeeded with
probability p(ej1) and failed with probability (1− p(ej1)).
Round 2. A player again either shirks or exerts effort, and the expected contin-
uation payoffs are calculated based on his beliefs about the other player’s
success.
At the end of Round 2 the two tasks’ final outcomes determine the project’s
overall outcome and the players receive their payoffs. ‖
The game tree is presented in Fig. 3.3.
We solve this extensive-form game backwards just like in the disclosure game, but
this time the Markov restriction on strategies does not have any bite because the
history (defined by first-round efforts) and the state are one and the same thing;
first-round efforts will define the state, with outcomes not disclosed anymore.
Therefore the solution concept is SPE. Although in this game SPE and MPE are
equivalent, we prefer to use the former terminology.
Fixing Round 1 efforts at any e1 = (e11, e21), consider the continuation game for
player 2, i.e., the game he would face having failed in Round 1.
• Player 2’s payoff from second-round effort choice, e22, depends on his beliefs
about player 1’s success or failure in Round 1. Given e11, player 2’s expected
payoff from e22 = 0 is
Eu22(e22 = 0) =
{
p(e11)αv + (1− p(e11))α2v if e12 = 0
p(e11)αv + (1− p(e11))αβv if e12 = 1,
and his expected payoff from e22 = 1 is

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.3: The secrecy game
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Eu22(e22 = 1) =
{
p(e11)(βv − c) + (1− p(e11))(αβv − c) if e12 = 0
p(e11)(βv − c) + (1− p(e11))(β2v − c) if e12 = 1.
• Similarly, if player 1 fails in Round 1 and knowing that player 2 chose e21,
his expected payoff from e12 = 0 is
Eu12(e12 = 0) =
{
p(e21)αv + (1− p(e21))α2v if e22 = 0
p(e21)αv + (1− p(e21))αβv if e22 = 1,
and his expected payoff from e12 = 1 is
Eu12(e22 = 1) =
{
p(e21)(βv − c) + (1− p(e21))(αβv − c) if e22 = 0
p(e21)(βv − c) + (1− p(e21))(β2v − c) if e22 = 1.
Denote the “simultaneous-move” game that is played in the second round when
one or both players failed in the first round but are only able to observe e1, by





p(e21)αv + (1− p(e21))α2v,
p(e11)αv + (1− p(e11))α2v
p(e21)αv + (1− p(e21))αβv,
p(e11)(βv − c) + (1− p(e11))(αβv − c)
1
p(e21)(βv − c) + (1− p(e21))(αβv − c),
p(e11)(αv) + (1− p(e11))(αβv)
p(e21)(βv − c) + (1− p(e21))(β2v − c),
p(e11)(βv − c) + (1− p(e11))(β2v − c)
Figure 3.4: “Simultaneous-move game” GSe1
Remark 3.2. Under maintained assumptions, GSe1 has no asymmetric (pure
strategy) equilibrium.
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The strategy profile (1, 0) is an asymmetric equilibrium of GSe1 only if
p(e11)(αv) + (1− p(e11))(αβv) ≥ p(e11)(βv − c) + (1− p(e11))(β2v − c),
i.e., 0 ≥ p(e11)((β − α)v − c) + (1− p(e11))(β(β − α)v − c),
which contradicts conditions (3.2) and (3.3), combined. By the same argument,
the strategy profile (0, 1) cannot be an NE.
We see that asymmetric equilibria do not arise in any GSe1 . Moreover, for any
player i, if player j chooses ej1 = 1, player i is strictly better off choosing ei1 = 1
instead of ei1 = 0, applying (3.2) and (3.3) and the fact that 0 < α < β < 1. We
can therefore state the following result:
Corollary 3.1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then e∗GSe1
= (1, 1) for any e1.
This should not be surprising. Recall that, by Assumption 1, e∗G = (1, 1), so in the
case of disclosure when both players fail in Round 1 it is in the best interest of any
player to exert effort in the second round provided that the other player does the
same. With secrecy, such an incentive remains, and in fact it is sharpened, since
now he believes that his partner’s first attempt, even a perfunctory one, might
have succeeded with some probability (in which case making sure his own task is
completed by exerting effort surely pays).
Let us now turn to the first round. Denote the reduced one-shot game, when there
is secrecy, by GS1 , and a strategy profile under secrecy by eGS1 = (eS11, eS21; eS12, eS22),
where eSi2 is an unsuccessful player i’s second-round action. Denote the equilibrium
(or, SPE ) of this reduced game by e∗GS1
. Analyzing first-round choices and their
corresponding continuation games then leads to the following results.
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Lemma 3.2. Consider the game under secrecy. Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
Then:
[L2a] e∗GS1
= (1, 1; 1, 1) (i.e., both players exerting effort in the first round, followed
by any player with an unsuccessful first attempt exerting effort in the second
round, is an SPE) if and only if
c ≤ β(β − α)(2− β)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v. (3.7)
[L2b] In the continuation game GS(1,1), (1, 1) is the unique (strict) dominant strat-
egy equilibrium.14 That is, for each player, exerting effort in the second
round regardless of the other player’s second-round action (if the other player
has indeed failed in the first round) is a strict best response in GS(1,1).
In contrast to the reinforcement strategy in the disclosure case where a player
exerts effort in the second round only if the other player succeeded in the first
round, in the continuation game GS(1,1) exerting effort is a “(strictly) dominant
strategy”, i.e., any player would do strictly better to exert effort (rather than
shirk) even though his partner shirks. This is because the probability of success
of his partner’s first-round action (which was to put in effort) is large enough such
that the additional payoff from exerting effort, given that the other player has
succeeded, outweighs the loss from putting in effort when the other player has in
fact failed (recall, (0, 0) is an NE in the game G) and chooses to shirk in the second
round.15 Note that the dominance of effort over shirking in the continuation game
is possible because of secrecy.
14See Osborne (2004, Section 2.7.8) for a definition of strict equilibrium.
15The continuation game under secrecy is an imperfect information game: in the second round,
a player may be the only player choosing an effort decision and yet not know that the other player
has succeeded in the first round.
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Lemma 3.3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then under secrecy, e∗GS1 = (0, 0; 1, 1)
(i.e., both players shirking in the first round, followed by any player with an un-
successful first attempt exerting effort in the second round, is an SPE) if and only
if
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v ≤ c. (3.8)
We are ready to report one of our main results.
Proposition 3.1 (Secrecy dominates Disclosure). Suppose that, given
α, β, v and c, and α < β, the following conditions hold:
α(β − α)v ≤ c ≤ β(β − α)v (3.9)
with at least one inequality strict (which is Assumption 1), and
c <
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v. (3.10)
Then:
[P1a] Under disclosure, e∗GD1
= (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)): both players exerting effort
in the first round, followed by the reinforcement strategy, is an MPE. Also,
e∗GD1
= (1, 1; 1, 1).
[P1b] Under secrecy, the unique SPE is e∗GS1
= (1, 1; 1, 1).
Condition (3.9), which is Assumption 1, allows us to determine the equilibrium
that will be played in any continuation game (by Corollary 3.1). Given that (3.9)
holds, condition (3.10) supports the disclosure equilibria e∗GD1
= (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a))
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and e∗GD1
= (1, 1; 1, 1), as well as uniqueness of the secrecy equilibrium e∗GS1
=
(1, 1; 1, 1).
The domination result in Proposition 3.1 is in a weak sense: secrecy retains the
best equilibrium under disclosure and eliminates all worse effort pairs.16 Further
discussion of Proposition 3.1 is postponed until after Proposition 3.2. Next we
consider the possibility of disclosure dominating secrecy.
In the disclosure case, denote the subgame where player i is the only unsuccess-
ful player following the first round by Fi. Other than the reinforcement strategy
e˜i2(a) (in which player i shirks in G and exerts effort in Fi), there are three other
possible continuation strategies under disclosure for player i when he has failed
in the first round: (i) shirk in both G and Fi; (ii) exert effort in G and shirk
in Fi; and (iii) exert effort in both G and Fi. By condition (3.3) (which follows
from Assumption 1), a player would prefer to exert effort rather than shirk in Fi.
Thus (i) and (ii) cannot be part of an MPE, and the only permissible continuation
strategies for a player under disclosure are e˜i2(a) and (iii) above (call this strategy
eˆi2(a)). Players may follow asymmetric continuation strategies. Therefore, under
disclosure the possible strategy profiles in the second round are (e˜i2(a), e˜j2(a)),
(eˆi2(a), eˆj2(a)), and (e˜i2(a), eˆj2(a)). However, (e˜i2(a), eˆj2(a)) (i.e., one player fol-
lowing the reinforcement strategy while the other exerts effort irrespective of his
partner’s outcome) cannot be part of a disclosure MPE. If it were, then (1, 0)
would be an NE in the game G, which is an impossibility given that α < β, since
16Note that the commitment of players to secrecy is crucial to this result. Suppose however
that the decision to disclose outcomes is left to the players, and that they can choose not to
commit to disclosure. If they agree to make outcomes secret and a player, say player 1, succeeds
while the other fails, then player 1 will prefer to renege on the agreement and reveal his success,
otherwise player 2 will infer that player 1 had failed for sure (otherwise, why be silent?) and
not put in effort. It follows that under secrecy without commitment, choosing to remain silent
conveys bad news, thus the equilibrium e∗GD1 = (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) will not be eliminated. I
thank an anonymous internal reviewer for raising this point.
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this requires (refer to Fig. 3.1):
αβv − c ≥ α2v ⇒ α(β − α)v ≥ c
and αβv ≥ β2v − c⇒ c ≥ β(β − α)v.
Therefore, other than (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), the remaining disclosure equilibrium
candidates are:
[1] (1, 1; eˆ12(a), eˆ22(a)); [2] (1, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)); [3] (1, 0; eˆ12(a), eˆ22(a));
[4] (0, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)); [5] (0, 1; eˆ12(a), eˆ22(a)); [6] (0, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)); and
[7] (0, 0; eˆ12(a), eˆ22(a)).
Now consider the equilibrium (0, 0; 1, 1) under secrecy (which obtains under con-
dition (3.8)), and compare each of the candidate equilibria under disclosure listed
above to this strategy profile. In candidate equilibrium [7], both players shirk in
the first round, and each player, should he fail, exerts effort in the second round
irrespective of the other player’s outcome; thus this strategy profile, and (0, 0; 1, 1)
under secrecy, are the same. The strategy profiles [1], [3], and [5] are clearly su-
perior: in the continuation strategy in each of these profiles, both players exert
effort irrespective of the other player’s outcome (same as in (0, 0; 1, 1) under se-
crecy) and at least one player is being proactive by exerting effort in the earlier
round (whereas in (0, 0; 1, 1) under secrecy, both players shirk in Round 1). The
remaining strategy profiles (namely, (1, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), (0, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), and
(0, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a))) are either inferior, or do not yield an obvious comparison. We
can now make the following claim.
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Proposition 3.2 (Disclosure dominates Secrecy). Suppose that, given
α, β, v and c, and α < β, the following conditions hold:
α(β − α)v ≤ c ≤ β(β − α)v (3.11)
with at least one inequality strict (which is Assumption 1),
c >
β(β − α)(2− β)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v, (3.12)
and c < min
{
(β − α)g(α, β)v, (β − α) [(2β − α
2)(1− α)− (β − α)]
1− α(β − α) v
}
= min {(β − α)g(α, β)v, (β − α)h(α, β)v} , (3.13)
where g(α, β) is defined in section 3 and h(α, β) = [(2β−α
2)(1−α)−(β−α)]
1−α(β−α) . Then:
[P2a] (Proactive outcome) Under disclosure, e∗GD1
= (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)): both
players exerting effort in the first round, followed by the reinforcement strat-
egy, is an MPE.
[P2b] (Opportunistic play) Under secrecy, e∗GS1
= (0, 0; 1, 1).
[P2c] Under secrecy, e∗GS1
6= (1, 1; 1, 1), e∗GS1 6= (1, 1; 1, 0), e
∗
GS1
6= (1, 1; 0, 1),
e∗GS1
6= (1, 0; 1, 1), e∗GS1 6= (1, 0; 1, 0), and e
∗
GS1
6= (1, 0; 0, 1): strategy profiles
that involve at least one player exerting effort in the first round, followed by
at least one player exerting effort in the second round, cannot be SPE.
[P2d] Under disclosure, e∗GD1
6= (1, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), e∗GD1 6= (0, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)),
and e∗GD1
6= (0, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)).
Given Assumption 1 (condition (3.11)), the rest of the conditions facilitate the fol-
lowing. Condition (3.13) supports e∗GD1
= (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), and (3.12) supports
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e∗GS1
= (0, 0; 1, 1). Secrecy SPE that are superior to the disclosure equilibrium
e∗GD1
= (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) (identified in [P2c]) are eliminated, using either (3.11)
or (3.12). Finally, disclosure MPE that are inferior to e∗GS1
= (0, 0; 1, 1) (identified
in [P2d]) are eliminated, through condition (3.13).
Proposition 3.1 presents plausible scenarios where secrecy dominates disclosure,
whereas Proposition 3.2 presents the opposite possibility.17 The intuitions are as
follows. In the disclosure MPE, efforts are sustained in the first round because
of the threat of punishment (following mutual failures in the first round players
coordinate on the (0, 0) Nash equilibrium rather than (1, 1) equilibrium in the
continuation game), whereas with secrecy, any of two possibilities may happen.
First, early activity by both players (i.e., (1, 1) in the first round) may be encour-
aged although there is no implied penalty for shirking in the form of playing the
‘bad’ equilibrium in the continuation game (as in the disclosure case), mainly to
keep the other player motivated should he need to make a second attempt. If c is
moderately low, then (1, 1; 1, 1) remains the unique SPE because savings in effort
costs by shirking in the first round generally do not justify the fall in expected
benefits for a player along alternative continuation paths (first-round deviation by
a player can be followed up by more than one strategy in the second round). On
the other hand, for c large enough, a player would rather save in first-round effort
costs and take a chance with the first-round draw and put in the effort in the
last round if first round proves unsuccessful, giving rise to (0, 0; 1, 1) equilibrium.
Note that because of high c it is possible that, under secrecy, (0, 0; 0, 0) is an SPE,
17The domination in Proposition 3.1 is in the weak sense, whereas in Proposition 3.2 we can
apply only strict domination. While the secrecy equilibrium strategies, (1, 1; 1, 1), translate
naturally in the disclosure game, there is no direct comparable strategy profile in the secrecy
game corresponding to the disclosure equilibrium strategies (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)).
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which further serves to strengthen the dominance of the disclosure equilibrium
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Figure 3.5: Double-edged transparency for v = 10, β = 0.7, and α = 0.3
Example 3.2 [Double-edged Transparency]. Suppose that, as in Example
3.1 in section 3, β = 0.7, α = 0.3, and v = 10. Recall that, for these parameter
values, α(β−α)v = 1.2 and min {β(β − α)v, (β − α)g(α, β)v} = (β−α)g(α, β)v =
2.18333, so that (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) is an MPE under disclosure if and only if
c ∈ [1.2, 2.18333] (refer to Lemma 3.1).
According to the critical values for c identified in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we can
split the interval, c ∈ [1.2, 2.18333], further into three sub-intervals depending on
whether one or both of the secrecy SPE analyzed here emerges. We plot these
critical values for c against α ∈ (0, β) in Fig. 3.5.19 One can check that at α =
18Note that (1, 1; 0, 0) is not an SPE under secrecy, by Assumption 1.
19The figure is generated in Mathematica.
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0.3, (β−α)[β+α(1−β)](1−β)
1−(β−α) v = 1.58,
β(β−α)(2−β)(1−β)
1−(β−α) v = 1.82, and (β − α)h(α, β)v =
2.35 (these bounds appear in conditions (3.10), (3.12) and (3.13), respectively).
Therefore,
• secrecy dominates disclosure if c ∈ [1.2, 1.58), and
• disclosure dominates secrecy if c ∈ (1.82, 2.18333);
• If c ∈ [1.58, 1.82] (as indicated by the cross-hatched region), then under secrecy
both (1, 1; 1, 1) and (0, 0; 1, 1) are SPE.
In the intermediate range c ∈ [1.58, 1.82], the secrecy equilibrium (1, 1; 1, 1) is
better than the disclosure equilibrium (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), while the secrecy equi-
librium (0, 0; 1, 1) is worse. Thus for these intermediate c values, a clear ranking
is not possible: secrecy may either enhance or weaken players’ effort incentives.
Overall, by not disclosing outcomes helps to eliminate a player’s tendency to give
up on the project following failure in the early stage, whereas disclosure of out-
comes incentivizes players to be pro-active in exerting efforts early and be success-
ful in their own tasks so that others are encouraged to follow suit. 
Role of Assumption 1. Both players exerting effort in the first round in
our constructed equilibrium (under disclosure) is achieved when there are multiple
equilibria in the continuation game, G, but the players coordinate on the bad
equilibrium e∗G = (0, 0). Somewhat surprisingly, the case for both players exerting
effort in the first round becomes weaker if, instead, one assumes that (0, 0) is the
unique equilibrium in G. The reason is, shirking by both players being the unique
NE in G implies that the effort cost, c, must be rather high, which in turn weakens
first-round effort incentives.
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Unobservable efforts. Our analysis so far relied on the assumption of
mutual observability of efforts. What happens if efforts are not observable is a
natural question to ask.
First note that when outcomes are disclosed, information on first-round efforts is
irrelevant – all that matters to a player in Round 2, if he has not been successful in
Round 1, is the outcome of the other player’s first-round effort rather than the ef-
fort itself or his own first-round effort. Thus, as noted earlier in section 3, any two
subgames following identical outcomes but different first-round actions are identi-
cal one-shot games. So, in analyzing any particular subgame, non-observability of
efforts makes no difference: the NE efforts under observable and non-observable
efforts would coincide. Second, when viewed at the start of the game in the first
round, on the face of it observability of efforts may potentially make a difference:
if a player were to deviate in the first round by choosing a different effort level
from the one specified in a hypothetical equilibrium, then in the second round, for
any subgame to follow depending on outcomes, the players may adopt strategies
different from that specified in the posited equilibrium. However, our equilibrium
constructions (and eliminations) in the disclosure game with observable efforts
relied on players choosing the same NE (or sequentially rational strategies) in
second-round subgames irrespective of first-round actions (the Markov strategy
assumption). So, any lack of knowledge of first-round efforts isn’t going to alter
our original equilibrium construction (or elimination) arguments. Therefore, the
set of equilibrium under observable and non-observable efforts will coincide, im-
plying part [P1a] of Proposition 3.1 and parts [P2a] and [P2d] of Proposition 3.2
would extend to the case when efforts are not observable.
For the secrecy game, however, effort observability becomes more of an issue.
When team members are able to observe first-round efforts but not outcomes, they
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condition their second-round strategies on first-round efforts. So the subgames are
defined in terms of first-round efforts rather than the outcomes; the players engage
in a repeated (efforts) contribution game, earlier denoted by GS1 .
When efforts are not observable and outcomes are not disclosed, each player pri-
vately makes two attempts at his task without any information to condition his
decision on in the second round (except his own effort outcome in the first round).
Thus, the game is a simultaneous (efforts) contribution game, to be referred simply
as GS, with NE as the equilibrium definition.
In the repeated efforts game, being able to condition the second-round strategies
on first-round efforts can create new equilibria that are not available under the
simultaneous move game, or remove existing equilibria of the simultaneous move
game by introducing strategies that lead to profitable deviations. So how the
equilibrium sets in the two alternative game forms under secrecy differ is not, a
priori, clear.
A formal analysis of the simultaneous contribution game yields the following result.
Lemma 3.4. If c satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3.2, then disclosure
dominates secrecy, both with and without effort observability.
On the other hand, the dominance of secrecy over disclosure under the conditions of
Proposition 3.1 may fail when efforts are no longer observable. This is because with
unobservable efforts, (1, 1; 1, 1) may no longer be the unique secrecy equilibrium.
Lemma 3.5. If c satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3.1, then secrecy con-
tinues to dominate disclosure when efforts are not observable if and only if
c < (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v. (3.14)
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One potential downside of non-observability of efforts in the secrecy game is the
strong temptation of shirking, especially in the early stage of the game. For
instance, when players are considering to play (0, 0; 0, 0) in a hypothetical equilib-
rium, there is no way a player can deviate and exert an effort in the first round
and ensure that it would be reciprocated by the other player in the second round.
As a result, (0, 0; 0, 0) may arise in equilibrium. While this is possible for some
parameter configurations, if the effort cost is reasonably small as defined by (3.14),
secrecy may continue to dominate disclosure when efforts are not observable.
Our two main results under observable efforts can thus be extended, as follows.
Proposition 3.3 (Transparency with unobservable efforts). Suppose
that the players’ efforts are not observable. Then transparency of outcomes can
boost or weaken effort incentives under appropriate conditions:
[P3a] If c satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3.1, then secrecy continues to
dominate disclosure if and only if c < (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v.
[P3b] If c satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3.2, then disclosure continues to
dominate secrecy.
Below we demonstrate the countervailing implications of transparency, as formal-
ized in Proposition 3.3, by extending our Example 3.2.
Example 3.3. Refer to Fig. 3.5, where we illustrate double-edged transparency
with observable efforts for β = 0.7, α = 0.3, and v = 10. Using Lemma 3.1 and
the conditions in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we showed that (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) is
an MPE under disclosure if and only if c ∈ [1.2, 2.18333], and that, within this
interval,
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• secrecy dominates disclosure if c ∈ [1.2, 1.58),
• disclosure dominates secrecy if c ∈ (1.82, 2.18333); and
• if c ∈ [1.58, 1.82], an unambiguous ranking is not possible.
Note that (β−α)[α+α(1−α)]v = 2.04, so the additional constraint (3.14) is not
binding. Therefore, using Proposition 3.3, all the aforementioned results still hold
when efforts are not observable.
Next, consider α = 0.2, with the rest of the parameter values unchanged. It
is easy to check that α(β − α)v = 1 and min {β(β − α)v, (β − α)g(α, β)v} =
(β − α)g(α, β)v = 3.13846, so that (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) (refer to Lemma 3.1) is an
equilibrium under disclosure if and only if c ∈ [1, 3.13846], both when efforts are
observable and when not observable. Using Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, in particular
the conditions (3.10), (3.12) and (3.13), respectively, one can check that at α = 0.2,
(β−α)[β+α(1−β)](1−β)
1−(β−α) v = 2.28,
β(β−α)(2−β)(1−β)
1−(β−α) v = 2.73, and (β − α)h(α, β)v = 3.27.
Therefore, when efforts are observable, within the interval [1, 3.13846],
• secrecy dominates disclosure if c ∈ [1, 2.28),
• disclosure dominates secrecy if c ∈ (2.73, 3.13846); and
• if c ∈ [2.28, 2.73] then under secrecy both (1, 1; 1, 1) and (0, 0; 1, 1) are SPE, so
an unambiguous ranking is not possible.
Now let us decompose the same interval c ∈ [1, 3.13846] when efforts are not
observable. By part [P3b] of Proposition 3.3, disclosure continues to dominate
secrecy if c ∈ (2.73, 3.13846). This time, however, since (β − α)[α+ α(1− α)]v =
1.8 < 2.28, by part [P3a] of Proposition 3.3, secrecy dominates disclosure if and
only if c ∈ [1, 1.8). If c ∈ [1.8, 2.28) then under secrecy both (1, 1; 1, 1) and
(0, 0; 0, 0) are NE, and if c ∈ [2.28, 2.73] then (1, 1; 1, 1), (0, 0; 1, 1) and (0, 0; 0, 0)
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are all NE. Thus the range of c over which secrecy dominates disclosure shrinks due
to the additional constraint in (3.14), and the intermediate range with ambiguous
ranking expands from c ∈ [2.28, 2.73] to c ∈ [1.8, 2.73]. With a lower value of α,
non-observability of efforts has thrown in the additional shirking equilibrium.
We have thus shown that as α is varied, although regions of c values exhibiting
particular types of dominance may be affected (which is expected), our basic
hypothesis about the double-edged nature of transparency remains validated even
when efforts are not observable. One can provide similar illustrations for different
values of β. 
3.5 Conclusion
Often failure of important decisions is attributed to lack of transparency of pro-
cedures or relevant information. Or if one wants to avert criticisms for failures,
giving the defense of having followed a transparent procedure is not uncommon.
Much of the skepticism about transparency so far have been directed at political
applications. This paper extends the analysis to team problems. The message is a
mixed one – transparency can be good or bad depending on specific environment.
This suggests that perhaps decision makers should be left to their own discretion
on procedural matters.
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Appendix A Chapter 1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1. For various comparisons in this proof, refer to Fig. 1.1.
Suppose (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (1, 0). This implies that
p(1, 0)v − c ≥ p(0, 0)v,
and p(1, 0)v ≥ p(1, 1)v − c.
These imply, respectively, that (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v − c ≥ 0 and that (p(1, 1) −
p(1, 0))v − c ≤ 0, leading to inconsistencies given that p(1, 1)− p(1, 0) = p(1, 1)−
p(0, 1) > p(1, 0)− p(0, 0), by A2 and A4. Therefore, (1, 0) cannot be an NE, and
by symmetry, nor can (0, 1).
Suppose that (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (2, 0). Therefore,
p(2, 0)v ≥ v − 2c,
and p(2, 0)v − 2c ≥ p(0, 0)v,
yielding, respectively, (1 − p(2, 0))v − 2c ≤ 0 and (p(2, 0) − p(0, 0))v − 2c ≥ 0,
which are inconsistent given that (1− p(2, 0))v − 2c = (p(2, 2)− p(2, 0))v − 2c =
(p(2, 2)−p(0, 2))v−2c > (p(2, 0)−p(0, 0))v−2c, by A2 and A4. Therefore, (2, 0)
and (0, 2) cannot be NE.
85
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Finally, suppose that (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (2, 1). This implies that
p(2, 1)v − c ≥ v − 2c,
and p(2, 1)v − 2c ≥ p(1, 1)v − c,
yielding, respectively, (1 − p(2, 1))v − c ≤ 0 and (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v − c ≥ 0,
which are inconsistent given that (1 − p(2, 1))v − c = (p(2, 2) − p(2, 1))v − c =
(p(2, 2)− p(1, 2))v − c > (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c, by A2 and A4. Therefore, (2, 1)
and (1, 2) cannot be NE. 
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Equilibrium (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (0, 0) occurs if and only if
p(0, 0)v ≥ p(1, 0)v − c,
and p(0, 0)v ≥ p(2, 0)v − 2c,
i.e., c ≥ max{(p(1, 0)−p(0, 0))v, [(p(2, 0)−p(0, 0))v]/2}, which is satisfied for high
c values. Equilibrium (e∗1, e
∗
2) = (1, 1) occurs if and only if
p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(0, 1)v,
and p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(2, 1)v − 2c,
i.e., (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v. Finally, equilibrium (e∗1, e∗2) =
(2, 2) occurs if and only if
v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c,
and v − 2c ≥ p(0, 2)v,
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i.e., c ≤ min{(1 − p(1, 2))v, [(1 − p(0, 2))v]/2}, which is clearly satisfied for low
values of c. 
Existence of pure strategy NE in G. The one-shot game, G, has at
least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that e∗G 6= (0, 0). Then (refer to Fig. 1.1) p(0, 0)v < max{p(1, 0)v−
c, p(2, 0)v − 2c}. If max{p(1, 0)v − c, p(2, 0)v − 2c} = p(1, 0)v − c, then
p(1, 0)v − c ≥ p(2, 0)v − 2c, i.e., c ≥ (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v,
and p(1, 0)v − c > p(0, 0)v, i.e., (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v > c,
from which we can infer, using A4, that
(p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v > (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v > (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v > c ≥ (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v.
(15)
Now if c ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v, then using (15) write
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v > c ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v,
and we conclude that e∗G = (1, 1), by Proposition 1.1. On the other hand, if
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v > c, then by A4,
(1− p(1, 2))v > c. (16)
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From (15), we know that p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v > c, hence
(1− p(1, 2))v + (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v > 2c, i.e., [(1− p(0, 2))v]/2 > c,
which, together with (16), implies that e∗G = (2, 2), by Proposition 1.1.
If max{p(1, 0)v − c, p(2, 0)v − 2c} = p(2, 0)v − 2c, then
p(2, 0)v − 2c ≥ p(1, 0)v − c, i.e., (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v ≥ c,
i.e., (1− p(1, 2))v > c (by A4);






> c (by A4).
Therefore, c < min{(1− p(1, 2))v, [(1− p(0, 2))v]/2}, and e∗G = (2, 2), by Proposi-
tion 1.1.
Otherwise, e∗G = (0, 0). Therefore, G has at least one pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium. 
Proof of Lemma 1.2. (i) First we claim that full cooperation cannot be
achieved in the extensive-form game through (0, 0; 2, 2) or (2, 2; 0, 0). The first
case implies that (2, 2) is an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (0, 0),
contradicting our hypothesis that (2, 2) 6= e∗G (recall, the continuation game follow-
ing e1 = (0, 0) is simply G). The second case cannot be supported in equilibrium
as any player i would have an incentive to deviate from ei1 = 2 to either ei1 = 1
or ei1 = 0, because full cooperation is not an equilibrium in the one-shot game:
in the extensive form i can deviate the same way as he would have done in the
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one-shot game, first by deviating in the first round (as in the one-shot game) and
then putting in zero effort in the second round.
Next consider full cooperation of the form (2, 1; 0, 1) or (1, 2; 1, 0) and each player
collecting a payoff of v− 2c overall. Since (2, 2) 6= e∗G, at least one of the following
must hold (see Fig. 1.1):
p(0, 2)v > v − 2c, (17)
p(1, 2)v − c > v − 2c. (18)
But then the player who is considering to cooperate gradually in the extensive-
form game (say, player 1) can either shirk in both rounds and obtain an overall
payoff p(0, 2)v that exceeds v − 2c, or partially cooperate in the first round and
shirk in the second round to receive p(1, 2)v − c that exceeds v − 2c; one of these
profitable deviations must be possible, by (17) and (18). Thus, neither (2, 1; 0, 1)
nor (1, 2; 1, 0) can be sustained as SPE.
Then consider (0, 1; 2, 1) (or similarly (1, 0; 1, 2)) as an equilibrium possibility. It
is easy to see that there is a profitable deviation for player 1 in the second round,
given that one of (17) and (18) must be true.
The above eliminations leave us with gradual cooperation, i.e. (1, 1; 1, 1), as the
only equilibrium possibility.
(ii) Since e∗G = (1, 1), by Proposition 1.1,
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v. (19)
Independently, since by hypothesis (2, 2) 6= e∗G, applying part (i) of this lemma
we conclude that the only way full cooperation can arise with observability is
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through (1, 1; 1, 1). But to generate (e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) = (1, 1), it must be that
(1− p(1, 1))v − c ≥ (p(1, 2)− p(1, 1))v (see Fig. 1.2), i.e.,
v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c.
Further, since (2, 2) 6= e∗G, either (17) or (18) must apply. Condition (17) and
v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c (an implication of gradualism) imply that
(p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v < c,
which contradicts the right-hand side (weak) inequality in condition (19) (since
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1)) < (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2)), by A4). On the other hand, condition (18)
directly contradicts v− 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v− c (established above). Thus, gradualism is
also ruled out as an equilibrium possibility. So full cooperation cannot arise with
observability. 
Proof of Lemma 1.3. Given that shirking is the unique equilibrium without
observability, by Lemma 1.2 the only way full cooperation can arise with observ-
ability is via gradualism, i.e., through the sequence of efforts (1, 1; 1, 1). Below we
verify compatibility of gradual cooperation with shirking being the unique equi-
librium, under the stated sufficient conditions. The sufficient conditions will be
verified to be non-empty.
Recalling the first of the triple conditions in (1.3),
p(0, 2)v > v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c, (20)
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we can further write
(1− p(1, 2))v ≥ c > (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v. (21)
Also write the left-hand side inequality of (20) separately as
(1− p(0, 2))v − 2c < 0. (22)
We now claim that condition (20) (equivalently, conditions (20) and (21) together)
implies that e∗G = (0, 0) and it is a unique equilibrium.
By Proposition 1.1, e∗G = (0, 0) if and only if c ≥ max{(p(1, 0)−p(0, 0))v, [(p(2, 0)−
p(0, 0))v]/2}. The right-hand side inequality of (21) and A4 imply that c >
(p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v, and (22) and A4 imply that
[(p(2, 0)− p(0, 0))v]/2 < c, (23)
so e∗G = (0, 0).
Next, recall that (1, 1) is an NE in the one-shot game if and only if
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v
(by Proposition 1.1). The right-hand side (weak) inequality above implies that
c < (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v (by A4). But from (21) (which derives from (20)), we
know that c > (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v. Therefore e∗G 6= (1, 1).
Finally, (22) implies that e∗G 6= (2, 2) (by Proposition 1.1). Thus, e∗G = (0, 0) is
unique.
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Let us next consider how gradual cooperation can be supported as an equilibrium
under observability.




22(1, 1)) = (1, 1) if and
only if v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c (see Fig. 1.2), which is guaranteed by the right-hand
(weak) inequality in condition (20). Now going back to the start of the extensive-
form game and considering the strategy profile (1, 1; 1, 1), the overall payoff to
each player is
ui(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c.
Suppose now player 1 contemplates deviation in Round 1 to e11 = 2 while player 2
continues to choose e21 = 1. Since v−2c ≥ p(2, 1)v−c (using right-hand inequality
in (20) and A2), in Round 2 player 2 can choose either e22 = 0 or e22 = 1 (see
Fig. 1.2), neither of which results in a profitable deviation for player 1, since
u1(2, 1; 0, 0) = p(2, 1)v − 2c,
and u1(2, 1; 0, 1) = v − 2c.
Next we rule out a possible deviation by player 1 in Round 1 to e11 = 0 (refer to
Fig. 1.2) by identifying sufficient conditions. In the continuation game following
e1 = (0, 1), we show that (e12, e22) = (0, 0) is an NE if the following condition
holds (along with (20), i.e., (21) and (22)):
p(0, 1)v − c > p(0, 2)v − 2c. (24)
(Recall, this is the second of the triple conditions in (1.3) specified in the lemma
statement.) This condition implies that c > (p(0, 2) − p(0, 1))v, which is not
inconsistent with (21) and (22). Therefore, condition (24) is not inconsistent with
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the fact that the unique one-shot equilibrium is e∗G = (0, 0).
In addition to (24), suppose that the following condition applies (the last of the
triple conditions under (1.3)):
v − 2c ≥ p(0, 1)v. (25)
Note that this condition is also not inconsistent with the fact that e∗G = (0, 0) is
unique, since it merely implies that (1−p(0, 1))v−2c ≥ 0 and c ≤ 1−p(0,1)
2
v, which
do not necessarily contradict (21) and (22) holding together.
We can now show that if (20), (24), and(25) (i.e., (21), (22), (24) and (25)) hold,
then player 1 does not gain by unilaterally deviating to e11 = 0. From condition
(21), we see that (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v − c < 0, which in turn implies that
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c < 0,
using A4. Also, from condition (22) and using A4, we conclude that
(p(2, 1)− p(0, 1))v − 2c < 0.
Given these last two derived inequalities and using conditions (21) and (22) di-
rectly, it can be checked using Fig. 1.2 that in the continuation game following
e1 = (0, 1), e12 = 0 is the (strict) dominant strategy for player 1. Given that player
1 chooses e12 = 0, then from condition (24), player 2’s (unique) best response is
e22 = 0, generating an overall payoff to player 1 of
u1(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v,
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which, by condition (25), is not a gainful deviation. Therefore, there is no incentive
for player 1 to engage in a unilateral first-round deviation from e11 = 1.
By symmetric arguments as above, for the specified conditions, in Round 1 player
2 will not deviate from e21 = 1 either. Therefore, when shirking is the unique
equilibrium in the one-shot game, full cooperation (only in the form of gradual
cooperation) can be supported as an SPE if conditions (20), (24) and (25) hold.
Fig. 1.3 shows an example of parameter constellations satisfying these sufficient
conditions.
However, under these conditions, shirking remains an SPE. To see this, first note
that shirking in the extensive form implies e∗Ĝ = (0, 0; 0, 0), from which any player
i, say player 1, receives
u1(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v.
Suppose he deviates by choosing e11 = 1. From (21) and (22) (which follow from
(20)) and A4, and from (24), we see that (e12, e22) = (0, 0) is an NE following
(1, 0); moreover, from (20), it is clear that player 2 chooses e22 = 0 following player
1’s first-round deviation to e11 = 2. These deviations yield to player 1, respectively,
the payoffs u1(1, 0; 0, 0) = p(1, 0)v − c and u1(2, 0; 0, 0) = p(2, 0)v − 2c, both of
which are no better than u1(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v, by condition (24). 
Proof of Lemma 1.4. (i) Shirking in the extensive form implies e∗Ĝ = (0, 0; 0, 0).
But if (0, 0) 6= e∗G, then (e∗12(0, 0), e∗22(0, 0)) 6= (0, 0), since the continuation game
following e1 = (0, 0) is simply G; a contradiction.
(ii) When effort is observable, four strategy profiles entail partial cooperation:
(0, 0; 1, 1), (1, 0; 0, 1), (0, 1; 1, 0) or (1, 1; 0, 0). We immediately rule out e∗Ĝ =
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(0, 0; 1, 1): the continuation game following e1 = (0, 0) is simply G, and since
(1, 1) 6= e∗G, therefore (e∗12(0, 0), e∗22(0, 0)) 6= (1, 1).
We next rule out e∗Ĝ = (1, 0; 0, 1). The fact that (1, 1) 6= e∗G implies that at least
one of the following two conditions must hold:
p(1, 1)v − c < p(1, 0)v, (26)
p(1, 1)v − c < p(1, 2)v − 2c. (27)
The first inequality implies that (p(1, 1) − p(1, 0))v − c < 0. If, following e1 =
(1, 0), player 1 chooses e12 = 0, player 2 would benefit by deviating to e22 = 0
from e22 = 1 (see Fig. 1.2); hence (1, 0; 0, 1) cannot be an equilibrium. The
second inequality implies that p(1, 1)v− c− p(1, 0)v < p(1, 2)v− 2c− p(1, 0)v, i.e.,
(p(1, 1)−p(1, 0))v− c < (p(1, 2)−p(1, 0))v−2c, which means in the second round
player 2 does better by deviating to e22 = 2; so once again (1, 0; 0, 1) cannot be an
SPE. By symmetry, (0, 1; 1, 0) is also ruled out to be an SPE.
Finally, consider (1, 1; 0, 0). Since (1, 1) 6= e∗G, either (26) or (27) must hold. If (27)
holds, then following e1 = (1, 1) player 2 would deviate in Round 2 by choosing
e22 = 1 as player 1 continues to choose e12 = 0 (see Fig. 1.2). This implies that
(1, 1; 0, 0) is not an SPE. Suppose now that (27) fails so that
p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(1, 2)v − 2c. (28)
Then it must be that (26) holds, hence,
p(1, 0)v > p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(1, 2)v − 2c. (29)
We claim that player 1 would deviate in Round 1 to e11 = 0, given that player
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22(0, 1)) = (0, 0) as an NE
in the continuation game. For this to happen, the following conditions must hold
(see Fig. 1.2):
Player 1’s best-response : 0 ≥ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c, (30)
0 ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(0, 1))v − 2c; (31)
Player 2’s best-response : 0 ≥ (p(0, 2)− p(0, 1))v − c. (32)
Conditions (30) and (31) are guaranteed by (29) and A2. To see that (32) is
satisfied, rewrite (28):
0 ≥ (p(1, 2)− p(1, 1))v − c
i.e., 0 > (p(0, 2)− p(0, 1))v − c, by A4.
So, in the NE, (e∗12(0, 1), e
∗
22(0, 1)) = (0, 0), following player 1’s deviation in Round
1, player 1 receives an overall payoff in the two rounds combined,
u1(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v,
which, by (29) and A2, exceeds player 1’s overall payoff in the originally posited
strategy profile:
u1(1, 1; 0, 0) = p(1, 1)v − c.
Hence player 1 would deviate in Round 1 as claimed and (1, 1; 0, 0) cannot be an
SPE. This completes the proof that, under transparency, overall efforts of (1, 1)
cannot be supported in equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 1.5. (i) If e∗G = (2, 2), then for every e1 = (e11, e21) ∈ Eˆ1, the
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second-round strategy profile (2− e11, 2− e21) is an NE in the continuation game,
denoted by (e∗12(e1), e
∗










22(e1)) = v − 2c for i = 1, 2.
Therefore, for each of these strategy profiles, there exists no profitable first-round
deviation for any player i, since the payoffs to the deviating player is the same as
what he would get by not deviating. Thus, full cooperation is an SPE.
(ii) Corresponding to overall efforts (1, 1), the strategy profile in the extensive
form is one of the following: (0, 0; 1, 1), (1, 1; 0, 0), (1, 0; 0, 1), (0, 1; 1, 0). Each of
these profiles yields player 1 a payoff of p(1, 1)v− c, and since v−2c ≥ p(1, 2)v− c
(recall, e∗G = (2, 2)) it follows, using A3, that v − 2c > p(1, 1)v − c. It is now
easy to see that none of the strategy profiles will be SPE : given a first-round
deviation by player 1 to e11 = 2, in Round 2 player 2 choosing an effort such that
overall efforts are (2, 2) is an NE. This would result in a payoff of v− 2c to player
1, which exceeds his payoff p(1, 1)v − c in the posited equilibrium. Thus, under
transparency, overall efforts of (1, 1) cannot be supported in equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 1.6. Let e∗G = (1, 1), and by definition
I(1,1) = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2)} .
By Proposition 1.1,
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c ≥ 0 (33)
and (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c. (34)
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Fix any (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ I(1,1) \ (0, 0). By Lemma 1.1, such (e˜1, e˜2) cannot be an SPE
with the strategy profile (0, 0; e˜1, e˜2). This is so because the continuation game
following e1 = (0, 0) is strategically equivalent to the one-shot game G.
Consider elimination of overall efforts (1, 0). Since (0, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE,
what remains to be shown is that (1, 0; 0, 0) is not subgame-perfect. Player 1’s
payoff u1(1, 0; 0, 0) = p(1, 0)v − c; but then player 1 can deviate in Round 1 to
e11 = 0 while player 2 chooses e21 = 0, and with (1, 1) being an NE in the
continuation game (because e∗G = (1, 1)) player 1 will receive an overall payoff of
u1(0, 0; 1, 1) = p(1, 1)v−c. Thus, player 1 would benefit (p(1, 1)v−c > p(1, 0)v−c,
by (33) and A3), ruling out (1, 0; 0, 0) as an SPE. So, under transparency, overall
efforts of (1, 0), and by symmetry (0, 1), cannot be supported in equilibrium.
Next consider overall efforts (2, 0). We know that (0, 0; 2, 0) cannot be an SPE.
Consider then the strategies (2, 0; 0, 0). By (33) and invoking A2 and A4, (p(2, 1)−
p(2, 0))v − c > 0, so following (2, 0) player 2 will gain by choosing e22 = 1 over




22(2, 0)) 6= (0, 0), hence (2, 0; 0, 0)
is not an SPE. Finally, consider (1, 0; 1, 0). By (34) and invoking A4, (p(2, 0) −
p(1, 0))v−c < 0: if player 2 chooses e22 = 0, player 1 would choose e12 = 0 instead
of e12 = 1, so (1, 0) cannot be an NE following (1, 0); this rules out (1, 0; 1, 0) as
an SPE. Thus, overall efforts (2, 0), and by symmetry (0, 2), cannot be supported
in equilibrium.
Finally, consider overall efforts (0, 0). There are two subcases to be considered.
If e∗G 6= (0, 0), then by Lemma 1.4 overall efforts of (0, 0) cannot arise in equilibrium
of Ĝ.
Alternatively suppose e∗G = (0, 0), in addition to e
∗
G = (1, 1). We claim that here
too overall efforts of (0, 0) cannot be supported in equilibrium of Ĝ. To see this,
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note that by (33) and (34) and invoking A2, we can conclude that (0, 1) is an NE
in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 0) (see Fig. 1.2). Moreover, using (33)
directly and invoking A3, we see that
u1(1, 0; 0, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(0, 1)v > p(0, 0)v = u1(0, 0; 0, 0).
This shows that first-round efforts (0, 0) cannot be supported as part of an equi-
librium in the extensive-form game, since player 1 (in fact, any player) would have
an incentive to undertake a first-round unilateral deviation by choosing e11 = 1
which will be followed up in Round 2 by (0, 1) as an NE. Therefore, once again
overall efforts, (0, 0), cannot be supported in equilibrium of Ĝ.
This completes the proof that overall efforts in I(1,1) cannot be supported in SPE.

Proof of Lemma 1.7. Let e∗G = (2, 2), and by definition
I(2,2) = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2), (1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 1)} .
By Proposition 1.1,
(1− p(1, 2))v − c ≥ 0 (35)
and(1− p(0, 2))v − 2c ≥ 0. (36)
Fix any (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ I(2,2) \ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}. By Lemma 1.1, such (e˜1, e˜2) cannot be
supported in an SPE with the strategy profile (0, 0; e˜1, e˜2); the continuation game
following e1 = (0, 0) is strategically equivalent to the one-shot game G. Note that,
by construction e˜1 6= e˜2.
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Consider elimination of overall efforts (1, 0). Since (0, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE,
what remains to be shown is that (1, 0; 0, 0) is not subgame-perfect. Player 1’s
payoff u1(1, 0; 0, 0) = p(1, 0)v − c; but then player 1 can deviate in Round 1 to
e11 = 0 while player 2 chooses e21 = 0, and with (2, 2) being an NE in the
continuation game (because e∗G = (2, 2)) player 1 will receive an overall payoff of
u1(0, 0; 2, 2) = v − 2c. This makes player 1 better off since
u1(0, 0; 2, 2) = v − 2c ≥︸︷︷︸
by (35)
p(1, 2)v − c >︸︷︷︸
by A3
p(1, 0)v − c = u1(1, 0; 0, 0).
Therefore, overall efforts (1, 0), and by symmetry (0, 1), cannot be supported in
SPE.
Consider overall efforts (2, 0). Aside from (0, 0; 2, 0), which we already argued
cannot be an SPE, these efforts can also arise via the strategy profiles (2, 0; 0, 0)
and (1, 0; 1, 0). First consider (2, 0; 0, 0) in which player 1 receives p(2, 0)v−2c. But
then player 1 can deviate in Round 1 to e11 = 0, following which (e12, e22) = (2, 2)
is an NE in the continuation game (since e∗G = (2, 2)) and player 1 receives a
higher payoff, u1(0, 0; 2, 2) = v − 2c. Hence (2, 0; 0, 0) is not an SPE.
Consider next the strategy profile (1, 0; 1, 0). Again, similar to the case just ana-
lyzed, player 1 can deviate in Round 1 to e11 = 0, following which (e12, e22) = (2, 2)
realizes and player 1 is strictly better off compared to his payoff of u1(1, 0; 1, 0) =
p(2, 0)v − 2c. Hence (1, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE.
Thus, overall efforts (2, 0), and by symmetry (0, 2), cannot be supported in SPE.
Consider overall efforts (1, 1). By Lemma 1.5(ii), overall efforts (1, 1) cannot be
supported in an SPE.
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Consider overall efforts (2, 1). The strategy profiles that yield these overall efforts
are (2, 1; 0, 0), (2, 0; 0, 1), (1, 1; 1, 0), (1, 0; 1, 1), (0, 1; 2, 0), and (0, 0; 2, 1). Note
that in each of these profiles player 1 receives a payoff of p(2, 1)v − 2c. First, it
has already been established at the beginning that the strategy profile (0, 0; 2, 1)
cannot be an SPE. Next, examine the strategy profiles (2, 1; 0, 0) and (2, 0; 0, 1).
Neither of these strategy profiles will be an SPE : given a first-round deviation
by player 1 to e11 = 1 in either strategy profile, (e12, e22) = (1, 2 − e21) is an
NE in the continuation game that follows (since e∗G = (2, 2)), which results in a
payoff of u1(1, 1; 1, 1) = u1(1, 0; 1, 2) = v − 2c ≥ p(2, 1)v − c > p(2, 1)v − 2c (the
first inequality follows from (35) and applying A2). Now consider the strategy
profile (1, 1; 1, 0). For (1, 0) to be an NE following e1 = (1, 1), and given that
e∗G = (2, 2) (in particular, note condition (35) and property A2), the following
conditions must hold (see Fig. 1.2):
Player 1’s best-response : 0 ≤ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c (37)
Player 2’s best-response : (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v = (1− p(1, 1))v − c
i.e., 0 = (1− p(2, 1))v − c. (38)
However, these conditions are inconsistent, given A4 and A2. Therefore,
(e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) 6= (1, 0), and (1, 1; 1, 0) is not an SPE. Moreover, note that
conditions (37) and (38) must also hold for (2, 0) to be an NE following e1 = (0, 1)
and for (1, 1) to be an NE following e1 = (1, 0). Since these conditions are in-
consistent, then (e∗12(0, 1), e
∗
22(0, 1)) 6= (2, 0) and (e∗12(1, 0), e∗22(1, 0)) 6= (1, 1), and
the strategy profiles (0, 1; 2, 0) and (1, 0; 1, 1) are not SPE. Therefore, none of the
strategy profiles yielding overall efforts (2, 1) can be SPE.
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What is left now is to show that overall efforts of (0, 0) cannot be supported in an
SPE. There are three subcases to be considered.
First consider the subcase where e∗G 6= (0, 0). By Lemma 1.4(i), overall efforts
(0, 0) cannot arise in an SPE.
Next, suppose e∗G = (2, 2), e
∗
G = (0, 0), and e
∗
G 6= (1, 1). While (0, 0) is clearly an
NE in the continuation game following e1 = (0, 0), (0, 0; 0, 0) cannot be sustained
as an equilibrium in the overall game since a first-round unilateral deviation to
e11 = 2 by player 1 is gainful:
u1(2, 0; 0, 2) = v − 2c ≥︸︷︷︸
by (36)
p(0, 2)v > p(0, 0)v = u1(0, 0; 0, 0),
thus ruling out overall efforts of (0, 0) in an equilibrium of Ĝ.
Finally, consider the subcase where all symmetric equilibria arise in the one-shot
game. By Lemma 1.6, overall efforts of (0, 0) cannot be supported in an equilibrium
of Ĝ. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3. We divide the proof into three parts.
[1] First suppose that e∗G = (1, 1) but e
∗
G 6= (2, 2); this equilibrium may be unique
or there could be another equilibrium e∗G = (0, 0). Then, we show that the overall
efforts (1, 1) can be supported as an SPE in the extensive-form game; moreover,
the equilibrium (in terms of overall efforts) will be unique.
By Proposition 1.1, e∗G = (1, 1) if and only if
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v. (39)
Appendix A. Ch.1 Proofs 103
Consider the strategy profile (1, 0; 0, 1). By condition (39), we know that (0, 1) is
an NE in the continuation game following first-round efforts (1, 0).
Suppose that player 1 unilaterally deviates in Round 1 to e11 = 0. Since
e∗G = (1, 1), and the continuation game following e1 = (0, 0) is simply G, then
(e∗12(0, 0), e
∗
22(0, 0)) = (1, 1). This yields payoffs of p(1, 1)v − c to player 1, the
same as his payoffs before the deviation. Therefore, deviation to e11 = 0 is not
gainful for player 1.
Moreover, since e∗G 6= (2, 2), we know that if player 1 deviates unilaterally in Round
1 by choosing e11 = 2, then player 2 will not choose e22 = 2. Specifically, player
2 will choose e22 = 1: the right-hand side (weak) inequality in (39) implies that
(p(2, 1) − p(2, 0))v − c > 0, by A2 and A4. Consequently, this deviation is not
gainful for player 1 since, by (39),
u1(2, 0; 0, 1) = p(2, 1)v − 2c ≤ p(1, 1)v − c = u1(1, 0; 0, 1).
Thus, there is no profitable deviation for player 1.
There is also no profitable deviation for player 2 in Round 1. To see this, suppose
player 2 deviates in Round 1 to e21 = 2. Recall that (p(1, 2)−p(0, 2))v− c > 0 (as
argued in the above paragraph), or p(1, 2)v− c > p(0, 2)v. Since e∗G 6= (2, 2), then
p(1, 2)v − c > v − 2c (because p(1, 2)v − c > p(0, 2)v), i.e., (1− p(1, 2))v − c < 0.
Therefore, player 1 chooses e12 = 0 following e1 = (1, 2), and
u2(1, 2; 0, 0) = p(1, 2)v − 2c ≤︸︷︷︸
(e∗G=(1,1))
p(1, 1)v − c = u2(1, 0; 0, 1).
Next, suppose player 2 deviates to e21 = 1. Note that (e12, e22) = (0, 0) is the only
NE of the continuation game following e1 = (1, 1), since (1 − p(1, 2))v − c < 0
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(as established above) and A2 and A4 apply. So, u2(1, 1; 0, 0) = p(1, 1)v − c =
u2(1, 0; 0, 1).
Therefore, overall efforts (1, 1) can be supported in an SPE with (1, 0; 0, 1) (and
by symmetry, (0, 1; 1, 0) is also an SPE ).20
Note that in this case overall efforts of (2, 2) cannot be supported in an SPE of
Ĝ, by Lemma 1.2. Moreover, by Lemma 1.6, none of the overall efforts that are
inferior to (1, 1) are subgame-perfect. Also, overall efforts (2, 1) (and by sym-
metry, (1, 2)) cannot be supported in SPE. To show this, consider first over-
all efforts (2, 1) which can result from any of the following strategy profiles:
(0, 0; 2, 1), (1, 1; 1, 0), (1, 0; 1, 1), (0, 1; 2, 0), (2, 0; 0, 1), and (2, 1; 0, 0). By Lemma
1.1, (e∗12(0, 0), e
∗
22(0, 0)) 6= (2, 1), hence (0, 0; 2, 1) cannot be an SPE. Next, con-
sider (1, 1; 1, 0). If (1, 0) is an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 1),
then by A4 and A2 respectively,
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c ≥ 0, i.e.,(p(2, 2)− p(1, 2))v − c > 0 (40)
and
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≥ (1− p(1, 1))v − c, i.e.,0 ≥ (1− p(1, 2))v − c. (41)
However, these conditions are inconsistent. Therefore, (e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) 6=
(1, 0), and (1, 1; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE. By the same argument, the profiles
(1, 0; 1, 1) and (0, 1; 2, 0) cannot be SPE : both (e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) = (1, 1) and
(e∗12(0, 1), e
∗
22(0, 1)) = (2, 0) require that conditions (40) and (41) simultaneously
hold, an impossibility. Next, the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 1) is an SPE only if
(e∗12(2, 0), e
∗
22(2, 0)) = (0, 1), which in turn requires
20In fact, all strategy profiles leading to (1, 1) are SPE, a result derived in an earlier version
of this paper.
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(p(2, 1)− p(2, 0))v − c ≥ (1− p(2, 0))v − 2c, i.e., 0 ≥ (1− p(2, 1))v − c.
Consequently, by A2 and then A4, 0 > (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v− c, i.e., p(1, 1)v−
c > p(2, 1)v − 2c, thus player 1 gains from a unilateral first-round deviation to
e11 = 1: following e1 = (1, 0), in the continuation game (0, 1) is an NE (since e
∗
G =
(1, 1)), and u1(1, 0; 0, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c > p(2, 1)v − 2c = u1(2, 0; 1, 0). Therefore,
(2, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE. Finally, consider the strategy profile (2, 1; 0, 0). For
(e∗12(2, 1), e
∗
22(2, 1)) = (0, 0) to arise, it must be that
0 ≥ (1− p(2, 1))v − c,
which implies that, by A2 and A4, 0 > (p(2, 1)−p(1, 1))v−c, or that p(1, 1)v−c >
p(2, 1)v − 2c. But then player 1 will find unilateral deviation to e11 = 1 gainful,
because (e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) = (0, 0) and
u1(1, 1; 0, 0) = p(1, 1)v − c > p(2, 1)v − 2c = u1(2, 1; 0, 0).
Thus (2, 1; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE either.
This achieves (weak) domination of partial cooperation in the game G by par-
tial cooperation in the game Ĝ, through elimination of any inferior equilibrium.
Moreover, this is the only overall equilibrium efforts possible in the game Ĝ.
[2] Suppose that e∗G = (2, 2) (possibly unique). Then in the transparent environ-
ment overall efforts of (2, 2) can also be supported in an SPE (by Lemma 1.5(i)).
Moreover, by Lemma 1.7, none of the overall efforts that are inferior to (2, 2) can
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be supported in an SPE. Therefore, full cooperation in G is (weakly) dominated
by full cooperation as the unique overall equilibrium efforts in the game Ĝ.
[3] Finally, suppose the unique one-shot equilibrium is e∗G = (0, 0). By Lemma
1.4(ii), partial cooperation cannot arise in an SPE. However, by Proposition 1.2,
full cooperation can arise in equilibrium in the extensive-form game. Therefore,
shirking in G can be dominated by full cooperation in Ĝ. 
Derivation of Table 1
The equilibrium (or equilibria) reported in Table 1 are exhaustive. We start with
a preliminary result that will be used repeatedly.
Lemma .6. Suppose e∗G = (0, 0) is unique. Then,
(i) c > (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v;
(ii) e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 0);
(iii) e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0);
(iv) Further, if p(0, 2)v > p(1, 2)v − c, then e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1).
Proof. (i) Uniqueness of e∗G = (0, 0) implies the following conditions must hold:
p(0, 0)v ≥ p(1, 0)v − c, p(1, 1)v − c < max{p(0, 1)v, p(2, 1)v − 2c}, and v − 2c <
max{p(0, 2)v, p(1, 2)v − c}. We claim that max{p(0, 1)v, p(2, 1)v − 2c} = p(0, 1)v.
Suppose not. Then p(0, 1)v < p(2, 1)v − 2c and p(1, 1)v − c < p(2, 1)v − 2c, i.e.,
c < p(2,1)−p(0,1)
2
v and c < (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v. By A4, these conditions further
imply that c < 1−p(0,2)
2
v and c < (1−p(1, 2))v, or that e∗G = (2, 2), a contradiction.
So max{p(0, 1)v, p(2, 1)v − 2c} = p(0, 1)v, which in turn implies that p(0, 1)v >
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p(1, 1)v− c, or c > (p(1, 1)−p(0, 1))v. Applying A4 on this last inequality yields
c > (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v.
(ii) Note that (1, 0) cannot be supported in SPE through the profile (0, 0; 1, 0), by
Lemma 1.1. Thus the only way (1, 0) can be an SPE is through (1, 0; 0, 0), but this
is not possible either: if player 1 deviates to e11 = 0, then (0, 0) is an NE in the
continuation game, and player 1 receives u1(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v > p(1, 0)v − c =
u1(1, 0; 0, 0), by part (i).
(iii) By Lemma 1.1, (2, 0) cannot be supported in SPE through (0, 0; 2, 0). Next,
note that in part (i) we had established that p(0, 1)v ≥ p(2, 1)v− 2c. By A4, this
implies that p(0, 0)v > p(2, 0)v−2c. Therefore, (2, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE : player




22(0, 0)) = (0, 0) arises (since
e∗G = (0, 0)), and he receives u1(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v > p(2, 0)v− 2c = u1(2, 0; 0, 0),
a profitable deviation. Finally, consider the strategy profile (1, 0; 1, 0). If player 1
deviates to e11 = 0, in the continuation game (0, 0) is an NE and he thus obtains
u1(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v > p(2, 0)v − 2c = u1(1, 0; 1, 0).
(iv) Since e∗G 6= (2, 2), either p(0, 2)v > v − 2c or p(1, 2)v − c > v − 2c must
hold. But then the condition p(0, 2)v > p(1, 2)v− c implies that p(0, 2)v > v− 2c.
This part will rely on Fig. 1.2. By Lemma 1.1, (0, 0; 2, 1) is not an SPE. The
profile (2, 1; 0, 0) is not an SPE either: if player 2 deviates to e21 = 0, then by
p(0, 2)v > p(1, 2)v−c, p(0, 2)v > v−2c and A2, player 2’s unique best response in
Round 2 is e22 = 0. This results in u2(2, 0; 0, 0) = p(2, 0)v > p(2, 1)v− c, so player
2 would deviate in Round 1. Also, (2, 0; 0, 1) is not an SPE ; following e1 = (2, 0),
player 2’s unique best response is e22 = 0.
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The profile (0, 1; 2, 0) is not an SPE as well. Applying A4 on p(0, 2)v > v − 2c
(established above) yields p(0, 1)v > p(2, 1)v − 2c which, together with p(0, 1)v >
p(1, 1)v − c (part (i)), imply that player 1’s unique best response, if player 2
chooses e22 = 0 in the continuation game following e1 = (0, 1), is e12 = 0. Hence,
(e∗12(0, 1), e
∗
22(0, 1)) 6= (2, 0). The profile (1, 1; 1, 0) is not an SPE : if (1, 0) is an
NE following e1 = (1, 1), then by player 1’s best-response property (p(2, 1) −
p(1, 1))v ≥ c, which, by A4, implies that (1−p(1, 2))v > c, i.e., if player 1 chooses
e12 = 1 then player 2 chooses e22 = 1 and not e22 = 0. Finally, (1; 0; 1, 1) cannot
be an SPE : following e1 = (1, 0), if player 1 chooses e12 = 1 then player 2 would
prefer e22 = 0 over e22 = 1 (since p(0, 2)v > p(1, 2)v − c, by hypothesis). ||
We now verify the equilibria reported in Table 1. The analysis consists of two
sets of conditions – the main condition and the subsidiary conditions – and it is
developed in order of ascending costs.
1. Suppose that c < (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v. By A4, c < (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v; thus,
if c < (p(2, 0) − p(1, 0))v, e∗G 6= (1, 1) (see Proposition 1.1). Therefore, the
only equilibrium possibilities in the one-shot game are (0, 0) only, (2, 2) only,
and the multiple equilibria of (0, 0) and (2, 2). We consider the following
additional conditions.
(a) Suppose further that c ≤ (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v. This condition and the
main condition imply, respectively, that p(1, 0)v − c ≥ p(0, 0)v and
p(2, 0)v − 2c > p(1, 0)v − c; therefore, p(2, 0)v − 2c > p(0, 0)v, or c <
p(2,0)−p(0,0)
2
v, which by Proposition 1.1 implies e∗G 6= (0, 0). Since there
always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in the game G, it must be that
e∗G = (2, 2). Then by Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e
∗
Ĝ = (2, 2).
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Now suppose that
(p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v < c.
We consider three subcases (configurations (b), (c), and (d)):
(b) Suppose that (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v < c and c < (p(2,0)−p(0,0))
2
v. From the
latter condition it follows that e∗G 6= (0, 0), hence, as in (a), it follows
that e∗G = (2, 2), and by Proposition 1.3 the unique SPE is e
∗
Ĝ = (2, 2).
(c) Suppose that (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v < c and p(2,0)−p(0,0)
2
v ≤ c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v.
By A4, the main condition c < (p(2, 0) − p(1, 0))v implies that c <
(1−p(1, 2))v; this, together with the additional condition c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v,
implies that e∗G = (2, 2). Also, the additional conditions (p(1, 0) −
p(0, 0))v < c and p(2,0)−p(0,0)
2
v ≤ c imply that e∗G = (0, 0). Since e∗G =
(2, 2), by Proposition 1.3 the unique SPE is e∗Ĝ = (2, 2).
(d) Suppose that (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v < c and 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c. The latter
condition implies that e∗G 6= (2, 2). Moreover, applying A4 on this
condition yields p(2,0)−p(0,0)
2
v < c; this and (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v < c imply
that e∗G = (0, 0).
We claim that e∗Ĝ = (0, 0), i.e., e
∗
Ĝ = (0, 0; 0, 0). First observe
that following e1 = (0, 0), (0,0) is an NE given that e
∗
G = (0, 0).
Now go back to Round 1. Suppose player 1 deviates to e11 = 1.
By A4, the main condition implies c < (1 − p(1, 2))v, which, to-
gether with 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c, implies ((p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v < c. This and
1−p(0,2)
2
v < c (defining player 2’s best response) and the main con-
dition c < (p(2, 0) − p(1, 0))v (defining player 1’s best response) im-
ply that following e1 = (1, 0), (1,0) is an NE, yielding player 1 the
payoff u1(1, 0; 1, 0) = p(2, 0)v − 2c < p(0, 0)v = u1(0, 0; 0, 0) (by the
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inequality in the previous paragraph). Finally, suppose player 1 devi-
ates to e11 = 2. From ((p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v < c and 1−p(0,2)2 v < c, we
know that player 2 would choose e22 = 0, yielding player 1 the payoff
u1(2, 0; 0, 0) = p(2, 0)v − 2c < p(0, 0)v = u1(0, 0; 0, 0). By symmetry,
there is no profitable deviation for player 2.
We claim that e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 2). Note that by Proposition 1.2, full co-
operation arises in this case only through (1, 1; 1, 1); applying A4 on
the main condition allows us to conclude that (1, 1) is an NE following
e1 = (1, 1). However, the sequence of efforts (1, 1; 1, 1) is not an SPE
because player 2 (say) can profitably deviate to e21 = 0 : following
e1 = (1, 0), we know (from the argument above) that (1,0) is an NE, so
player 2 would receive u2(1, 0; 1, 0) = p(2, 0)v > v − 2c = u2(1, 1; 1, 1).
Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Lemma .6 e
∗
Ĝ 6= (1, 0) and e∗Ĝ 6=
(2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1). Finally, rewrite ((p(1, 2) −
p(0, 2))v < c (as shown above) as p(1, 2)v − c < p(0, 2)v, which, by
Lemma .6(iv), implies e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1).
Therefore, the unique SPE is e∗Ĝ = (0, 0).
2. Suppose that the main condition is now (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v ≤ c < (p(2, 1)−
p(1, 1))v. From the right-hand side inequality, we conclude that e∗G 6= (1, 1)
by Proposition 1.1. Therefore, the only equilibrium possibilities in the one-
shot game are (0, 0) only, (2, 2) only, and the multiple equilibria of (0, 0) and
(2, 2). Moreover, note that the right-hand side inequality also implies that
c < (1− p(1, 2))v.
(e) Suppose that c < (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v holds at the same time; thus
e∗G 6= (0, 0). Since there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in the
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game G, it must be that e∗G = (2, 2). By Proposition 1.3, the unique
SPE is e∗Ĝ = (2, 2).
(f) Next, suppose that c = (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v. This condition and the
left-hand side inequality of the main condition imply that p(0, 0)v =
p(1, 0)v − c ≥ p(2, 0)v − 2c, i.e., e∗G = (0, 0). Applying A4 on the
subsidiary condition yields p(0, 2)v < p(1, 2)v−c. Likewise, by A4, the
right-hand side inequality of the main condition implies that p(1, 2)v−
c < v − 2c. Therefore, p(0, 2)v < p(1, 2)v − c < v − 2c, i.e., e∗G = (2, 2).
By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e∗Ĝ = (2, 2).
Now suppose that
(p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v < c.
From this condition and the left-hand side inequality of the main condi-
tion, we see that p(0, 0)v > p(1, 0)v− c ≥ p(2, 0)v− 2c, i.e., e∗G = (0, 0).
We consider three subcases (configurations (g), (h), and (i)):
(g) Consider (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v < c and c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v. The latter condition
and applying A4 on the right-hand side inequality of the main condition
yield e∗G = (2, 2). Moreover, e
∗
G = (0, 0), once by the left-hand side
inequality of the main condition, then a second time again by the left-
hand side inequality of the main condition together with the left-hand
side inequality of the subsidiary condition. By Proposition 1.3, the
unique SPE is e∗Ĝ = (2, 2).
(h) Consider (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v < c and 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c ≤ 1−p(0,1)
2
v. By
the left-hand side inequality of the latter relation, e∗G 6= (2, 2). Since
there always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in the game G, it must
be that e∗G = (0, 0). By Lemma 1.3, using the main condition and the
subsidiary conditions listed in Table 1 and applying A4 we can conclude
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that e∗Ĝ = (0, 0) and e
∗
Ĝ = (2, 2). The right-hand side inequality of the
main condition implies that c < (1− p(1, 2))v, or p(1, 2)v− c < v− 2c;
together with the left-hand side inequality of the second subsidiary
condition, this yields p(1, 2)v − c < v − 2c < p(0, 2)v, thus e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1),
by Lemma .6(iv). Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Lemma .6 it follows
that e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 0) and e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1).
(i) Finally, suppose that (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v < c and 1−p(0,1)
2
v < c. By
A3, the latter implies that 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c, i.e., e∗G 6= (2, 2). Therefore,
shirking is the unique one-shot equilibrium.
Note that because of the subsidiary condition 1−p(0,1)
2
v < c, Lemma
1.3 does not apply. We establish that e∗Ĝ = (0, 0), i.e. (0, 0; 0, 0) is an
SPE, as follows. That following e1 = (0, 0), (0, 0) is an NE is clear.
So consider the beginning of Round 1. Suppose player 2 deviates to
e21 = 1. The right-hand side inequality of the main condition combined
with 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c and A4 result in p(0, 2)v > v − 2c > p(1, 2)v −
c, i.e., c > 1−p(0,2)
2
v and c > (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v. Applying A4 on
these two conditions yields c > p(2,1)−p(0,1)
2
v and c > (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v,
or p(0, 1)v > p(2, 1)v − 2c and p(0, 1)v > p(1, 1)v − c; thus in the
continuation game following (0, 1) in the first round, e12 = 0 is player
1’s best response when player 2 chooses e22 = 0. Further, if player 1
chooses e12 = 0, player 2’s best response is e22 = 0, by the left-hand
side inequality of the main condition. Thus (0, 0) is an NE in the said
continuation game, resulting in the payoff u2(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v− c <
p(0, 0)v = u2(0, 0; 0, 0) (from condition (p(1, 0)−p(0, 0))v < c). If player
2 deviates to e21 = 2, we know that e12 = 0 (since p(0, 2)v > v − 2c >
p(1, 2)v − c, as argued above); therefore, u2(0, 2; 0, 0) = p(0, 2)v − 2c <
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p(0, 0)v = u2(0, 0; 0, 0) (from condition v − 2c < p(0, 2)v and A4). By
symmetry, there is no profitable deviation for player 1.
We claim that in the extensive form, e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 2). To see this, note
that by Proposition 1.2, full cooperation in this case only arises through
(1, 1; 1, 1). The right-hand side inequality of the main condition, with
A4 applied to it, guarantees that (1, 1) is an NE following (1, 1). How-
ever, suppose that player 1 deviates to e11 = 0. As we have shown
above, in the continuation game following (0, 1) in the first round, (0, 0)
is an NE, thus player 1 receives u1(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v > v − 2c =
u1(1, 1; 1, 1) (since by hypothesis,
1−p(0,1)
2
v < c), a profitable deviation.
Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Lemma .6 it follows that e
∗
Ĝ 6= (1, 0)
and e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1).
By A4, the right-hand side inequality of main condition implies that
p(1, 2)v − c < v − 2c. Together with 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c (as shown above),
we conclude that p(1, 2)v − c < p(0, 2)v. Therefore, by Lemma .6(iv),
e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1).
3. Suppose that the main condition is now (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (1 −
p(1, 2))v. First, consider the case where c also satisfies
c ≤ 1− p(0, 2)
2
v.
We analyze three subcases (configurations (j), (k), and (l)).
(j) Suppose that c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v and c < (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v. The right-
hand side inequality of the main condition and c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v imply that
e∗G = (2, 2). Applying A4 on c < (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v and combining it
with the left-hand side of the main condition yields (p(2, 1)−p(1, 1))v ≤
c < (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v, i.e, e∗G = (1, 1). The condition c < (p(1, 0) −
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p(0, 0))v implies that e∗G 6= (0, 0). By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE
is e∗Ĝ = (2, 2).
(k) Next, suppose that c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v and (p(1, 0)−p(0, 0))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1)−
p(0, 1))v. As in case (j) above we have e∗G = (2, 2), while the left-hand
side inequality of the main condition and c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v imply
that e∗G = (1, 1). Applying A4 on the left-hand side inequality of the
main condition yields p(2, 0)v−2c < p(1, 0)v− c; this and the fact that
(p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v ≤ c result in p(2, 0)v − 2c < p(1, 0)v − c ≤ p(0, 0)v,
i.e., e∗G = (0, 0). By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e
∗
Ĝ = (2, 2).
(l) Finally, suppose that c ≤ 1−p(0,2)
2
v and (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c. From
the latter condition, it follows that e∗G 6= (1, 1). As in case (j), we
have e∗G = (2, 2). Applying A4, the left-hand side inequality of the
main condition and (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c imply, respectively, that
p(2, 0)v − 2c < p(1, 0)v − c and p(1, 0)v − c < p(0, 0)v, i.e., e∗G = (0, 0).
By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e∗Ĝ = (2, 2).




This implies that e∗G 6= (2, 2). Note that the right-hand side inequality
of the main condition can be rewritten as p(1, 2)v−c ≤ v−2c, while the
condition 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c can be rewritten as v−2c < p(0, 2)v. Combining
the two we obtain p(1, 2)v − c < p(0, 2)v, i.e, (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v <
c. Applying A4 on this condition we obtain (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v <
c, and applying A4 on the subsidiary condition 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c yields
p(2,0)−p(0,0)
2
v < c. By Proposition 1.1, these two conditions imply that
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e∗G = (0, 0). We now analyze three subcases (configurations (m), (n),
(o)).
(m) Suppose that 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c ≤ 1−p(0,1)
2
v and c ≤ (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v.
This set is empty. To see why, note that by A4, the condition c ≤
(p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v implies that p(0, 2)v < p(1, 2)v − c. Together with
the right-hand side inequality of the main condition, it must be that





v < c ≤ 1−p(0,1)
2
v and (p(1, 0)−p(0, 0))v < c ≤ (p(1, 1)−
p(0, 1))v. The left-hand side inequality of the main condition and c ≤
(p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v imply that e∗G = (1, 1). By Proposition 1.3, the
unique SPE is e∗Ĝ = (1, 1).
(o) Suppose that 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c ≤ 1−p(0,1)
2
v and (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v < c. The
latter condition implies that e∗G 6= (1, 1). By Lemma 1.3 – using the
main condition, A4, and the subsidiary conditions – we can conclude
that e∗Ĝ = (0, 0) and e
∗
Ĝ = (2, 2). The right-hand side inequality of the
main condition and the left-hand side inequality of the first subsidiary
condition together yield p(1, 2)v−c ≤ v−2c < p(0, 2)v, thus e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1),
by Lemma .6(iv). Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Lemma .6 it follows
that e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 0) and e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1).




Since it follows by A3 that 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c, we can conclude as in the
above subcases that e∗G 6= (2, 2) and e∗G = (0, 0). Let us then consider
two subcases.
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(p) Suppose that 1−p(0,1)
2
v < c and c ≤ (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v. The latter
condition and the left-hand side inequality of the main condition imply
that e∗G = (1, 1). By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e
∗
Ĝ = (1, 1).
(q) Finally, suppose that 1−p(0,1)
2
v < c and (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c. Then
by the latter condition, e∗G 6= (1, 1). Hence e∗G = (0, 0), which is already
guaranteed, is unique. However, because of the condition 1−p(0,1)
2
v < c,
we cannot use Lemma 1.3. Note that the subsidiary condition 1−p(0,1)
2
v <
c implies that 1−p(0,2)
2
v < c; combining with the right-hand side inequal-
ity of the main condition, we obtain p(1, 2)v − c ≤ v − 2c < p(0, 2)v.
Therefore, using the same argument as in configuration (i), we can show
that e∗Ĝ = (0, 0) and e
∗
Ĝ 6= (2, 2).
Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Lemma .6 it follows that e
∗
Ĝ 6= (1, 0)
and e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1).
From p(1, 2)v − c ≤ v − 2c < p(0, 2)v already established above,
conclude that p(1, 2)v − c < p(0, 2)v. Therefore, by Lemma .6(iv),
e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1).
4. Suppose that the main condition is now (1−p(1, 2))v < c. Then e∗G 6= (2, 2).
Therefore, the only possible equilibria are (1, 1) only, (0, 0) only, and the
multiple equilibria of (1, 1) and (0, 0). We consider the following subsidiary
conditions.
(r) Suppose that c < (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v; thus e∗G 6= (0, 0). Since there
always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in the game G, it must be
that e∗G = (1, 1). By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e
∗
Ĝ = (1, 1).
(s) Suppose now that (p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v. The
condition c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v and the main condition (where A4 is
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used) imply that e∗G = (1, 1). Applying A4 on the main condition, we
obtain p(1, 0)v − c > p(2, 0)v − 2c; combining this with the condition
(p(1, 0) − p(0, 0))v ≤ c yields p(0, 0)v ≥ p(1, 0)v − c > p(2, 0)v − 2c;
thus e∗G = (0, 0). By Proposition 1.3, the unique SPE is e
∗
Ĝ = (1, 1).
Now we consider the case where
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v < c ≤ (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v,
which is analyzed in three subcases (configurations (t), (u), and (v)).
The left-hand side inequality of the above condition implies that e∗G 6=
(1, 1). Since a pure-strategy NE must exist in G, it must be that the
unique one-shot equilibrium is e∗G = (0, 0).
Note that by Proposition 1.2, full cooperation in this case only
arises through (1, 1; 1, 1). However, the main condition implies that
(e∗11(1, 1), e
∗
21(1, 1)) 6= (1, 1), thus e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 2).
Consider the profile (0, 0; 0, 0), and the continuation game following
the first-round deviation of player 2 (this argument applies to player 1
as well, by symmetry) to e21 = 1. Applying A4 on the main condition
yields (p(2, 1)−p(1, 1))v < c; this and the subsidiary condition (p(1, 1)−
p(0, 1))v < c together imply that p(2, 1)v− 2c < p(1, 1)v− c < p(0, 1)v,
i.e., following e1 = (0, 1), e12 = 0 is the best response of player 1 to
e22 = 0. Moreover, applying A4 on the main condition and then A2
yields (p(0, 2) − p(0, 1))v < c, i.e., following e1 = (0, 1), e22 = 0 is the




22(0, 1)) = (0, 0),
and player 2’s deviation results in the payoff u2(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v −
c < p(0, 0)v = u2(0, 0; 0, 0) (by applying A4 on condition (p(1, 1) −
p(0, 1))v < c). Now consider player 2’s deviation to e21 = 2. By the
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condition c ≤ (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v and the main condition, player 1 can
choose e12 = 0 (if c ≤ (p(1, 2)−p(0, 2))v holds as an equality) or e12 = 1
(if it holds strictly) in the continuation game. If he chooses e12 = 0,
then player 2 receives the payoff u2(0, 2; 0, 0) = p(0, 2)v− 2c. Applying
A4 on the main condition and on the left-hand side inequality of the
subsidiary condition yields, respectively, (p(2, 0) − p(1, 0))v < c and
(p(1, 0)−p(0, 0))v < c, i.e., p(2, 0)v−2c < p(1, 0)v−c and p(1, 0)v−c <
p(0, 0)v. Thus p(2, 0)v−2c < p(0, 0)v, and u2(0, 2; 0, 0) = p(0, 2)v−2c <
p(0, 0)v = u2(0, 0; 0, 0), an unprofitable deviation. On the other hand,
suppose that following e1 = (0, 2), player 1 chooses e12 = 1 such that
player 2 receives u2(0, 2; 1, 0) = p(1, 2)v − 2c. Consider two subcases:
(t) Suppose that (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c ≤ (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v and
p(1,2)−p(0,0)
2
v < c. Then u2(0, 2; 1, 0) = p(1, 2)v − 2c < p(0, 0)v =
u2(0, 0; 0, 0). Therefore, there does not exist a profitable deviation for
player 2 (and by symmetry, for player 1), and hence e∗Ĝ = (0, 0).
We claim that e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1). By Lemma 1.1, the profile (0, 0; 2, 1) can-
not be an SPE. Applying A4 on the main condition yields (p(2, 1) −
p(1, 1))v < c; by this condition, (e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) = (0, 0). This im-
plies that (2, 1; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE : if player 1 deviates to e11 = 1,
then he receives u1(1, 1; 0, 0) = p(1, 1)v−c > p(2, 1)v−2c = u1(2, 1; 0, 0)
(by the condition (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v < c). Next check that (2, 0; 0, 1)
cannot be an SPE. Since e∗G = (0, 0), following e1 = (0, 0), (0, 0) is
an NE, which implies that player 1 can profitably deviate to e11 = 0:
u1(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v > p(2, 1)v− 2c = u1(2, 0; 0, 1), by the subsidiary
condition p(1,2)−p(0,0)
2
v < c. The profile (0, 1; 2, 0) cannot be an SPE ei-
ther: following e1 = (0, 1), if player 2 chooses e22 = 0 then e12 = 0 yields
player 1 strictly higher payoff than e12 = 2, by (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v < c
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and the left-hand side inequality of the first subsidiary condition. Also
(1, 1; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE : following e1 = (1, 1), if player 2 chooses
e22 = 0 then player 1 is strictly better off choosing e12 = 0 than e12 = 1,
by (p(2, 1) − p(1, 1))v < c. Finally, (1, 0; 1, 1) cannot be an SPE : fol-
lowing e1 = (1, 0), player 1 would strictly prefer e12 = 0 over e12 = 1 if
player 2 chooses e22 = 1, by the main condition and A4.
Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Lemma .6 it follows that e
∗
Ĝ 6= (1, 0)
and e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1).
(u) Suppose that (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c ≤ (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v and
p(1,2)−p(0,0)
2
v = c. Then u2(0, 2; 1, 0) = p(1, 2)v − 2c = p(0, 0)v =
u2(0, 0; 0, 0). Therefore, there does not exist a profitable deviation for
player 2 (and by symmetry, for player 1), and hence e∗Ĝ = (0, 0).
We claim that e∗Ĝ = (2, 1), through the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 1).
Player 1’s first-round deviation to e11 = 0 is not profitable: u1(0, 0; 0, 0) =
p(0, 0)v = p(2, 1)v − 2c = u1(2, 0; 0, 1), by p(1,2)−p(0,0)2 v = c. Earlier
we had shown that (0, 0) is an NE following e1 = (1, 0). Therefore,
a first-round deviation by player 1 to e11 = 1 is also not profitable:
u1(1, 0; 0, 0) = p(1, 0)v − c < p(0, 0)v = p(2, 1)v − 2c = u1(2, 0; 0, 1),
where the strict inequality follows from applying A4 on the left-hand
side inequality of the first subsidiary condition. Now consider first-
round deviations by player 2. If he deviates to e21 = 1, by the main
condition we know that e22 = 0, which does not alter his payoff:
u2(2, 1; 0, 0) = p(2, 1)v − c = u2(2, 0; 0, 1). If, on the other hand,
he deviates to e21 = 2, then by the main condition he is worse off:
u2(2, 2; 0, 0) = v − 2c < p(2, 1)v − c = u2(2, 0; 0, 1).
(v) Suppose that (p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c ≤ (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v and c <
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p(1,2)−p(0,0)
2
v. Then u2(0, 2; 1, 0) = p(1, 2)v−2c > p(0, 0)v = u2(0, 0; 0, 0),
i.e., player 2 can profitably deviate to e21 = 2, so e
∗
Ĝ 6= (0, 0). (Following
e1 = (0, 2), it is optimal for player 1 to choose e12 = 1.)
We claim that e∗Ĝ = (2, 1), with the profile (0, 2; 1, 0). Note that




22(0, 1)) = (0, 0), as
established earlier, and he receives u2(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v − c. This
implies that the deviation is unprofitable, since p(0, 1)v − c < p(0, 0)v
(this follows from applying A4 on the subsidiary condition (p(1, 1) −
p(0, 1))v < c), and p(0, 0)v < p(1, 2)v − 2c = u2(0, 2; 1, 0) (by the
second subsidiary condition). If he instead deviates to e21 = 0, then
(e∗11(0, 0), e
∗
21(0, 0)) = (0, 0), and he receives u2(0, 0; 0, 0) = p(0, 0)v <
p(1, 2)v−2c = u2(0, 2; 1, 0). Therefore, there exists no profitable devia-
tion for player 2. Now consider player 1. He can deviate to e11 = 1, fol-
lowing which he will choose e12 = 0 (by the main condition), resulting in
the payoff u1(1, 2; 0, 0) = p(1, 2)v−c = u1(0, 2; 1, 0). He can also deviate
to e11 = 2 and receive u1(2, 2; 0, 0) = v−2c < p(1, 2)v−c = u1(0, 2; 1, 0)
(by the main condition). Therefore, there also does not exist any prof-
itable deviation for player 1.
(w) Finally, suppose that (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v < c. By A4, this implies that
(p(1, 1) − p(0, 1))v < c, or that e∗G 6= (1, 1). Since a pure-strategy NE
must exist in G, it must be that the unique one-shot equilibrium is
e∗G = (0, 0).
Consider the profile (0, 0; 0, 0). We need to consider only first-round
deviations; there will be no deviation incentive in the second round.
Applying A4 on (p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v < c and on the main condition
yields, respectively, (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v < c and (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v < c,
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implying that p(2, 1)v − 2c < p(1, 1)v − c < p(0, 1)v, and applying
A4 on the main condition and then A2 yields (p(0, 2)− p(0, 1))v < c.
Therefore, following e1 = (0, 1), (0, 0) is an NE, thus the deviation
by player 2 to e21 = 1 is unprofitable: u2(0, 1; 0, 0) = p(0, 1)v − c <
p(0, 0)v = u2(0, 0; 0, 0) (by applying A4 on the subsidiary condition
(p(1, 2) − p(0, 2))v < c). Player 2’s deviation to e21 = 2 is likewise
unprofitable since in the continuation game player 1 chooses e12 = 0 (by
the main and the subsidiary conditions), and u2(0, 2; 0, 0) = p(0, 2)v −
2c < p(0, 0)v (by applying A4 both on the main condition and on the
subsidiary condition). By symmetry, there is no profitable deviation
for player 1. Therefore, e∗Ĝ = (0, 0).
Since e∗G = (0, 0) is unique, by Proposition 1.2 the only way (2, 2)
can be supported in an SPE is through the profile (1, 1; 1, 1). But the
main condition implies that (e∗11(1, 1), e
∗
21(1, 1)) 6= (1, 1), so e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 2).
Also, uniqueness of e∗G = (0, 0) implies, by Lemma .6, that e
∗
Ĝ 6= (1, 0)
and e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 0); and by Lemma 1.4(ii), e∗Ĝ 6= (1, 1).
Finally, rewriting the subsidiary condition yields p(1, 2)v−c < p(0, 2)v.
Therefore, by Lemma .6(iv), e∗Ĝ 6= (2, 1). 
Existence of (possibly asymmetric) pure strategy NE in GS.
The one-shot game, GS , has at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that e∗GS 6= (0, 0). Then (refer to Fig. 1.4),
ρ(0, 0)v < max{ρ(1, 0)v − c, ρ(2, 0)v − 2c}. (42)
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If max{ρ(1, 0)v − c, ρ(2, 0)v − 2c} = ρ(1, 0)v − c, then
ρ(1, 0)v − c ≥ ρ(2, 0)v − 2c, i.e., c ≥ (ρ(2, 0)− ρ(1, 0))v (43)
and ρ(1, 0)v − c > ρ(0, 0)v, i.e., (ρ(1, 0)− ρ(0, 0))v > c,(44)
from which we can infer, using A4′ in (43), that
c > (ρ(2, 1)− ρ(1, 1))v. (45)
Now if
(ρ(1, 0)− ρ(0, 0))v >︸︷︷︸
by A4′
(ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v ≥︸︷︷︸
by hypothesis
c,
then this and (45) imply that
(ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v ≥ c > (ρ(2, 1)− ρ(1, 1))v,
i.e, ρ(1, 1)v − c ≥ ρ(0, 1)v and ρ(1, 1)v − c > ρ(2, 1)v − 2c, thus e∗GS = (1, 1). On
the other hand, if alternative to our initial hypothesis (see above)
(ρ(1, 0)− ρ(0, 0))v > c > (ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v,
then using the right-hand side inequality, (45) and A2 yield
ρ(1, 0)v > ρ(1, 1)v − c > ρ(1, 2)v − 2c.
This, as well as (43) and (44), imply that e∗GS = (1, 0).
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We assumed above that e∗GS 6= (0, 0) and max{ρ(1, 0)v − c, ρ(2, 0)v − 2c} =
ρ(1, 0)v − c. If, on the other hand, e∗GS 6= (0, 0) and ρ(1, 0)v − c < ρ(2, 0)v − 2c,
then it must be that
(ρ(2, 0)− ρ(1, 0))v > c (46)
and ρ(2, 0)v − 2c > ρ(0, 0)v, i.e., [(ρ(2, 0)− ρ(0, 0))v]/2 > c. (47)
For this last scenario (i.e., (46) and (47)), consider further the following possibili-
ties.
[1] Suppose that
(1− ρ(1, 2))v ≥ c (48)
and [(1− ρ(0, 2))v]/2 ≥ c. (49)
(Note that (48) and (49) are not inconsistent with (46) and (47)). Then
v − 2c ≥ ρ(1, 2)v − c and v − 2c ≥ ρ(0, 2)v, i.e., e∗GS = (2, 2).
[2] Next, suppose (48) holds but (49) does not so that
c > [(1− ρ(0, 2))v]/2. (50)
Conditions (48) and (50) imply, using A2,
ρ(2, 0)v > v − 2c ≥ ρ(2, 1)v − c.
This, together with (46) and (47), imply that e∗GS = (2, 0).
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[3] Another possibility is that (49) holds, i.e., v − 2c ≥ ρ(0, 2)v, but (48) does
not. Then,
ρ(1, 2)v − c > v − 2c ≥ ρ(0, 2)v. (51)
Condition (51) has the following implications:
[(1− ρ(0, 2))v]/2 > c, i.e., [(ρ(2, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v]/2 > c (by A4′)(52)
(ρ(1, 2)− ρ(0, 2))v > c, i.e., (ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v > c (by A4′)(53)
and c > (1− ρ(1, 2))v. (54)
Consider condition (54). If c > (ρ(2, 1)−ρ(1, 1))v > (1−ρ(1, 2))v, then this,
together with (53), imply that (ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v > c > (ρ(2, 1)− ρ(1, 1))v,
i.e., e∗GS = (1, 1). On the other hand, suppose that (ρ(2, 1) − ρ(1, 1))v ≥
c > (1 − ρ(1, 2))v. Then using the left-hand side inequality and (52), and
applying A2 for both yield, respectively,
ρ(1, 2)v − 2c ≥ ρ(1, 1)v − c
and ρ(1, 2)v − 2c > ρ(1, 0)v.
These and (51) imply that e∗GS = (1, 2).
[4] Next suppose that both (48) and (49) fail to hold:
c > (1− ρ(1, 2))v, i.e., ρ(1, 2)v − c > v − 2c (55)
and c > [(1− ρ(0, 2))v]/2, i.e., ρ(0, 2)v > v − 2c. (56)
If ρ(0, 2)v > ρ(1, 2)v − c, then ρ(0, 2)v > ρ(1, 2)v − c > v − 2c, or ρ(2, 0)v >
ρ(2, 1)v− c > v− 2c (by A2) and this, along with conditions (46) and (47),
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imply that e∗GS = (2, 0). On the other hand, if ρ(1, 2)v − c ≥ ρ(0, 2)v, then
ρ(1, 2)v − c ≥ ρ(0, 2)v > v − 2c, (57)
and (ρ(1, 2)− ρ(0, 2))v > c. This last inequality implies, applying A4′, that
(ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v > c. (58)
Recall now that condition (55) holds. If





then the left-hand side inequality implies ρ(2, 1)v − 2c ≥ ρ(1, 1)v − c, and
using A2 and (58) we have ρ(1, 2)v− 2c ≥ ρ(1, 1)v− c > ρ(1, 0)v. This con-
dition, combined with (57), imply that e∗GS = (1, 2). However, if alternative
to our initial hypothesis (see above)
c > (ρ(2, 1)− ρ(1, 1))v >︸︷︷︸
by A4′
(1− ρ(1, 2))v
holds, then ρ(1, 1)v − c > ρ(2, 1)v − 2c. This, along with (58), imply that
e∗GS = (1, 1).
Finally, if our initial position fails then e∗GS = (0, 0), completing the proof that
there is at least one pure strategy NE in the game GS . 
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Proof of Lemma 1.8. Suppose, contrary to the claim, e∗GS = (0, 0) and e
∗
GS =
(1, 1). Then (refer to Fig. 1.4) it must be that
c ≥ (ρ(1, 0)− ρ(0, 0))v (59)
and c ≤ (ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v. (60)
However, by A4′, (59) implies that c > (ρ(1, 1)− ρ(0, 1))v, contradicting (60).
Next, suppose that e∗GS = (0, 0) and e
∗
GS = (2, 2). This requires that
c ≥ [(ρ(2, 0)− ρ(0, 0))v]/2 (61)
and c ≤ [(1− ρ(0, 2))v]/2. (62)
Condition (61) contradicts (62), since by A4′, (61) implies that c > [(1−ρ(0, 2))v]/2.
It is also not possible for e∗GS = (1, 1) and e
∗
GS = (2, 2) to arise simultaneously.
This would require
(ρ(2, 1)− ρ(1, 1))v ≤ c (63)
and c ≤ (1− ρ(1, 2))v, (64)
but using A4′ in (63) yields 1− ρ(1, 2))v < c, which contradicts (64). 
Proof of Proposition 1.5. Let ηi denote the aggregate efforts of player i in GS ,







j )v − cη∗i ≥ ρ(ηi, η∗j )v − cηi, ∀ηi, ∀i. (65)
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Denote the first-round efforts (e11, e21) in the game with transparency by e1, and
recall that we defined (in section 3) incremental gains from second-round actions
(ei2, ej2) given history e1, as
uˆi2(ei2, ej2|e1) = ui(ei1 + ei2, ej1 + ej2)− uˆi1(ei1, ej1).
We now claim that for any NE (symmetric or asymmetric) in the non-transparency
game, there is a strategy profile in the extensive-form game (under transparency)
with the same aggregate efforts that will be an equilibrium in the two-round game.




2), the following strategies form an SPE in the
extensive form:
1. In the first round, e∗i1 = η
∗
i for each player i, and
2. In the second round, for i = 1, 2,
e∗i2 =

0 if e1 = (η˜i, η˜j) and η˜i ≥ η∗i ;
η∗i − η˜i if e1 = (η˜i, η˜j), η˜i < η∗i , and η˜j ≤ η∗j ;
e∗∗i2 if e1 = (η˜i, η˜j), η˜i < η
∗




where e∗∗i2 = arg maxei2∈Eˆi2 uˆi2(ei2, 0|(η˜i, η˜j)), Eˆi2 being player i’s set of ad-
missible second-round effort choices, and j 6= i.
Actually, we will not fully verify the Nash equilibrium property of all continuation
strategies – both on- and off-the-equilibrium path – specified in (66). (The mutual
best-response property of the two players’ continuation strategies pretty much
follows by construction.) All we need is to confirm that for the specific strategies
(η∗1, η
∗
2; 0, 0), the continuation strategies will be an NE and there is no profitable
deviation in Round 1.
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So let us first establish that the second-round strategies (0, 0) following e1 =
(η∗i , η
∗
j ) form an NE in the continuation game. Consider player i’s second-round
strategies. In the second round player j would choose, as specified by (66), e∗j2 = 0,
to which we claim that player i’s best response is also to set e∗i2 = 0. To see this,
note that i’s incremental gains in the second round from choosing ei2 = 0 is
uˆi2(0, 0|(η∗i , η∗j )) = [ρ(η∗i + 0, η∗j + 0)− ρ(η∗i , η∗j )]v − c× 0,
whereas choosing any ei2 > 0 yields
uˆi2(ei2, 0|(η∗i , η∗j )) = [ρ(η∗i + ei2, η∗j + 0)− ρ(η∗i , η∗j )]v − cei2.
Thus,




By similar reasoning, uˆj2(0, 0|(η∗i , η∗j )) ≥ uˆj2(0, ej2|(η∗i , η∗j )). Therefore, (0, 0) forms





Let us now return to the first round and consider the overall strategies (η∗i , η
∗
j ; 0, 0).








j )v − cη∗i . It is
clear that there does not exist any profitable first-round deviation for any player:
if i lowers his first-round contribution to η˜i < η
∗




i − η˜i, 0) =
ρ(η∗i , η
∗
j )v−cη∗i ,21 which is equal to his payoff from not deviating, and if he increases
it to η˜i > η
∗
i , he receives ui(η˜i, η
∗
j ; 0, 0) = ρ(η˜i, η
∗
j )v − cη˜i ≤ ρ(η∗i , η∗j )v − cη∗i (by
21It is easy to see why player i restoring his total contribution back to η∗i and player j con-
tributing zero should constitute an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (η˜i, η
∗
j ).
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condition (65));22 similar argument is applicable to player j. Therefore, e∗ĜS =
(η∗1, η
∗
2; 0, 0). 
Proof of Proposition 1.6. Suppose not so that one of the players, say player
1, would benefit by deviating from the claimed equilibrium strategy under non-










2)v − cη1 > ρ(η∗1, η∗2)v − cη∗1. (67)
Claim 1. η1 ≥ e∗11 is not possible.
To see why, let η1 = e
∗
11 + e12 where e12 ∈ {0, 1, 2} with the restriction that
e12 ≤ 2− e∗11. Now rewrite (67) as:




22)− ρ(e∗11, e∗21)]v − ce12 > [ρ(e∗11 + e∗12, e∗21 + e∗22)− ρ(e∗11, e∗21)]v − ce∗12,
i.e., uˆ12(e12, e
∗
22|(e∗11, e∗21)) > uˆ12(e∗12, e∗22|(e∗11, e∗21)),














21)) is an SPE in
the extensive-form game under transparency.||
Next consider the possibility of profitable deviation in the one-shot game (under
non-transparency) with η1 < e
∗
11.
First note that e∗11 ≥ 1, for deviation to a lower effort level to be feasible. Also
observe that for the SPE, e∗ĜS , it must be that e
∗
22 ≥ 1, because otherwise profitable
deviation to η1 in the one-shot game is not consistent with the equilibrium e
∗
ĜS .



















22Again, it is easy to see why (0, 0) is an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (η˜i, η
∗
j ),
where η˜i > η
∗
i .















21)) is an SPE, the following two best-response
conditions will be satisfied:
[1] (Optimality of Round 2 decisions) In the second round player 1 will not







22)− ρ(e∗11, e∗21)]v − ce∗12
≥ [ρ(e∗11 + e12, e∗21 + e∗22)− ρ(e∗11, e∗21)]v − ce12, (68)
for any 0 ≤ e12 ≤ 2− e∗11. A similar condition can be stated for player 2.
[2] (Optimality of Round 1 decisions) It must be that player 1 will not










22)v − c[e∗11 + e∗12]
≥ ρ(e11 + e∗12(e11, e∗21), e∗21 + e∗22(e11, e∗21))v − c[e11 + e∗12(e11, e∗21)],(69)






21)), in the continuation game
following e1 = (e11, e
∗
21). Again, a similar condition can be written for player
2.
Following on the optimality of first-round decisions, we further claim:
The best deviation payoff for player 1 when he lowers his first-round effort e11
below e∗11 is same as his original SPE payoff.
We show this result by establishing the following steps.
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First, let player 1, upon deviation in Round 1, increase his second-round effort by
∆ = e∗11−e11 > 0 to e∗12+∆, and restore his total efforts to e11+e∗12+∆ = e∗11+e∗12.
Second, with player 1’s total efforts equalling η∗1, player 2’s best response in Round
2 continues to be e∗22; this follows from eĜS being SPE (i.e., by writing a condition
for player 2 similar to (68)).
Third, with total efforts by player 2 over the two rounds equalling η∗2 (shown in the
second step), below we reconfirm that player 1’s best response in Round 2 (after
Round 1 deviation to e11) will indeed be to choose e
∗
12 + ∆. To see this, recall (68)
which can be written as:
[ρ(η∗1, η
∗
2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − ce∗12
≥ [ρ(e∗11 + e12, η∗2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − ce12, for any 0 ≤ e12 ≤ 2− e∗11
i.e., [ρ(η∗1, η
∗
2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − c[η∗1 − e11] + c[η∗1 − e11 − e∗12]
≥ [ρ(e11 + e˜12, η∗2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − c[e11 + e˜12 − e∗11], for e11 + e˜12 = e∗11 + e12 ≤ 2
i.e., [ρ(η∗1, η
∗
2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − c[η∗1 − e11]
≥ [ρ(e11 + e˜12, η∗2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − ce˜12
+{−c[e11 − e∗11]− c[η∗1 − e11 − e∗12]}, for 0 ≤ e˜12 ≤ 2− e11
i.e., [ρ(η∗1, η
∗
2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − c[η∗1 − e11]
≥ [ρ(e11 + e˜12, η∗2)− ρ(e11, e∗21)]v − ce˜12, for 0 ≤ e˜12 ≤ 2− e11. (70)
(The last inequality is the optimality of Round 2 decision by player 2 after cutting
back on Round 1 effort.)
The second and third steps, together, establish that player 1 choosing e∗12 + ∆ and
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player 2 choosing e∗22 form an NE in the continuation game following the deviation




2)v − c[η∗1 − e11] ≥ ρ(e11, η∗2)v
i.e., ρ(η∗1, η
∗
2)v − cη∗1 ≥ ρ(e11, η∗2)v − ce11, for any e11 < e∗11,
contradicting (67).
We have thus shown that in the one-shot game under non-transparency, if player
2 chooses η∗2 then deviation by player 1 (as in (67)) is not possible. Similarly, if








Complementary technology with increasing marginal cost
of effort
For the complementary technology, consider the two-round effort investment game
specified in section 2 of Chapter 1 except that now the cost of exerting the second
unit of effort within the same round is c+ δ, δ > 0, i.e., the marginal cost of effort
is increasing within a round. Denote the simultaneous-move game in this case by
GI . When efforts are unobservable, the cost of exerting ei = 2 is still 2c: when
a player decides to cooperate fully, exerting two units of effort regardless of the
distribution of effort results in the same probability of the project’s success, but
distributing his effort over the two rounds (compared to putting them all in one
round) minimizes his effort costs; therefore, when a player decides to cooperate
fully, he does so by putting in one unit of effort in each round. As a consequence,
the payoffs to the players in the simultaneous-move game with complementarity
and increasing marginal costs of effort are the same as in G. Thus we can say that
GI = G. For future reference, we replicate the game G (i.e., the game GI) here:
The following result is same as Lemma 1 in the main draft.
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0 p(0, 0)v, p(0, 0)v p(0, 1)v, p(0, 1)v − c p(0, 2)v, p(0, 2)v − 2c
1 p(1, 0)v − c, p(1, 0)v p(1, 1)v − c, p(1, 1)v − c p(1, 2)v − c, p(1, 2)v − 2c
2 p(2, 0)v − 2c, p(2, 0)v p(2, 1)v − 2c, p(2, 1)v − c v − 2c, v − 2c
Figure 6: Simultaneous-move game GI
Lemma A1. GI has no asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Another consequence of GI = G is that Proposition 1 (in the main draft) would
still hold, and the existence of a pure-strategy NE for the game GI is guaranteed.
However, the players’ payoffs in the extensive-form game with increasing marginal
cost of effort will now differ; see Fig. 7.
Our first result confirms that the best effort profile under transparency is no worse
than the best achievable without transparency:
Proposition A1. [i] Suppose that full cooperation is an NE in the one-shot game
GI. Then full cooperation can be supported in an SPE in the extensive-form game
(under transparency), with the strategy profile (1, 1; 1, 1).
[ii] Suppose that partial cooperation is the best NE in the one-shot game GI. Then
partial cooperation can be supported in an SPE in the extensive-form game, with
the strategy profile (1, 0; 0, 1).
(The proof of Proposition A1 and the remaining results appear in the Addendum.)
By part [i] above, whenever both partial cooperation and full cooperation are Nash
equilibria in the one-shot game, in the extensive-form game there is an equilib-
rium sustaining full cooperation. This does not imply, however, that transparency
cannot be harmful. It is quite possible that some additional equilibrium emerges
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in the transparent environment that is inferior (in the sense defined in the original
manuscript) to the worst equilibrium in the non-transparent environment. For
example, consider the case where full cooperation is the unique equilibrium in the
one-shot game. When the game becomes transparent, the players may potentially
end up in a bad coordination with zero efforts each in the first round followed
by (1, 1) in the second round, given that raising individual effort levels to two
units in the second round could be prohibitively costly. In the remainder of this
analysis, we address possibilities of this type. We will show that transparency is
never harmful in the above sense. Also we show that transparency can be strictly
beneficial.
Denote the continuation game following e1 = (0, 0) in the extensive-form game ĜI
by GI (0,0).
Remark. With the complementary technology and increasing marginal cost of
effort, players’ strategic decisions in GI (0,0) will no longer be the same as in GI
(in contrast to the constant marginal cost of effort case). That is, unlike our base
model with complementarity (in the original manuscript), GI and GI (0,0) are not
identical.
Note, however, that not all strategic decisions will be altered when players move
from GI to GI (0,0). In particular, if e∗G = (1, 1), then e∗GI = (1, 1) (since, as
previously established, GI = G), and the following must be true:
p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(0, 1)v
and p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(2, 1)v − 2c i.e., p(1, 1)v − c > p(2, 1)v − (2c+ δ).
But these conditions imply that (1, 1) is an NE in GI (0,0). Therefore:




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Extensive-form game ĜI
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Lemma A2. If e∗GI = (1, 1), then e
∗
GI(0,0) = (1, 1).
Corollary to Lemma A2. Even if e∗GI 6= (1, 1) (in particular, if p(1, 1)v − c ≥
p(0, 1)v but p(1, 1)v − c < p(2, 1)v − 2c), it is still possible to have e∗GI(0,0) = (1, 1)
(for δ large enough).
Similarly, e∗G = e
∗
GI = (0, 0) if and only if
p(0, 0)v ≥ p(1, 0)v − c
and p(0, 0)v ≥ p(2, 0)v − 2c i.e., p(0, 0)v > p(2, )v − (2c+ δ).
Therefore:
Lemma A3. If e∗GI = (0, 0), then e
∗
GI(0,0) = (0, 0).
Corollary to Lemma A3. Even if e∗GI 6= (0, 0) ( in particular, if p(0, 0)v ≥
p(1, 0)v− c but p(0, 0)v < p(2, 0)v−2c), it is still possible that e∗GI(0,0) = (0, 0) (for
δ large enough).
On the other hand, e∗G = e
∗
GI = (2, 2) arises if and only if
v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c
and v − 2c ≥ p(0, 2)v,
while e∗GI(0,0) = (2, 2) requires that
v − (2c+ δ) ≥ p(1, 2)v − c
and v − (2c+ δ) ≥ p(0, 2)v.
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Clearly, for δ large enough, it is possible that either v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c >
v − (2c+ δ) or v − 2c ≥ p(0, 2)v > v − (2c+ δ). Therefore:
Lemma A4. When e∗GI = (2, 2), it is possible that e
∗
GI(0,0) 6= (2, 2).
The following is a useful property of GI (0,0).
Lemma A5. GI (0,0) has no asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to report the following results.
Proposition A2. Suppose that partial cooperation (i.e., eGI = (1, 1)) is the best
NE in the one-shot game GI. Then overall efforts in the extensive-form game
(under transparency) that entail shirking by any player cannot be supported in an
SPE.
Proposition A3. Suppose that e∗GI = (2, 2) and the equilibrium is unique. Then,
under transparency, overall efforts with any player exerting less than two units of
effort cannot be supported in an SPE.
Proposition A4. Suppose that both e∗GI = (2, 2) and e
∗
GI = (1, 1) but e
∗
GI 6= (0, 0).
Then, under transparency, overall efforts with at least one player shirking cannot
be supported in an SPE.
The combined message of the above propositions plus Proposition A1 is that, for
convex costs and complementary technologies, transparency can never make the
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effort profile worse compared to a non-transparent environment. What we can-
not guarantee, however, is the uniqueness of the overall equilibrium efforts in the
extensive-form game. For example, when there are multiple Nash equilibria in the
simultaneous-move game under non-transparency (as in Proposition A4), the ex-
tensive form can have multiple equilibria. The reason for the multiple equilibria in
the extensive form with increasing marginal cost of effort is that now the deviation
possibilities are much less – to exert two units of effort within the same round is
more costly.
To complete the analysis, we construct an example to show that transparency can
be strictly beneficial in terms of overall efforts.
An Example of Beneficial Transparency. Suppose that e∗GI = (0, 0) and the
equilibrium is unique. With increasing marginal cost of effort, in the transparent
environment full cooperation can be supported in an SPE with the strategy profile
(1, 1; 1, 1), given the following sufficient conditions:
p(0, 2)v > v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c
p(0, 1)v − c > p(0, 2)v − 2c
and v − 2c ≥ p(0, 1)v.
 (71)
The verification of the domination claim in the above Example is almost identical
to the constructive proof of Lemma 3 in the main draft. Note that the equilib-
rium strategy profile of (1, 1; 1, 1) distributes efforts over the two rounds, thus the
escalation effect (due to increasing marginal cost of effort) is not impacting on
the players’ payoffs along the equilibrium path (as compared to Lemma 3 con-
struction). The players’ deviation incentives are also weakened when a player
contemplates deviating to two units of effort in the first round (from only one unit
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of effort in the posited equilibrium); and deviation incentive to zero effort (from
one unit of effort) is either unchanged (if it is in the second round, because δ
addition does not come into play) or adversely affected due to escalation costs of
the two units of effort (in the continuation game, if the deviation being considered
is in the first round).
Addendum
Proof of Proposition A1. [i] Recall that e∗G = (2, 2) if and only if
(1− p(1, 2))v − c ≥ 0 (72)
and (1− p(0, 2))v − 2c ≥ 0. (73)
By (72), (1, 1) is an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 1). This
strategy profile yields player 1 an overall payoff
u1(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c.
Suppose that player 1 (unilaterally) deviates in the first round to e11 = 2. Then
following e1 = (2, 1), player 2 can choose either e22 = 1 or e22 = 0. In either case
the deviation is not beneficial for player 1:
u1(2, 1; 0, 0) = p(2, 1)v − (2c+ δ) < v − (2c+ δ) = u1(2, 1; 0, 1) < u1(1, 1; 1, 1).
Now suppose that player 1 deviates to e11 = 0 while player 2 continues to play
e21 = 1. In the continuation game following e1 = (0, 1), there are six possi-
ble strategy profiles (e12, e22): (0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1); the respective
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overall payoffs to player 1 (in the two rounds combined) are: p(0, 1)v, p(1, 1)v −
c, p(2, 1)v − 2c− δ, p(0, 2)v, p(1, 2)v − c, v − 2c− δ. It is easy to check, using
(72) and (73), that none of these payoffs exceed u1(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c. Therefore,
the deviation to e11 = 0 by player 1 is not gainful. By symmetry, there is no
profitable unilateral first-round deviation for player 2. Thus, (1, 1; 1, 1) is an SPE.
[ii] By Proposition 1, e∗G = (1, 1) if and only if
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c ≤ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v. (74)
For (0, 1) to be an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 0), the following
must hold (see Fig. 7):
(p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ 0, (75)
(p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ (p(1, 2)− p(1, 0))v − (2c+ δ)
i.e., c+ δ ≥ (p(1, 2)− p(1, 1))v, (76)
and (p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c
i.e., c ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v. (77)
Clearly, if (77) holds, then (76) is satisfied (by A2 in the main draft). By (74)
and A2, conditions (75) and (77) are met. Therefore, (e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) = (0, 1).
Consider now possible deviations by player 1 in Round 1. Suppose player 1 deviates




22(0, 0)) = (1, 1); for this to
happen, (75) and (76) must hold, which are guaranteed by (74) and A2. So
player 1’s payoff from the proposed deviation is u1(0, 0; 1, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c, which
is the same as his payoff in the proposed equilibrium: u1(1, 0; 0, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c;
so player 1’s deviation to e11 = 0 is not gainful.
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Finally, suppose player 1 deviates to e11 = 2. Because e
∗
G 6= (2, 2), therefore
v − 2c < max{p(2, 1)v − c, p(2, 0)v}, (78)
and hence v − (2c+ δ) < max{p(2, 1)v − c, p(2, 0)v}. Therefore, player 2 will not
choose e22 = 2. In particular, he will choose e22 = 1 (over e22 = 0): the right-hand
side (weak) inequality in (74), A2 and A4 (refer section 3 in the main draft for
the last two) imply that (p(2, 1)− p(2, 0))v − c > 0. So, again, player 1 does not
gain from deviation:
u1(2, 0; 0, 1) = p(2, 1)v− (2c+ δ) < p(2, 1)v− 2c ≤︸︷︷︸
by (74)
p(1, 1)v− c = u1(1, 0; 0, 1).
Next consider possible deviations by player 2 in Round 1. Suppose he deviates to
e21 = 1. In the continuation game following (1, 1), (0, 0) is an NE, by the left-hand
side (weak) inequality in (74). Player 2 is not strictly better off from this deviation
since u2(1, 1; 0, 0) = p(1, 1)v − c = u2(1, 0; 0, 1).
Now suppose player 2 deviates to e21 = 2. From (78) and the right-hand side
inequality in (74), it follows that v − 2c < p(1, 2)v − c, or (1 − p(1, 2))v − c < 0.
So player 1 will choose e12 = 0, following e1 = (1, 2). This results in a payoff to
player 2,
u2(1, 2; 0, 0) = p(1, 2)v− (2c+ δ) < p(1, 2)v− 2c <︸︷︷︸
by (74)
p(1, 1)v− c = u2(1, 0; 0, 1).
Therefore, the strategies (1, 0; 0, 1), and by symmetry (0, 1; 1, 0), are both SPE,
resulting in overall efforts (1, 1). 
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Proof of Lemma A5. The second-round effort profile (1, 0) cannot be an NE of
GI (0,0). Otherwise
(p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v − c ≥ 0
and (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v ≥ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 0))v − c,
i.e., (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c ≤ 0 (by A2),
but these two conditions are inconsistent, given A4. Likewise, (e∗12(0, 0), e
∗
22(0, 0)) 6=
(2, 0); otherwise the following conditions,
(p(2, 0)− p(0, 0))v − (2c+ δ) ≥ 0
and (p(2, 0)− p(0, 0))v ≥ (1− p(0, 0))v − (2c+ δ),
i.e., (1− p(0, 2))v − (2c+ δ) ≤ 0 (by A2),
must hold simultaneously, a contradiction, given A4. Finally, (2, 1) cannot be an
NE following (0, 0) in the first round. If it were, then
(p(2, 1)− p(0, 0))v − (2c+ δ) ≥ (p(1, 1)− p(0, 0))v − c,
i.e., (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − (c+ δ) ≥ 0
and (p(2, 1)− p(0, 0))v − c ≥ (1− p(0, 0))v − (2c+ δ),
i.e., (1− p(1, 2))v − (c+ δ) ≤ 0 (by A2),
and the two conditions are inconsistent, given A4. By symmetry, (0, 1), (0, 2),
and (1, 2) cannot be NE in the continuation game. 
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Proof of Proposition A2. Suppose, first, that e∗GI = (1, 1) is unique. By
definition,
Ie∗GI = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2)} . (79)
Overall efforts, (0, 0), will correspond to an SPE in the extensive form if and only
if e∗ĜI = (0, 0; 0, 0). Although we assume that e
∗
GI 6= (0, 0), by the Corollary to
Lemma A3, it is possible to have e∗GI(0,0) = (0, 0). So suppose that e
∗
GI(0,0) =
(0, 0). Then the strategy profile (0, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE : player 1 can make a
unilateral deviation in the first round to e11 = 1, in which case following e1 = (1, 0),
(e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) = (0, 1) (since e
∗
GI = (1, 1)). This deviation is gainful for player
1:
u1(1, 0; 0, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c ≥︸︷︷︸
since e∗GI=(1,1)
p(0, 1)v > p(0, 0)v = u1(0, 0; 0, 0).
Hence (0, 0) cannot realize in equilibrium in the extensive-form game ĜI .
By Lemma A5, none of (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ Ie∗GI \ (0, 0) can be supported in SPE with the
strategy profile (0, 0; e˜1, e˜2). Therefore, of the overall efforts that are asymmetric,
the remaining possibilities are:
(i) Overall efforts (1, 0) realize in an SPE with the strategy profile (1, 0; 0, 0).
We show that this is not possible. If player 1 deviates in Round 1 to e11 = 0,
in the continuation game (1, 1) is an NE, by Lemma A2, given that e∗GI =
(1, 1). This yields u1(0, 0; 1, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c > p(1, 0)v − c = u1(1, 0; 0, 0).
Therefore, (1, 0), and by symmetry (0, 1), cannot be supported in SPE.
(ii) Overall efforts (2, 0) realize in an SPE with the strategy profile either
(2, 0; 0, 0) or (1, 0; 1, 0). We show that neither of the two is possible. Recall
that e∗GI = (1, 1) requires that p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(0, 1)v. That is,
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(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c ≥ 0
i.e. by A2 and A4, (p(2, 1)− p(2, 0))v − c > 0. (80)
By (80), in the continuation game following e1 = (2, 0), player 2 would
strictly gain by choosing e22 = 1 over e22 = 0. Therefore, (2, 0; 0, 0) cannot
be an SPE.
Now consider (1, 0; 1, 0). For e∗GI = (1, 1) to hold, it must be that
p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(2, 1)v − 2c i.e., (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≤ c
i.e., (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v < c (by A4).
Thus if, following e1 = (1, 0), player 2 chooses e22 = 0, player 1’s
best response would be to choose e12 = 0 instead of e12 = 1, and
(e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) 6= (1, 0). Therefore, (1, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE.
Therefore, overall efforts (2, 0), and by symmetry (0, 2), cannot be sup-
ported in SPE.
Next suppose that e∗GI = (1, 1) is not unique. In particular, e
∗
GI = (0, 0) but
e∗GI 6= (2, 2). The proof showing that overall efforts in the set Ie∗GI=(1,1) \ (0, 0)
cannot realize in a subgame-perfect equilibrium still holds with the additional
premise that e∗GI = (0, 0). So it remains to rule out the occurrence of overall
efforts (0, 0) in an SPE.
In contrast to the case where e∗GI = (1, 1) is unique (i.e., e
∗
GI 6= (0, 0)), now we
can definitely say that (e∗12(0, 0), e
∗
22(0, 0)) = (0, 0), by Lemma A3; however, we
already showed (at the start of the proof) that if this were indeed the case, then
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(0, 0; 0, 0) 6= e∗ĜI . Therefore, no effort pair (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ Ie∗GI=(1,1) can be supported in
an SPE. 
Proof of Proposition A3. First, note that the strategy space of GI is S (i.e.,
same as the strategy space of G), so Ie∗GI=(2,2) = S \ (2, 2). Since e
∗
GI = (2, 2),
v − 2c ≥ p(1, 2)v − c i.e., (1− p(1, 2))v − c ≥ 0, (81)
andv − 2c ≥ p(0, 2)v i.e., (1− p(0, 2))v − 2c ≥ 0. (82)
By Lemma A5, none of (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ Ie∗GI \ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} can be supported in SPE
with the strategy profile (0, 0; e˜1, e˜2). Of the overall efforts that are asymmetric,
the following possibilities remain:
(i) Overall efforts (1, 0) realize in an SPE with the strategy profile (1, 0; 0, 0).
We show that this is not possible. If player 2 deviates in Round 1 to
e21 = 1, in the continuation game (1, 1) is an NE : refer Fig. 7 and ap-
ply (81). This results in a payoff u2(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c ≥︸︷︷︸
(by (82))
p(0, 2)v >
p(1, 0)v = u2(1, 0; 0, 0), making the deviation profitable. Therefore, (1, 0),
and by symmetry (0, 1), cannot be supported in SPE.
(ii) Overall efforts (2, 0) realize in an SPE with the strategy profile either (2, 0; 0, 0)
or (1, 0; 1, 0).
First consider the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 0). If (0, 0) is not an NE
following e1 = (2, 0), then (2, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE. However, if
(e∗12(2, 0), e
∗
22(2, 0)) = (0, 0), then it must be that
(p(2, 1)− p(2, 0))v − c ≤ 0 i.e., p(2, 1)v − c ≤ p(2, 0)v (83)
and (1− p(2, 0))v − (2c+ δ) ≤ 0 i.e., v − (2c+ δ) ≤ p(2, 0)v.(84)
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Suppose player 1 deviates in the first round to e11 = 1 while player 2 contin-
ues to play e21 = 0. We claim that, in the continuation game, either (1, 0) or
(0, 0) is an NE. The first possibility is true, i.e. (1, 0) is an NE, if and only
if the following conditions hold:
(p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c,
i.e., p(2, 1)v − c ≤ p(2, 0)v (85)
(p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v ≥ (1− p(1, 0))v − (2c+ δ),
i.e., v − (2c+ δ) ≤ p(2, 0)v (86)
and (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ 0. (87)
The first two conditions are same as (83) and (84), thus are satisfied for the
case being considered. However, condition (87) need not necessarily hold
(given (81) and property A4 in the main draft). If (87) indeed holds, then
(1, 0) is an NE following e1 = (1, 0), in which case player 1 receives a payoff
u1(1, 0; 1, 0) = p(2, 0)v − 2c > p(2, 0)v − (2c+ δ) = u1(2, 0; 0, 0),
thus the originally posited equilibrium profile (2, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE.
If, on the other hand, (87) does not hold, then
(p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v − c < 0, (88)
which, along with the conditions,
0 > (p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c
0 > (p(1, 2)− p(1, 0))v − (2c+ δ),
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would guarantee that (0, 0) is an NE following e1 = (1, 0) (the last two
conditions follow respectively from (83) and (84), applying A4). In such a
case, the resulting payoff to player 1 is
u1(1, 0; 0, 0) = p(1, 0)v − c > p(2, 0)v − (2c+ δ) = u1(2, 0; 0, 0).
(The above inequality can be written as (p(2, 0) − p(1, 0))v − (c + δ) < 0
which follows from (88).) Thus, again player 1 will have an incentive to
deviate in Round 1 and the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE.
Next consider (1, 0; 1, 0). If (1, 0) is not an NE following e1 = (1, 0), then
(1, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE. However, if (e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) = (1, 0), then
(as in (85)-(87)) it must be that
p(2, 1)v − c ≤ p(2, 0)v,
v − (2c+ δ) ≤ p(2, 0)v,
and (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ 0.
Suppose that player 2 deviates in the first round to e11 = 1. Following




22(1, 1)) = (1, 1) (because e
∗
GI = (2, 2)). Then player
2’s payoff is
u2(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c ≥ p(2, 0)v = u2(1, 0; 1, 0).
Further note that v−2c 6= p(2, 0)v, because otherwise it can be easily verified
(applying A2 and A4 to v − 2c = p(2, 0)v and (85)) that e∗GI = (0, 0),
contradicting that e∗GI = (2, 2) is unique. Thus, player 2 strictly benefits
from deviation, hence (1, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE.
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This shows that none of the strategy profiles corresponding to overall
efforts (2, 0) can be supported in SPE.
(iii) Overall efforts (2, 1) realize in an SPE with one of these strategy profiles:
(2, 1; 0, 0), (2, 0; 0, 1), (1, 1; 1, 0), (1, 0; 1, 1), and (0, 1; 2, 0).
First consider the strategy profiles (2, 1; 0, 0) and (0, 1; 2, 0); in each of
these profiles, player 1 receives a payoff of p(2, 1)v− (2c+ δ). Neither will be
an SPE, since given a first-round deviation by player 1 to e11 = 1 in either
strategy profile (resulting in the first-round effort profile e1 = (1, 1)), (1, 1) is
an NE in the continuation game (by (81)), which results in a strictly higher
payoff of u1(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c.
Next consider the strategy profile (1, 1; 1, 0). For (1, 0) to be an NE fol-
lowing e1 = (1, 1), the following conditions must hold:
Player 1’s best-response : 0 ≤ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c, (89)
Player 2’s best-response : (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v ≥ (1− p(1, 1))v − c,
i.e., 0 ≥ (1− p(1, 2))v − c (by A2). (90)
However, (89) and (90) are inconsistent, by A4. Therefore,
(e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) 6= (1, 0), and (1, 1; 1, 0) is not an SPE.
Next consider the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 1), which yields player 2 a payoff
u2(2, 0; 0, 1) = p(2, 1)v−c. If player 2 deviates in the first round by choosing
e21 = 1, then in the continuation game following e1 = (2, 1), (0, 1) is an NE
(because e∗GI = (2, 2)). The resulting payoff to player 2 is
u2(2, 1; 0, 1) = v − 2c >︸︷︷︸
(we claim)
p(2, 1)v − c = u2(2, 0; 0, 1).
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If the above claim were not true, then
(1− p(2, 1))v − c ≤ 0, i.e., (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c < 0 (by A4) (91)
i.e., p(2, 1)v − 2c < p(1, 1)v − c. (92)
Condition (92) and the fact that e∗GI 6= (1, 1) imply that
p(1, 1)v − c < p(0, 1)v, i.e., (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c < 0,
i.e., (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v − c < 0 (by A4)
i.e., p(1, 0)v − c < p(0, 0)v. (93)
Applying A4 to (91) yields:
(p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v − c < 0, i.e., p(2, 0)v − 2c < p(1, 0)v − c. (94)
Combining (93) and (94) obtain:
p(2, 0)v − 2c < p(1, 0)v − c < p(0, 0)v,
which implies that e∗GI = (0, 0), contradicting that e
∗
GI = (2, 2) is unique.
This establishes our claim, so player 2 would like to deviate in Round 1 and
hence the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 1) cannot be an SPE.
Finally, consider the strategy profile (1, 0; 1, 1). If player 2 deviates by
choosing in Round 1 e21 = 1, in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 1),
(1,1) is an NE, and yields player 2 the payoff
u2(1, 1; 1, 1) = v − 2c > p(2, 1)v − c = u2(1, 0; 1, 1).
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(The inequality was established in the previous case.) So player 2 benefits
by deviation and therefore (1,0;1,1) cannot be an SPE.
Thus, none of the strategy profiles yielding the overall efforts (2, 1) can be
SPE.
Next, consider the symmetric efforts. Overall efforts (1, 1) can be achieved in the
extensive form through one of the following strategy profiles: (1, 0; 0, 1), (0, 1; 1, 0),
(0, 0; 1, 1), and (1, 1; 0, 0). The first two profiles cannot be SPE ; for these to be
SPE, the corresponding second-round strategies must be NE in the respective
continuation games, which must also imply that e∗GI = (1, 1), a contradiction.
Now consider the strategy profile (0, 0; 1, 1). Although e∗GI 6= (1, 1), by the Corol-
lary to Lemma A2, (e∗12(0, 0), e
∗
22(0, 0)) = (1, 1) can occur. Suppose that it does.
Then it must be that
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 0))v − c ≥ (p(0, 1)− p(0, 0))v,
i.e., (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c ≥ 0 (95)
i.e., (p(1, 2)− p(0, 2))v − c > 0 (by A4)(96)
and (p(1, 1)− p(0, 0))v − c ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(0, 0))v − (2c+ δ),
i.e., 0 ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − (c+ δ). (97)
One can infer from (95) and (97) that p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(0, 1)v and p(1, 1)v − c ≥
p(2, 1)v− (2c+δ), respectively. Since e∗GI 6= (1, 1) but e∗GI(0,0) = (1, 1), this implies
that max{p(0, 1)v, p(2, 1)v − 2c} = p(2, 1)v − 2c. Therefore,
p(1, 1)v − c < p(2, 1)v − 2c. (98)
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Let δ ≡ (v − 2c)− (p(1, 2)v − c). Note that δ ≥ 0 (by (81)).
• Suppose δ ≥ δ so that
p(1, 2)v − c ≥ v − (2c+ δ). (99)
Then (96), (98), and (99) imply, respectively, that
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c > (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v, [using A2]
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c > (p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v,
and (p(2, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ (1− p(1, 0))v − (2c+ δ), [using A2]
that is, (1, 1) is an NE in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 0). Thus if
player 1 deviates in the first round to e11 = 1 while player 2 continues to exert




22(1, 0)) = (1, 1) is
played, then player 1 receives a payoff of
u1(1, 0; 1, 1) = p(2, 1)v − 2c >︸︷︷︸
by (98)
p(1, 1)v − c = u1(0, 0; 1, 1),
and thus gains from the deviation. Therefore, the profile (0, 0; 1; 1) cannot be an
SPE.
• Next suppose that δ < δ. Then v − (2c+ δ) > p(1, 2)v − c, which together with
(96) yield:
v − (2c+ δ) > p(1, 2)v − c > p(0, 2)v. (100)
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Now if player 1 deviates in the first round to e11 = 2, player 2 would choose e22 = 2
following e1 = (2, 0), resulting in gainful deviation for player 1:
u1(2, 0; 0, 2) = v − (2c+ δ) >︸︷︷︸
by (100)
p(1, 2)v − c > p(1, 1)v − c = u1(0, 0; 1, 1).
Thus again (0, 0; 1, 1) cannot be an SPE in this range of δ.
Finally, we show that (1, 1; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE. The second-round equilibrium
strategy (e∗12(1, 1), e
∗
22(1, 1)) = (0, 0) requires
(p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c ≤ 0, i.e., p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(2, 1)v − 2c.
Since e∗GI 6= (1, 1), the above inequality implies that
p(0, 1)v > p(1, 1)v − c ≥ p(2, 1)v − 2c.
The left-hand side inequality implies that
0 > (p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c
⇒ 0 > (p(1, 0)− p(0, 0))v − c [using A4]
⇒ p(0, 0)v > p(1, 0)v − c, (101)
while p(0, 1)v > p(2, 1)v − 2c implies that
0 > (p(2, 1)− p(0, 1))v − 2c
⇒ 0 > (p(2, 0)− p(0, 0))v − 2c [using A4]
⇒ p(0, 0)v > p(2, 0)v − 2c. (102)
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But (101) and (102) together imply that e∗GI = (0, 0), contradicting the premise
that e∗GI = (2, 2) is unique. Thus, (1, 1; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE.
So far, we have shown that none of (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ Ie∗GI \ (0, 0) can be supported in
SPE. Now consider overall efforts (0, 0). Shirking in SPE implies e∗ĜI = (0, 0; 0, 0).
Since e∗GI = (2, 2) is unique, therefore e
∗
GI 6= (0, 0). However, by the Corollary to
Lemma A3, it is possible that (0, 0) is an NE following e1 = (0, 0). Specifically,
this arises if and only if
max{p(1, 0)v − c, p(2, 0)v − 2c} = p(2, 0)v − 2c, (103)
such that p(1, 0)v − c ≤ p(0, 0)v < p(2, 0)v − 2c (hence e∗GI 6= (0, 0))
and p(2, 0)v − (2c+ δ) ≤ p(0, 0)v < p(2, 0)v − 2c (hence e∗GI(0,0) = (0, 0)).
Hence,
p(2, 0)v − 2c > p(1, 0)v − c i.e., (p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v − c > 0
i.e., (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c > 0 [using A4] (104)
i.e., (1− p(1, 2))v − c > 0. [again apply A4]
Suppose now that player 1 deviates in the first round to e11 = 1 while player
2 continues to play e21 = 0. The set of conditions (104) implies that in the
continuation game following e1 = (1, 0), e12 = 1 is the dominant strategy for player
1. This results in one of three possible outcomes in this continuation game, namely
(1, 0), (1, 1), and (1, 2), from which player 1 receives the overall payoffs p(2, 0)v−2c,
p(2, 1)v − 2c, and v − 2c, respectively; all of these payoffs exceed p(0, 0)v, since
p(0, 0)v < p(2, 0)v−2c (implied by (103)), and p(2, 0)v−2c < p(2, 1)v−2c < v−2c,
by A3. Therefore, the first-round deviation by player 1 to e11 = 1 is gainful, and
(0, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE. 
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Proof of Proposition A4. Recall that GI = G. Thus by Proposition 1 (in the
main draft), e∗GI = (1, 1) if and only if
(p(1, 1)− p(0, 1))v − c ≥ 0, (105)
and (p(2, 1)− p(1, 1))v − c ≤ 0. (106)
Note that
Ie∗GI=(1,1) = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (2, 0), (0, 2)} . (107)
By Lemma A5, none of (e˜1, e˜2) ∈ Ie∗GI \ {(0, 0)} can be supported in an SPE with
the strategy profile (0, 0; e˜1, e˜2). Of the overall efforts that are asymmetric, the
following possibilities remain:
(i) Overall efforts (1, 0), resulting from the strategy profile (1, 0; 0, 0). But this
strategy profile cannot be an SPE, using the same argument as in the proof
of Proposition A3. Therefore, overall efforts (1, 0), and by symmetry (0, 1),
cannot be supported in SPE.
(ii) Overall efforts (2, 0), resulting from strategies (2, 0; 0, 0) or (1, 0; 1, 0).
Consider the strategy profile (2, 0; 0, 0). Player 1 can deviate in the first-
round to e11 = 1 while player 2 continues to play e21 = 0; conditions (105)
and (106) then imply that in the continuation game following e1 = (1, 0),
(p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ 0,
(p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v ≥ (p(2, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c,
and (p(1, 1)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ (p(1, 2)− p(1, 0))v − (2c+ δ),

(108)
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i.e., (e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) = (0, 1). This results in a payoff to player 1 of
u1(1, 0; 0, 1) = p(1, 1)v−c ≥︸︷︷︸
by (106)
p(2, 1)v−2c > p(2, 0)v− (2c+δ) = u1(2, 0; 0, 0).
Therefore, (2, 0; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE.
Likewise, the strategy profile (1, 0; 1, 0) cannot be an SPE. For
(e∗12(1, 0), e
∗
22(1, 0)) = (1, 0) to arise in the continuation game following
e1 = (1, 0), it must be that
(p(2, 0)− p(1, 0))v − c ≥ 0.
However, this contradicts condition (106), after applying A4
Thus, overall efforts (2, 0), and by symmetry (0, 2), cannot be supported
in SPE..
Finally, consider overall efforts (0, 0), which can realize only if (0, 0; 0, 0) is an
SPE. By assumption, e∗GI 6= (0, 0). However, by the Corollary to Lemma A3,
it is possible for (0, 0) to be an NE following e1 = (0, 0). So suppose that
(e∗12(0, 0), e
∗
22(0, 0)) = (0, 0). Then consider a first-round deviation by player 1
to e11 = 1. Following e1 = (1, 0), conditions (105) and (106) imply that the set of
conditions (108) holds, thus (0, 1) is an NE in the continuation game. Therefore,
player 1 benefits from the deviation, since
u1(1, 0; 0, 1) = p(1, 1)v − c ≥︸︷︷︸
by (105)
p(0, 1)v > p(0, 0)v = u1(0, 0; 0, 0).
Therefore, none of the strategy profiles that are inferior to overall efforts (1, 1) can
be supported in SPE. 
Appendix C Chapter 3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2. [L2a] For e1 = (1, 1), the continuation game (summarized





β(αv) + (1− β)(α2v),
β(αv) + (1− β)(α2v)
β(αv) + (1− β)(αβv),
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(αβv − c)
1
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(αβv − c),
β(αv) + (1− β)(αβv)
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(β2v − c),
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(β2v − c)
Figure 8: Simultaneous-move game GS(1,1)
First, note that e∗GS
(1,1)
= (1, 1) if and only if
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(β2v − c) ≥ β(αv) + (1− β)αβv
i.e. β(β − α)(2− β)v ≥ c. (109)
Each player’s expected payoff from the first-round strategy profile (1, 1) (followed
by (1, 1) in the second round) is
EuS11(1, 1; 1, 1) = Eu
S
21(1, 1; 1, 1) = β
2v+β(1−β)βv+(1−β)β(βv−c)+(1−β)2(β2v−c)−c.
157
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Now suppose that player 2 deviates to e21 = 0. By Corollary 3.1, (1, 1) is an NE in
the continuation game GS(1,0). Then player 2’s expected payoff from the first-round
strategy profile (1, 0) (followed by (1, 1) in the second round) is
EuS21(1, 0; 1, 1) = αβv+β(1−α)(βv− c) + (1−β)α(βv) + (1−β)(1−α)(β2v− c).
Thus,
EuS21(1, 1; 1, 1)− EuS21(1, 0; 1, 1) = (β − α)βv + (β − α)(1− β)βv − (β − α)β(βv − c)
− (β − α)(1− β)(β2v − c)− c
= (β − α) [(2− β)βv − (2− β)β2v + c]− c
= (β − α) [(2− β)(1− β)βv + c]− c
= (β − α)(2− β)(1− β)βv + (β − α)c− c,
and the deviation is unprofitable, i.e., EuS21(1, 1; 1, 1) ≥ EuS21(1, 0; 1, 1), if and only
if
β(β − α)(2− β)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v ≥ c. (110)
Therefore, (1, 1; 1, 1) is an SPE with secrecy if and only if (109) and (110) hold,
i.e.,
c ≤ min{β(β−α)(2−β)v, [ (1− β)
1− (β − α)
]
β(β−α)(2−β)v} = β(β − α)(2− β)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v.
[L2b] By Corollary 3.1, e∗GS
(1,1)
= (1, 1). In fact, a stronger claim is that e∗GS
(1,1)
=
(1, 1) is also a unique “strict dominant strategy” equilibrium (see footnote 15 for
the nature of the game being considered). To see this, note that in the continuation
game GS(1,1), exerting effort instead of shirking yields each player a strictly higher
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payoff whether his partner shirks or exerts effort (refer to Fig. 8):
β(βv−c)+(1−β)(αβv−c)−(β(αv) + (1− β)α2v) = β(β−α)v−c+(1−β)α(β−α)v > 0,
and
β(βv−c)+(1−β)(β2v−c)−β(αv)−(1−β)αβv = β[(β−α)v−c]+(1−β)[β(β−α)v−c] > 0.
Both inequalities follow from condition (3.2). Therefore, both players exerting
effort is the unique strict dominant strategy equilibrium. 






α(αv) + (1− α)(α2v),
α(αv) + (1− α)(α2v)
α(αv) + (1− α)(αβv),
α(βv − c) + (1− α)(αβv − c)
1
α(βv − c) + (1− α)(αβv − c),
α(αv) + (1− α)(αβv)
α(βv − c) + (1− α)(β2v − c),
α(βv − c) + (1− α)(β2v − c)
Figure 9: Simultaneous-move game GS(0,0)
By Corollary 3.1, (1,1) is an NE of this continuation game. Player 1’s expected
payoff when the players choose (0, 0) in Round 1 followed by (1, 1) in Round 2, is
EuS11(0, 0; 1, 1) = α
2v + α(1− α)βv + (1− α)α(βv − c) + (1− α)2(β2v − c).




= (1, 1). We
then see that this deviation results in an expected payoff of
EuS11(1, 0; 1, 1) = αβv+β(1−α)βv+(1−β)α(βv−c)+(1−β)(1−α)(β2v−c)−c,
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and the deviation is unprofitable if and only if
EuS11(1, 0; 1, 1)− EuS11(0, 0; 1, 1) = (β − α)
[
αv + (1− α)βv − αβv − (1− α)β2v + c]− c
= (β − α) [(1− β)αv + (1− α)(1− β)βv + c]− c
≤ 0,
that is, for given β, v, and α,
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v ≤ c.
Therefore, (0, 0; 1, 1) is an SPE with secrecy if and only if
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v ≤ c 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. [P1a] Recall that (1, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) will be an MPE
under the policy of disclosure if and only if the cost parameter c satisfies (3.1) and
(3.2), and (3.5). The first two conditions are summarized in (3.9). If (3.10) holds,
then (3.5) is satisfied, since (β−α)[β+α(1−β)](1−β)1−(β−α) v < (β − α)g(α, β)v:
(β − α)g(α, β)v − (β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v
=
(β − α)(2β − α2)(1− β)
1− β(β − α) v −
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)




1− β(β − α) −
β + α(1− β)
1− (β − α)
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
=
[
(2β − α2)[1− (β − α)]− [β + α(1− β)][1− β(β − α)]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
=
[
(2β − α2)− (β − α)(2β − α2)− [β + α(1− β)] + β(β − α)[β + α(1− β)]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
=
[
2β − α2 − β − α+ αβ + (β − α)[β2 + αβ − αβ2 − 2β + α2]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
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=
[
β − α2 − α+ αβ + (β − α)[β2 + αβ − αβ2 − 2β + α2]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
=
[
(β − α) + α(β − α) + (β − α)[β2 + αβ − αβ2 − 2β + α2]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
=
[
(β − α)[1− 2β + β2 + α+ α2 + αβ − αβ2]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
=
[
(β − α)[(1− β)2 + α(1 + α) + αβ(1− β)]
[1− β(β − α)][1− (β − α)]
]
(β − α)(1− β)v
> 0.
Next we show that the following strategies also constitute an MPE under disclo-
sure:
Round 1: Both players exert effort in the first round.
Round 2: Any player who fails in Round 1 will exert effort in Round 2, regardless
of the other player’s first-round outcome or their efforts.
Note that the second-round strategies, like the reinforcement strategies {e˜i2(a)},
are consistent with Assumption 1, except that in contrast to e˜i2(a), both players
now choose to coordinate on the “good equilibrium” whenever they find themselves
in the one-shot game G. Also, in the subgame where a player is the only one who
failed, the strategy of exerting effort is sequentially rational as implied by (3.3).
Therefore, given that the players play in the second round subgames the NE (or
sequentially rational) strategies as specified, the expected payoff of player 1 in the
first-round, simultaneous-move game for each first-round effort profile (e11, e21)
under disclosure can be written as follows:
EuD
′
11 (e11, e21) = p(e11)p(e21)v + p(e11)(1− p(e21))βv + (1− p(e11))p(e21)(βv − c) +
(1− p(e11))(1− p(e21))(β2v − c)− ce11.
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Let EuD
′
11 (1, 1) = Eu
D′
21 (1, 1) = z
′ and EuD
′
11 (0, 1) = Eu
D′
21 (1, 0) = y
′:
z′ = β2v + β(1− β)βv + (1− β)β(βv − c) + (1− β)(1− β)(β2v − c)− c,
y′ = αβv + α(1− β)βv + (1− α)β(βv − c) + (1− α)(1− β)(β2v − c).
Therefore, in the reduced one-shot game under disclosure, (1, 1) is an NE if and
only if z′ ≥ y′; that is,
(β − α)βv + (β − α)(1− β)βv − c ≥ (β − α)β(βv − c) + (β − α)(1− β)(β2v − c)
i.e.,
(β − α) [(2β − β2)(1− β)]





1−(β−α) v, since (2β − β2)− (β + α(1− β)) =
β − β2 − α(1 − β) = β(1 − β) − α(1 − β) = (β − α)(1 − β) > 0. Therefore, if
condition (3.10) holds, then (111) holds as well.
[P1b] First note that
β(β − α)(2− β)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v >
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v. (112)
This is because
β(β − α)(2− β)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v −
(β − α)[β + α(1− β)](1− β)
1− (β − α) v
=
(
β(2− β)− [β + α(1− β)]) [(β − α)(1− β)




2β − β2 − β − α(1− β)) [(β − α)(1− β)




β(1− β)− α(1− β)) [(β − α)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v
]
= (β − α)(1− β)
[
(β − α)(1− β)
1− (β − α) v
]
> 0.
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Therefore, if (3.10) holds then (3.7) is satisfied, and using Lemma 3.2 (in particular
[L2a]) we conclude that (1, 1; 1, 1) is an SPE under secrecy.
Recall that none of the continuation games under secrecy have asymmetric equi-
libria (see Remark 3.2 in section 4). Thus none of the strategy profiles (1, 1; 1, 0),
(1, 1; 0, 1), (1, 0; 1, 0), (1, 0; 0, 1), (0, 1; 1, 0), (0, 1; 0, 1), (0, 0; 1, 0), and (0, 0; 0, 1)
can be SPE.
Next, consider the strategy profiles (1, 1; 0, 0), (1, 0; 0, 0), and (0, 1; 0, 0). By [L2b],
e∗GS
(1,1)
6= (0, 0), thus (1, 1; 0, 0) cannot be an SPE. For e1 = (1, 0), the continuation





α(αv) + (1− α)(α2v),
β(αv) + (1− β)(α2v)
α(αv) + (1− α)(αβv),
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(αβv − c)
1
α(βv − c) + (1− α)(αβv − c),
β(αv) + (1− β)(αβv)
α(βv − c) + (1− α)(β2v − c),
β(βv − c) + (1− β)(β2v − c)
Figure 10: Simultaneous-move game GS(1,0)
In the continuation game GS(1,0), (0, 0) is an NE if and only if (refer to Fig. 10):
(Player 2’s best-response) β(αv) + (1− β)α2v ≥ β(βv − c) + (1− β)(αβv − c)
i.e. c ≥ β(β − α)v + (1− β)α(β − α)v
i.e. c ≥ [β + α(1− β)](β − α)v,
which contradicts condition (3.2). Thus, e∗GS
(1,0)
6= (0, 0) (by symmetry, e∗GS
(0,1)
6=
(0, 0)), and the strategy profiles (1, 0; 0, 0) and (0, 1; 0, 0) cannot be SPE.
By Corollary 3.1, e∗GS
(1,0)
= (1, 1). To show that (1, 0; 1, 1) cannot be an SPE, recall
the proof of Lemma 3.2. Note that if condition (3.10) holds, then in the proof of
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Lemma 3.2, condition (110) is satisfied as a strict inequality (because of (112)),
and EuS21(1, 1; 1, 1) > Eu
S
21(1, 0; 1, 1); that is, player 2’s payoff from the first-round
strategy profile (1, 0) (followed by (1, 1) in the second round) is strictly less than
his payoff from the first-round strategy profile (1, 1) (followed by (1, 1) in Round
2). Therefore, given that player 1 is choosing e11 = 1, player 2 is strictly better
off deviating in Round 1 from e21 = 0 to e21 = 1, thus (1, 0; 1, 1) is not an SPE.
Since (1, 0; 1, 1) is not an SPE, (0, 1; 1, 1) is likewise not an SPE, by symmetry.
By Lemma 3.3, (0, 0; 1, 1) is not an SPE (because condition (3.10) implies violation
of (3.8)).
Finally, suppose that following the first-round strategy profile (0, 0), in the con-
tinuation game the strategy profile (0, 0) is played. Then player 1’s payoff is
EuS11(0, 0; 0, 0) = α
2v + α(1− α)αv + (1− α)α2v + (1− α)2α2v.
Player 1’s payoff from the first-round profile (0, 0) when it is followed by (1, 1) in
the second round is
EuS11(0, 0; 1, 1) = α
2v + α(1− α)βv + (1− α)α(βv − c) + (1− α)2(β2v − c).
By condition (3.2), β2v − c > α2v, and by condition (3.3), βv − c > αv (re-
call Assumption 1, or equivalently condition (3.9), implies (3.2) and (3.3)), so
EuS11(0, 0; 1, 1) > Eu
S
11(0, 0; 0, 0). Condition (3.10) implies that Eu
S
11(1, 0; 1, 1) >
EuS11(0, 0; 1, 1) (see the proof of Lemma 3.3). Therefore, Eu
S
11(1, 0; 1, 1) >
EuS11(0, 0; 0, 0): given that player 2 chooses e21 = 0 in the first round, player 1
is strictly better off deviating to e11 = 1 in the first round, given that (1, 1) is
an equilibrium in the continuation game under secrecy (under Assumption 1) by
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Corollary 3.1. Therefore, (0, 0; 0, 0) is not an SPE. This completes the argument
that the equilibrium, e∗GS1
= (1, 1; 1, 1), is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. [P2a] If conditions (3.11) and (3.13) hold, then condition
(3.6) is satisfied and Lemma 3.1 applies.
[P2b] If c ≤ β(β − α)v (see condition (3.11)), then the right-hand side inequality
of (3.8) is satisfied, since β(β − α)v < (β − α)[β + α(1− β)]v. If condition (3.12)
holds, then the left-hand side inequality of (3.8) is also satisfied, because of (112).
So Lemma 3.3 applies.
[P2c] First note that condition (3.7) must be met for e∗GS1
= (1, 1; 1, 1) to arise.
Consequently, if (3.12) holds, then e∗GS1
6= (1, 1; 1, 1). Next, by Remark 3.2 in
section 4, GS(1,1) and GS(1,0) do not have any asymmetric equilibrium. Therefore,
(1, 1; 1, 0), (1, 1; 0, 1), (1, 0; 1, 0) and (1, 0; 0, 1) cannot be SPE. Finally, recall that
EuS11(1, 0; 1, 1) ≤ EuS11(0, 0; 1, 1) if and only if c ≥ (β−α)[β+α(1−β)](1−β)1−(β−α) v (with the re-
spective strict inequalities in the two relations exactly corresponding); see the proof
of Lemma 3.3. By (112), condition (3.12) implies that c > (β−α)[β+α(1−β)](1−β)
1−(β−α) v.
Thus, EuS11(1, 0; 1, 1) < Eu
S
11(0, 0; 1, 1), and (1, 0; 1, 1) cannot be an SPE.
[P2d] We are going to show that conditions (3.11)-(3.13) would rule out disclosure
equilibria that are inferior to the secrecy SPE (0, 0; 1, 1). Earlier in the text (before
the formal statement of the proposition), we have argued that if Assumption 1
holds, then the only strategy profiles under disclosure that are either inferior or
not directly comparable with e∗GS1
= (0, 0; 1, 1) (and that can possibly arise in
equilibrium) are (1, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), (0, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)), and (0, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)).
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The strategy profiles (1, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) and (0, 1; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) cannot be MPE
since these require (refer to Fig. 3.2):
y ≥ z, i.e., c ≥ (β − α)g(α, β)v, (113)
which is inconsistent with condition (3.13). On the other hand, (0, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a))
is an MPE if and only if, in GD1 (refer to Fig. 3.2):
x ≥ w
i.e., α2v + α(1− α)βv + (1− α)α(βv − c) + (1− α)2α2v
≥ βαv + β(1− α)βv + (1− β)α(βv − c) + (1− β)(1− α)α2v − c
i.e., − α(β − α)v − (1− α)(β − α)βv + α(β − α)(βv − c) + (β − α)(1− α)α2v + c ≥ 0
i.e., c ≥ (β − α)
[
(2β − α2)(1− α)− (β − α)]
1− α(β − α) v
i.e., c ≥ (β − α)h(α, β)v, (114)
where h(α, β) = (2β−α
2)(1−α)−(β−α)
1−α(β−α) . However, if condition (3.13) holds, then (114)
will not be met. Therefore, (0, 0; e˜12(a), e˜22(a)) cannot be an MPE. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. First recall the secrecy game with observable efforts GS1 .








22). Next, note that each player’s strategies in the simultaneous
contribution game GS are ΣSi = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, where the first and
second entries are the effort choices in the corresponding rounds and the second
entry is conditional upon the outcome in the first round being a “failure”. Let







22) that is an SPE in the game GS1 is an NE of GS if and only
























j ) ≥ ui(σ˜Si ;σS
∗
j ), ∀σ˜Si ∈ ΣSi ,
for i = 1, 2, i 6= j. We make the following observations.
Remark .3. ui(0, 1;σSj ) > ui(1, 0;σ
S
j ) for any σ
S
j ∈ ΣSj , i = 1, 2, j 6= i, and for
any c.






j ) = p(ei1)θv − cei1 + (1− p(ei1))[p(ei2)θv − cei2],
where θ is player j’s overall probability of success with strategy σSj . We see that
ui(0, 1;σ
S
j ) = αθv+ (1−α)[βθv− c] and ui(1, 0;σSj ) = βθv− c+ (1− β)αθv, thus
ui(0, 1;σ
S
j )− ui(1, 0;σSj ) = αc > 0 for any c. ||
Remark .4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then ui(0, 1;σSj ) > ui(0, 0;σ
S
j ) for
any σSj ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)}, i = 1, 2, j 6= i, and for any c.
We see that ui(0, 1;σ
S
j ) = αθv+(1−α)[βθv−c] and ui(0, 0;σSj ) = αθv+(1−α)αθv,
thus ui(0, 1;σ
S
j )− ui(0, 0;σSj ) = (1− α)[θ(β − α)v − c]. By Assumption 1, β(β −
α)v ≥ c. If σSj ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)}, then θ > β, so (1 − α)[θ(β − α)v − c] > 0.
||
Now rewrite any strategy profile σGS of GS as efforts to be chosen by the players






22). Then Remarks .3 and
.4, respectively, imply the following.
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Corollary .2. When efforts are not observable under secrecy, e∗GS 6= (1, 1; 0, 1),
e∗GS 6= (1, 1; 0, 0), e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 0, 1), e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 0, 0), e∗GS 6= (1, 1; 1, 0), e∗GS 6=
(0, 1; 1, 0), and e∗GS 6= (0, 1; 0, 0).
Corollary .3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. When efforts are not observ-
able under secrecy, e∗GS 6= (0, 1; 0, 1), e∗GS 6= (0, 0; 0, 1), e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 1, 0), e∗GS 6=
(1, 0; 0, 0), and e∗GS 6= (0, 0; 1, 0).
Now we analyze how non-observability of efforts affects parts [P2b] and [P2c] of
Proposition 3.2. (We already explained in the text that parts [P2a] and [P2d]
would continue to hold when efforts are not observable.) Consider part [P2b]: for
e∗GS = (0, 0; 1, 1), it must be that σ
∗
GS = (0, 1; 0, 1), i.e., ui(0, 1; 0, 1) ≥ ui(σSi ; 0, 1)
for any σSi ∈ ΣSi , i = 1, 2. By Remarks .3 and .4, this is true for σSi ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 0)}.
This holds for σSi = (1, 1) as well; to see this, note that
u1(1, 1; 0, 1)− u1(0, 1; 0, 1) = {βθv − c+ (1− β)[βθv − c]} − {αθv + (1− α)[βθv − c]}
= (β − α)(1− β)[α+ (1− α)β]v − [1− (β − α)]c
= (β − α)(1− β)[β + α(1− β)]v − [1− (β − α)]c. (115)
Given (112), if condition (3.12) of Proposition 3.2 holds, then (115) is negative.
Therefore, e∗GS = (0, 0; 1, 1).
Next, consider part [P2c] of Proposition 3.2. By Corollaries .2 and .3, e∗GS 6=
(1, 1; 1, 0), e∗GS 6= (1, 1; 0, 1), e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 1, 0), e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 0, 1), e∗GS 6= (0, 1; 1, 0),
and e∗GS 6= (0, 1; 0, 1). Above we established that (115) is negative. This implies
σ∗GS 6= (1, 1; 0, 1), and by symmetry, σ∗GS 6= (0, 1; 1, 1). Therefore, e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 1, 1)
and e∗GS 6= (0, 1; 1, 1).
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Finally, note that
u1(1, 1; 1, 1)− u1(0, 1; 1, 1) = {βθv − c+ (1− β)[βθv − c]} − {αθv + (1− α)[βθv − c]}
= (β − α)(1− β)[β + β(1− β)]v − [1− (β − α)]c
= (β − α)(1− β)(2β − β2)v − [1− (β − α)]c. (116)
If (3.12) holds, then (116) is less than zero, and σ∗GS 6= (1, 1; 1, 1), that is,
e∗GS 6= (1, 1; 1, 1). Therefore, Proposition 3.2 continues to hold when efforts are
not observable.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Part [P1a] continues to hold under unobservable efforts,
as noted in the text. Therefore, the remaining task is to evaluate how non-
observability of efforts affects part [P1b] of Proposition 3.1, that is, to establish
uniqueness of (1, 1; 1, 1).
First note that (1, 1; 1, 1) is unique given the conditions in Proposition 3.1, if and
only if e∗GS = (1, 1; 1, 1), e
∗
GS 6= (0, 1; 1, 1), e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 1, 1), e∗GS 6= (0, 0; 1, 1),
and e∗GS 6= (0, 0; 0, 0), i.e., σ∗GS = (1, 1; 1, 1), σ∗GS 6= (0, 1; 1, 1), σ∗GS 6= (1, 1; 0, 1),
σ∗GS 6= (0, 1; 0, 1) and σ∗GS 6= (0, 0; 0, 0), respectively. The remaining eleven effort
profiles are ruled out by Corollaries .2 and .3 (e∗GS 6= (1, 0; 0, 0) is common to both
corollaries).
By Remarks .3 and .4, we know that ui(0, 1; 1, 1) > ui(σ
S
i ; 1, 1) for σ
S
i ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 0)}.
Moreover, by condition (3.10) in Proposition 3.1, u1(1, 1; 1, 1)− u1(0, 1; 1, 1) given
in (116) is greater than zero (where (112) is used). Therefore, e∗GS = (1, 1; 1, 1).
Now consider the strategies σGS = (0, 1; 0, 1). By condition (3.10) of Proposition
3.1, (115) is greater than zero. Therefore, σ∗GS 6= (0, 1; 0, 1). Moreover, (116) is
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greater than zero, by condition (3.10) of Proposition 3.1 (where condition (112) is
used). Therefore, σ∗GS 6= (0, 1; 1, 1), and by symmetry, σ∗GS 6= (1, 1; 0, 1).
Finally, consider σGS = (0, 0; 0, 0). For these strategies to be an NE of GS, it must
be that, given α, β, and v, all of the following three conditions hold:
ui(1, 1; 0, 0)− ui(0, 0; 0, 0) = {βθv − c+ (1− β)[βθv − c]} − {αθv + (1− α)αθv}
= [(2− β)βv − (2− α)αv](α + (1− α)α)− (2− β)c
≤ 0
i.e.,
[(2− β)β − (2− α)α](α + (1− α)α)
(2− β) v ≤ c,
ui(1, 0; 0, 0)− ui(0, 0; 0, 0) = {βθv − c+ (1− β)αθv} − {αθv + (1− α)αθv}
= (β − α)(1− α)θv − c
≤ 0
i.e., (β − α)(1− α)[α + (1− α)α]v ≤ c,
and ui(0, 1; 0, 0)− ui(0, 0; 0, 0) = {αθv + (1− α)[βθv − c]} − {αθv + (1− α)αθv}
= (1− α)[(β − α)θv − c]
≤ 0
i.e., (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v ≤ c.
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Clearly, (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v > (β − α)(1− α)[α + (1− α)α]v, and
(β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v − [(2− β)β − (2− α)α](α + (1− α)α)
(2− β) v
=
[(2− β)(β − α)− (2− β)β + (2− α)α](2− α)αv
(2− β)
=
[−(2− β)α + (2− α)α](2− α)αv
(2− β)
=
(β − α)α2(2− α)v
(2− β) > 0.
Therefore, σ∗GS = (0, 0; 0, 0) if and only if
c ≥ max{ [(2− β)β − (2− α)α](α + (1− α)α)
(2− β) v, (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v}
= (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v,
i.e., σ∗GS 6= (0, 0; 0, 0) if and only if
c < (β − α)[α + (1− α)α]v. 
